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The idea of this volume was born in the framework of an international seminar in 
September 2019 at Helsinki University to celebrate the ILO centenary. The seminar 
discussed the role of the ILO in the development of the social dimension of global-
ization from several perspectives. Our aim is to broaden the understanding of the 
role and relevance of the ILO today, develop new points of view and demonstrate 
how much we can learn from the past of this uniquely structured organization.
The preparation of this book has taken place under the exceptional circumstances 
of the Covid-19 pandemic and the international spread of riots. Questions of legal 
change, justice and fairer globalization that we took on our agenda have become an 
increasingly pressing challenge of our time. However, this rather highlights than 
undermines the essence of the mission of the ILO and makes it all the more impor-
tant to continue a discourse of labour protection in the context of economic 
globalization.
We are grateful to the authors from three different continents for their willing-
ness to contribute to this volume and to a number of people for their invaluable help 
with the preparation of the book. In particular, Le Bao Ngoc Pham, Christopher 
Goddard and Minna Hjort have provided assistance to this project.
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1  Introduction
At the turn of the century, globalization was a hot topic. Many took part in demon-
strations for—or against—it. For some, globalization was a logical continuance of 
increasing production efficiency and of a global division of labour. Others felt that 
globalization only served the needs of capital and production and ignored people 
and their needs.
The ILO World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization reached 
a consensus to add to the UN Millennium Goals the concept of “decent work”, 
which has been part of the Sustainable Development Goals from the start. Balanced 
development requires the inclusion of people and human needs.
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How did it all happen? This is how I, as someone who was involved in the pro-
cess, understand and remember it. This is not an academic study or a personal mem-
oir but rather my personal perspective on what factors and circumstances led to the 
emergence of a new attitude towards globalization and, moving forward, to the 
emergence of the idea of sustainable development. This is also a statement about the 
benefits and risks of globalization in the contemporary world and in these 
coronavirus- ridden times.1
2  The Historical Conflict Between Capital and Labour
2.1  The Trade Union Movement as a Proponent 
of Employee Benefits
The history of the trade union movement is different from country to country, but 
usually it has been part of or occurred in parallel with a political labour movement. 
Therefore, it shares the ideals of democracy, human rights and rule of law. Similarly, 
from early on, the trade union movement has valued international collaboration. 
Technological development led to the emergence of/need for industrial labour; the 
trade union movement arose from the need to address poor working conditions.
This was the fundamental nature of the trade union movement at the time the 
ILO World Commission was established, and indeed remains so to this day. When 
work and working environments change, new challenges are posed to employees 
and thereby to the trade union movement. Certain problems cannot be solved in 
negotiations between employer and employee, but require broader, structural solu-
tions. This calls for extensive collaboration across different areas of society.
The World Commission also adopted this broad-based approach. Its proposals 
extend beyond the original focus of work-related issues. This was deliberate. Juan 
Somavia, then Director-General of the ILO, was closely connected to the World 
Commission, and shared our thinking,2 through the founding letter of the World 
Commission as well as through the selection of its members.
My co-chair, Benjamin William Mkapa, and I strove to paint an optimistic pic-
ture of opportunities for change, even though we did not have a mandate or even a 
desire to present a proposal outside the ILO. However, I knew, of course, that the 
issue had been broadly discussed within the UN family. The hopes and desires for 
change turned out to be tremendous. This is how we, the co-chairs of the ILO World 
Commission, phrased it: “Our proposals are ambitious but feasible. We are certain 
that a better world is possible.”3
1 This article is a translation from Finnish into English.
2 ILO (1999).
3 World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization (2004), p. ix.
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2.2  Controversial Tripartism
It is probably worthwhile to underline that this awakening came early, compared to 
many other national developments in the history of political and professional labour 
movements.
When the ILO was established in 1919, the rights of workers and their structur-
ally weaker contractual status were on the table. Trade unions were the natural 
answer. However, it was also clear that improving the status of employees is only 
possible in a democratic state that recognises the equal rights of all individuals. Rule 
of law and good governance also protect the status of workers. A state has a general 
obligation to protect its people, and therefore all employees.
Recently, the triangle—employers, employees, the government—as contractual 
parties has gained less attention. However, in exceptional times, employers also 
seem to be more willing to adopt a more positive approach to the tripartite system. 
The trade union movement is needed to bring a nation together. Tripartism was also 
a central philosophy in the rebuilding of Europe after the Second World War and 
during the financial crises early in the millennium. Currently, we are seeing signs of 
this during the coronavirus epidemic of 2020.
Throughout the decades, the ILO has shown interest in tripartism to a varying 
degree. It gained increasing importance in the 1960s and came back into focus at the 
turn of the millennium. Strong nation states are also needed to keep globalization 
in check.
3  Global Responsibility and Solidarity
The World Commission was not operating alone or in a void. For many, the 
Millennium Development Goals, set by the UN in 2000, represented the first state-
ment in favour of global social justice.4 The Goals are not a legally binding commit-
ment but, rather, a political commitment. The member states took them quite 
seriously, though. Developing countries in particular considered them a major win. 
They could have been implemented more quickly but the UN monitored them 
closely and addressed some of their shortcomings.
I followed this process closely, because the Millennium Summit of September 
2000 was jointly presided over by Finland and the exiting Presidency of the UN 
General Assembly, Namibia. My country was about to take over. It is customary in 
the UN that important summits are co-chaired by representatives of North and 
South, as was the case in 2000.
I had been elected President of Finland in our March elections, and therefore co- 
chaired the historic meeting with President Sam Nujoma of Namibia. Former Prime 
4 Resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly: United Nations Millennium Declaration (A/
RES/55/2).
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Minister Harri Holkeri assumed the role of President of the United Nations General 
Assembly during Finland’s one-year presidency. I knew him well. When I was a 
minister for the first time, it was in the Holkeri government of the 1980s. Looking 
back, the Millennium Development Goals were a great achievement. Poverty—
extreme poverty in particular—declined. Disparities of wealth continued to grow, 
however.
Progress was made in healthcare: the number of women and children dying dur-
ing childbirth shrank significantly, and the infant mortality rate declined dramati-
cally. Girls’ and women’s health still lagged behind that of men and boys. Many 
more girls and boys gained access to primary education, but the quality of education 
failed to meet expectations. Girls’ education was too often interrupted by family 
obligations.
Plans were made to address social injustice through development cooperation. In 
the Monterrey Consensus, the countries involved endorsed giving at least 0.7% of 
their GNI in official development assistance, in which education and healthcare 
would play a central role in tackling extreme poverty and hunger. Many felt an 
urgency to remove injustice from the prevailing economic system. The role of 
women needed to be improved.5
The key message of the Millennium Development Goals was global solidarity; 
yet, they did not mention the world’s most common source of income: work. There 
was also no reference to social security. From this point of view, too, the Report of 
the World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization was a welcome 
addition.
4  Globalization: A Multifaceted Challenge 
and an Opportunity
4.1  Globalization Changed the Way We Work
The emergence of an international division of labour was a lengthy process. At the 
turn of the millennium, different parts of the world witnessed it differently. Generally 
speaking, there was a division between industrial countries and developing coun-
tries—between North and South. A closer look showed that there were winners and 
losers in both groups. There were also winners and losers within individual countries.
In Europe and North America, globalization was largely considered to involve a 
division of labour related to increasing production efficiency. The invention and use 
of new technology after the Second World War strengthened opportunities—and the 
need—for an international division of labour. In a way, information technology 





Globalization did, however, give poor countries a new opportunity to narrow 
down the income gap and not just to the traditionally poorer countries of the global 
South but also to industrial countries with a smaller economy—such as my own 
country, Finland. We remained a well-educated and agile country that was able to 
create such phenomena as Nokia. It can be said that Finland’s Linus Torvalds cre-
ated an operating system that now runs a large part of the internet. Globalization 
appears to provide unprecedented opportunities for economic growth, not to men-
tion improved health and wellbeing.
In Africa, Asia and Latin America, globalization is typically considered part of 
the same continuum as colonialism. The opinions of the members of the World 
Commission reflected these diverse views. The Millennium Development Goals 
were seen as the beginning of global compensation programmes. The Monterrey 
Financing for Development conference, whose goal was to increase official devel-
opment assistance from 0.7% of GNI, had boosted faith in the changes under way. 
The Asian members of the World Commission were more optimistic than other 
developing countries about being able to close the divide between them and 
European countries and the USA by means of globalization. Upon closer inspec-
tion, we see that most new investments were made in the two largest Asian coun-
tries: China and India.
What the workers and labour representatives of different countries had in com-
mon was a concern that people and their needs would be sidelined by globalization. 
Demonstrations against globalization grew larger. People opposed the exportation 
of jobs to developing countries. Multinational enterprises in particular were seen as 
the culprits. At the same time, governments were blamed for not protecting their 
citizens against unemployment. The international finance world was blamed for 
supporting large corporations.
In a market economy, governments had limited possibilities to protect jobs, how-
ever. They mostly encouraged companies to retrain former employees who had been 
left jobless because of globalization. However, the training and reassignment of 
unemployed people was insufficient. Those with less education lost jobs, and any 
new jobs were given to younger people with a higher education. In the “old” indus-
trial countries, too, society became polarised into proponents of and opponents to 
globalization. 
Let’s take a practical example: 
In February 1997, the French car manufacturer Renault decided to close its plant in 
Vilvoorde, Belgium. After making the decision to cease manufacturing, Renault announced 
it publicly without first informing or consulting its European Works Council. The announce-
ment was followed by demonstrations and a strike that took place simultaneously in 
Belgium, France and Spain, of which the latter was to be the new home of the former 
Vilvoorde operations. The case was brought to court in both Belgium and France. This did 
not stop Renault from closing down its Vilvoorde plant, and most of the employees lost 
their jobs.6
6 For a discussion of the many legal dimensions and legal procedures related to the case, see 
Liukkunen (2005), p. 20.
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The European Union, alongside many other international organisations and govern-
ments, still had faith in managed globalization.
Thus, in a way, the tripartite principle behind establishment of the World 
Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization was a natural consequence 
in addressing the polarising political situation at the time.
4.2  Multinational Corporations: Aspirations of Autonomy
Multinational corporations grew rapidly. Their size was a challenge not just for the 
trade union movement but also for governments. They adopted a discourse accord-
ing to which multinational corporations had no home base. They seemed to want to 
form an independent community of their own, outside the jurisdiction of any coun-
try. The role of nation states as defenders of their people became weaker.
At the same time, large corporations in particular started to streamline operations 
by outsourcing non-core functions, such as cleaning and transportation, to formally 
independent operators. In reality, these subcontractors did not become independent 
entrepreneurs but subcontractors who were completely dependent on the head com-
pany. Their status was similar to that of employees, but health and safety rules and 
social security did not apply to them.
Furthermore, particularly in developing countries, many workers were excluded 
from employment calculations. Many agricultural workers belonged to this group. 
They did not own the land they were cultivating, yet they were not counted among 
the employees of the landowner. Most of these workers came from developing 
countries but, because of their status, they were not eligible to take part in any of the 
training or support programmes provided in the development cooperation agree-
ment. Thus, these people were not covered by employee health and safety or job 
security schemes, nor were they eligible to receive entrepreneur benefits.
In many developing countries, the share of such informal work was, and still is, 
significant. There are many reasons for this phenomenon: the remnants of colonial-
ism, the legal underdevelopment of ownership, women’s limited rights to own land, 
and so forth. Informal work was keeping people alive but at great risk.
These are the reasons why we in the World Commission considered it absolutely 
necessary to address both the issues and the solutions much more broadly than 
labour legislation would have permitted. We considered it a political rather than a 
legal question.
4.3  A Polarised World
The world had become polarised in many ways. The UN Millennium Development 
Goals set at the turn of the millennium remain founded on global solidarity and 
justice. They can also be seen as an attempt to mitigate the divide created by 
T. Halonen
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globalization between the wealthy global North and the poor South. They did not, 
however, highlight the fact that poverty could also be found in the industrial North. 
Unemployment was rising, and the standard of living was declining in many previ-
ously wealthy areas. People lost faith in the future. While awareness of the help 
needed in the poor global South was increasing, unemployed industrial workers did 
not consider themselves oppressors of the South. A breeding ground for political 
extremism and populism was created.
The international sentiment was already getting bleaker. On 11 September 2001, 
Al Qaida destroyed the twin towers of the World Trade Center. Hundreds of people 
died in a matter of minutes. The USA declared war on terrorism. Fear and deep 
mistrust spread across the world. It seemed unlikely that any new international trea-
ties could be concluded.
The Millennium Development Goals were a diplomatic surprise of sorts. They 
raised important issues ranging from poverty to health and education. They did not, 
however, mention work as a source of wellbeing. The Millennium Declaration was 
agreed upon at the UN relatively quickly but resources for its implementation were 
lacking. Concrete follow-up was also needed.
4.4  The World Commission Was Also Welcomed by 
the UN Family
In this polarised situation, the ILO decided to establish a World Commission to 
investigate the social dimension of globalization.7 It was a rather bold attempt to 
bring a highly split group—all with good arguments—to the same table. The World 
Commission, set up in 2002, was welcomed into the UN family: not to the UN itself 
but to the ILO, its agency organisation in Geneva.
The chairs and members of the World Commission formed a diverse group from 
around the world. The aim was to guarantee that the World Commission would have 
broad-based expertise on the many aspects of globalization. The members repre-
sented employers, trade unions, governments, academia and civil society, including 
the women’s rights and indigenous peoples’ movements.
Its diversity was both a blessing and a challenge. We spent a significant share of 
the relatively limited time we were given in building trust between different parties. 
This so-called honeymoon period was relatively successful. In my opinion, every-
one was interested in each other’s perspectives. Where else could the CEO of a large 
Japanese corporation have had reason or the time to learn about the experiences of 
a South African freedom fighter, or a European statesman ask a nurse working with 
the indigenous peoples of the Philippines for their opinion on how globalization was 
affecting people’s living conditions?
7 ILO (2004a).
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More attention was paid to differences between the lives of women and men, but 
it remained a minor theme in the talks, despite the participation of many active 
women and informed men. The strong and vivid presentations given by Ruth 
Cardoso and Hernando de Soto from Latin America have stuck in my mind. Gender 
equality issues were being raised across the world, but this was less obvious in the 
World Commission than in some other UN events. In the final version of the text of 
the Commission report, however, equality featured quite strongly.
We were lucky to have an excellent secretariat that had already worked on defin-
ing our scope within the ILO. The members of the World Commission included 
economic policy experts such as Joseph Stiglitz and Hernando de Soto, who, 
together with Giuliano Amato, the former prime minister of Italy, and German poli-
tician Ernst Ulrich von Weizsäcker, joined forces to take an in-depth look at the 
relationship between economic development and democracy.
China was represented by Lu Mai who comes from a research institute and was 
a very active participant. We also visited China. The World Commission marked the 
beginning of long-term collaboration between myself and several other members, 
including Valentina Matvienko from Russia, who was then the Mayor of St. 
Petersburg. The members of the World Commission were not only top experts but 
also charming personalities.
I had not met my co-chair, Benjamin William Mkapa from Tanzania, before. 
After spending hours with him and the Secretariat planning future action and dis-
cussing what might be realistic steps to take, we became close. Some of the mem-
bers of the World Commission were well-known and had long careers, while for 
others, their careers were just about to take off. All in all, I would like to say that 
cooperation between the members of the World Commission left me with an excel-
lent impression of competence and cooperation, which I benefited from on many 
later occasions. The ILO’s Director-General, Juan Somavia, had built a solid 
foundation.
Once, at a World Commission summit, I attempted to sum up the different view-
points of the participants. I likened globalization to a train that runs on its own 
tracks, fuelled by its own power. Industrial countries were seated in first class, hav-
ing purchased tickets with other people’s money. Asians were sitting on hard seats 
in third class. And Africans were still waiting at the station, wondering whether they 
should get on the train or not. Victoria Tauli-Corpuz, who represented the indige-
nous peoples of the Philippines, said it seemed to her that the train was running on 




5  Proposals of the World Commission
The practical near-future objective of the World Commission was to add decent 
work and employment to the ILO principles, the UN Millennium Development 
Goals and, possibly, the goals of other international organisations. The same aim 
was also to be included in government programmes.
The World Commission’s suggestions for fair globalization involved several lev-
els. The most comprehensive aim was to change the fundamental nature of global-
ization: to move away from narrow, production-centric thinking towards a 
broad-based approach attentive to the needs of the people. In addition to the econ-
omy, democracy, human rights and good governance must be promoted.
Corporations and other economic actors must abide by these rules just like every-
one else. The most radical idea of the World Commission was to incorporate 
employment and the democratisation of labour into a more socially just world. We 
were of the opinion that globalization had taken a wrong turn because it materi-
alised people. People want to earn a living and social independence through work-
ing: doing something that others consider to have exchange value. Thus, work is 
important not only because it provides a livelihood but because it integrates people 
in society. To put it conversely, working life is part of a democratic society where all 
the same laws apply as elsewhere in society.
Respect for human rights in working life was an integral element of ILO core 
labour standards.8 This means that forced and child labour are banned. All people 
must have the same human rights, including freedom of expression and freedom of 
association. Workers must have the same human rights inside and outside their 
workplaces. Thus, an employer’s power over an employee is not unlimited. The 
World Commission viewed core labour standards and respect therefor as important. 
Moreover, social dialogue is needed. The right to organise and collective bargaining 
are core elements of social dialogue.
I have sometimes been asked why we chose the phrase “decent work”. We did 
not want to use the word “good” because of its connotations. The terms “good job” 
and “good life” did not convey what we wanted. Decent means that we are not quite 
there yet but very close; and “decent” is also a synonym for “fair”. It was a realistic 
objective that we could build on. It is a global demand. It must be true everywhere. 
I remember the ILO Secretary-General, Juan Somavia, thinking along the same 
lines even before that. However, I was not involved in the process at that point.
The work of the World Commission was marked by an optimistic view of peo-
ple’s ability to control the world and globalization. We believed that globalization 
8 See ILO, Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. Adopted by the International 
Labour Conference, 86th Session, Geneva, 18 June 1998 (Annex revised 15 June 2010). The 
Declaration underlines four core labour standards, namely freedom of association and the effective 
recognition of the right to collective bargaining, the elimination of all forms of forced or compul-
sory labour, the effective abolition of child labour, and the elimination of discrimination in respect 
of employment and occupation.
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would increase the efficiency of production, benefit individuals and societies alike 
and integrate humanity in a way that would make conflicts and wars less likely.
6  Globalization Management Starts with a Strong State 
and Continues with International Collaboration
Many globalization scholars have theorised that nation states would become less 
important as globalization gains strength. This would probably be the case if the 
market economy had developed freely under globalization. Such a development 
would probably not attend to human needs and desires.
The World Commission had faith in the nation state because, at the moment, the 
state is the largest unit that people can impact. Therefore—without underestimating 
international organisations—we should try to make states stronger, instead of wish-
ing them to grow weaker. They still constitute the best protection for the people. 
However, citizens should be more aware of what their representatives do in interna-
tional forums.
In addition to globalization itself, the World Commission wanted to draw strong 
focus on attempts by financial market operators to impact the way countries can 
control the detrimental effects of globalization. For example, developing countries 
were pressured to allow movement of investments and capital as freely as possible, 
even though it was known that the rapid liberalisation of finance had proved highly 
destabilising to economic policymaking in a number of nations from Latin America 
to East Asia. The report of the World Commission states that developing countries 
should be allowed to take a cautious approach to freeing up movements of capital.9 
World trade rules hindered this type of selective protection or strategic promotion of 
domestic industries that played a part in the economic development of successful 
industrialised countries in Europe, North America and Asia. Some of these propos-
als were adopted.
Thus, international organisations should democratise their own rules and improve 
the efficiency of their own operations and mutual cooperation. The UN reform has 
been ongoing during the term of every UN Secretary-General of this millennium. It 
takes a long time. There should also be closer cooperation between the specialised 
agencies of the UN. According to the World Commission, special attention must be 
paid to coordination or collaboration between the UN and organisations close to it, 
such as Bretton Woods institutions.10
The international community continued to have the same kind of optimism as 
when the Millennium Development Goals were set. They believed that comprehen-
sive management of global economic policy could be achieved, even though nega-
tive phenomena such as the accumulation of wealth, polarisation and the crisis of 




financial capitalism were present. The World Commission’s idea of a comprehen-
sive and multipolar but controllable globalization lives on.
The Millennium Development Goals made few references to the environment. 
The report of the World Commission did not highlight environmental impacts in any 
major way. It was not until the Sustainable Development Goals—the Rio Summit11 
and Agenda 203012—that nature and the environment, gender equality and the status 
of women were brought to the fore.
7  Did the World Commission’s Objectives Change 
the World?
The report of the World Commission sparked discussion around the world.13 Even 
during the working stage, the Commission made its work visible not only through 
its diverse membership but also through its meetings and visits around the world. 
This was effective, albeit arduous.
The ILO approved the recommendations of the report, which was submitted to 
its Governing Body and the International Labour Conference (ILC) in 2004.14 Also 
the Director-General of the ILO submitted his proposals to the ILC for a strategic 
response to the World Commission’s recommendations, covering some of the key 
fields of work of the ILO: national policies to address globalization, decent work in 
the global production system, growth, investment and employment, a socio- 
economic floor, international migration, the international labour standard system, 
and the role of tripartism.15
Today, fair globalisation is one of the mainstream strategies of the ILO addressed 
in its programmes across the world.16
Decent work was added to the Millenium Development Goals in 2005.17 It has 
been part of the Sustainable Development Goals from the start.
11 See Resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly on 27 July 2012: The future we want (A/
RES/66/288).
12 See Resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly on 25 September 2015: Transforming our 
world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (A/RES/70/1).
13 ILO (n.d.-a), ILO (2004b); Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 2 December 2004: 
A fair globalization: creating opportunities for all – report of the World Commission on the Social 
Dimension of Globalization (A/RES/59/57).
14 ILO (2004c).
15 ILO (2004d).
16 See, for example, ILO (n.d.-b, n.d.-c). See also ILO Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair 
Globalization. Adopted by the International Labour Conference, 97th Session, Geneva, 10 
June 2008.
17 Resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly on 16 September 2005: 2005 World Summit 
outcome (A/RES/60/1), para 47.
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Decent work has featured widely in different UN programmes.18 I have myself 
twice been part of UNCTAD reform processes. In addition, the IMF has, to some 
extent, included the recommendations of the World Commission in its policies.19
8  Epilogue or: What’s Next, Globalization?
Globalization evolved into an effort to increase production efficiency. It was the 
next step of internationalization and the international division of labour. Without a 
doubt, globalization has in many ways been a great economic success; it has also 
played a part in tackling poverty. During the course of its evolution, globalization 
has become more cost efficient but also increasingly vulnerable. Furthermore, it has 
not proven to be as independent or omnipotent as its most fervent fans have led us 
to believe, because even a multinational corporation operates on national territory or 
territories. Nation states tend not be controlled by individual companies, even 
though the financial—and thereby political—influence of multinational corpora-
tions has greatly increased. It takes time to worm one’s way into a societal power 
structure. To assume political power, multinational companies can use semi- 
democratic means and pressure decision-makers to give them tax benefits by argu-
ing that these would boost employment or otherwise benefit voters. We have learned 
from court cases around the world that heads of state, government leaders and offi-
cials sometimes take bribes.
The free movement of goods and services is a prerequisite for free trade. 
Multinational companies would not be able to operate without bilateral or multilat-
eral cooperation between governments. In most nation states, citizens have some 
influence over the choice of the country’s decision-makers. This requires that they 
believe that they can benefit from the issues that their elected leader or leaders are 
lobbying for. This should also be the case with free trade and globalization.
Globalization will not disappear, and nor will nation states. Therefore, their 
mutual relationship must be rebuilt in a more sustainable way. A more humane but 
also economically more efficient form of globalization is only possible with the 
support of strong and democratic nation states that are open to international 
collaboration.
People desire financial wellbeing and social justice; that is the kind of develop-
ment they are looking for. At the same time as the ILO World Commission was 
working on its report, the UN Millennium Development Goals were already being 
implemented. The action programme, which emphasised social justice, was 
launched in 2004. In 2015, the Sustainable Development Goals were approved and 
they contain the same principles as the programme, with an added demand for 
18 See, for example, UN Women (n.d.) and UNDP (n.d.).
19 Jenkins et al. (2007), paras 89 and 97.
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environmental welfare.20 The link between these factors is logical and straightfor-
ward but, with so many of them to address, implementing changes is increasingly 
difficult. Furthermore, employment has been awarded relatively little attention in 
the programme-setting for sustainable development even though unemployment or 
fears of unemployment are among the key reasons behind the rise of populism.
The report of the ILO World Commission on the Social Dimension of 
Globalization covers a lot more than just decent work and employment. Globalization 
as a philosophy is in need of comprehensive reform. Sustainable development is 
founded on human rights, democracy and rule of law: they build trust between peo-
ple. This trust must extend to globalization. The World Bank in particular along 
with the IMF appears to have come to realise the significance of rule-based interna-
tional collaboration. As early as the financial crisis of 2008, governments were 
forced to pause and consider the warning given by the World Commission regarding 
the risks of unregulated international finance capital.
The problems that the European Union has faced with the single European cur-
rency have starkly demonstrated the significance of collaboration and honesty—or 
rather the consequences of a lack thereof. Member States have committed to a sin-
gle currency but hesitate to observe a common monetary and financial policy with-
out legally binding rules. This is one of the topics addressed by the Nobel-prize 
winning Joseph Stiglitz in this volume.21
The direction in which the WTO has developed in the 2000s is a stark reminder 
of the fundamental problem related to globalization, or rather the market economy. 
Even if capital and production dictated these rules, any mutually-agreed rules aim-
ing to promote change would be overrun by a struggle for the survival of the fittest. 
The World Trade Organization getting stuck in court is a great example: 
The crisis of the WTO’s dispute settlement system began on 10 December 2019, when the 
term of two of the remaining three Appellate Body members expired. As the United States 
refused to initiate the selection process and appoint new members to the organization’s 
Appellate Body, the Members were unable to reach a consensus to fill the vacant posi-
tions.22 With only one member in office, the Appellate Body has become dysfunctional and 
is unable to hear new appeals. The blockade of the Appellate Body has paralyzed the two-
tiered dispute settlement system in the WTO. Despite the members’ attempts to restore a 
fully functioning Appellate Body, the impasse remained unresolved.23
20 Resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly on 25 September 2015: Transforming our 
world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (A/RES/70/1).
21 See Stiglitz (2020).
22 See WTO (2020) Minutes of Meeting of the General Council, Geneva, 9–10 December 2019, 
pp. 12–33.
23 See WTO (2020) Minutes of Meeting of the Dispute Settlement Body, Geneva, 27 January 2020, 
pp. 14–19.
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8.1  The Future of Labour
The world and, with it, the world of labour have changed rapidly since the report of 
the ILO World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization was pub-
lished. The report of the ILO Global Commission on the Future of Work, titled 
“Work for a brighter future”, is a statement on this topic. It does not deny the future 
existence of globalization but requires that social justice be observed in its 
implementation.
Furthermore, people want to feel useful. Therefore, demands for livelihood or, 
for example, a universal basic income—which has gained popularity in the Nordic 
countries in particular—were not the only focus; rather, the significance of people 
was. Work is gaining increasing importance. For example, youth surveys from 
Finland point to a similar trend, showing that young people want to do work that 
matters and that they are not merely motivated by the opportunity to earn money.
In order to make this dream a reality, the ILO Global Commission on the Future 
of Work suggests that we invest in people not only through education but also 
through work and work-related institutions. In other words, labour must have an 
economic, humane and environmental impact. Future society will be increasingly 
information-based, and this requires the creation of opportunities for life-long 
learning.
8.2  What Can We Learn from the Coronavirus 
(COVID-19) Epidemic?
As I am writing this in April 2020, we do not yet know what returning to so-called 
“normal” will look like once the epidemic is over. However, we already know that 
this epidemic has had an unexpectedly significant impact on people’s health and 
wellbeing.
Tackling the coronavirus has required both a national and an international effort. 
Currently, the infection rate is approximately 3.1 million, and the death toll is 
roughly 223 thousand.24 The virus does not recognise national or other borders. For 
comparison, a total of 2.7 million people die from work-related reasons each year.
This tiny little virus turned our world upside down in what seemed like seconds: 
it emptied our calendars, closed our borders and made us change our behaviour both 
voluntarily and by coercion.
In addition to human suffering, the corona epidemic sparked a dire economic 
downturn. We are yet to learn its scope. The virus also forced people to consider the 
production-related, economic and humane consequences of globalization.
We realised how dependent we are on each other. We missed our families and 




around other people at school, at work, and in cafes, shops and parks. In other 
words, being human amongst other humans.
If there is a lesson to learn from COVID19 it is that our world is highly fragile.
The ways in which globalization developed, or was developed, resulted in a 
gigantic but extremely vulnerable system. An increasing number of people have 
come to observe how fragile the foundation of globalization is: a system driven by 
profit-making alone is simply not compatible with sustainable development. 
Economic production systems must be able to operate under common rules, not 
outside them.
I am an optimist. I believe that we want to change the world and that we will 
indeed change the world.
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1  Introduction
In a globalizing world, questions of working life remain central to most people.1 
These questions place at the centre individuals and their well-being, and they offer 
perspectives of vulnerabilities to society that voices of the globalization of economy 
tend to sideline. But while norm-setting for international economic relations has 
been considered central to global governance, norm-setting for the governance of 
the social dimension of globalization has been greeted with less enthusiasm. 
Recently, we have been witnessing times where the economic transformation has 
led to accumulating challenges to labour protection that have turned out 
increasingly difficult to overcome. The objectives of the oldest UN agency, the ILO, 
1 As the ILO Commission of the Social Dimension of Globalization stated in its report, globaliza-
tion affects people most directly through their work. See World Commission on the Social 
Dimension of Globalization (2004), p 64.
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have met obstacles that seem to flow directly from the way economic-political glo-
balization has been writing the regulatory agenda for states.2
The effects on the labour market of globalization of the world economy have 
been altering the role of traditional regulatory actors. In recent decades, states and 
social partners, the actors that work tripartitely in the ILO towards social justice and 
international labour standards, have confronted changes in their position that have 
made them weaker builders of a better working life. States’ ability as regulatory 
actors has diminished as increasingly often they face situations beyond the reach of 
their legislative powers. For the social partners, declining coverage of collective 
agreements has meant changes in their position and regulatory power. Consequently, 
the role of labour law has also been changing. With a strong emphasis on economic 
competition, the post-industrial era has come to mark a profound change in concep-
tions of the objectives and functions to be set for labour law.
States have started to respond to global economic competition with regulatory 
strategies that tend to highlight flexibility over labour protection. This trend has 
gained support from international financial institutions that have long argued for 
flexibility and deregulation of the labour market.3 It has been suggested that labour 
law models need an adjusted framework to enable more competitive flexibility. 
Simultaneously there are demands for more inclusive regulatory approaches as old 
categorizations in labour law are building divides that strongly impair working indi-
viduals.4 The idea of employment contract-centred labour law has come under 
mounting question.5 Increasingly, not only the regulatory model of labour law but 
also its foundations, in terms of substance, sphere and institutions, have been put to 
the test with new labour market realities.
Against this background, the ILO as an organization appears to have been given 
an almost impossible task to promote social justice and fairer globalization.6 A 
weaker commitment to workers’ human rights seems to be a direct consequence of 
a global legal environment where the power of states as regulatory actors is not the 
same as hitherto. As the ILO’s governance model is based on tripartism, efforts on 
the part of the organization have become more challenging also with the develop-
ment of the diminishing power of the social partners. We are witnessing both insti-
tutional and regulatory changes to the labour market that push forward 
decentralization of collective bargaining. The entire industrial relations infrastruc-
ture has been changing so that legal-institutional structures have been affected. 
Meanwhile, the transnational dimension of labour law has been evolving, providing 
a new normative basis for transnational industrial relations and cross-border collec-
tive contractual arrangements.
2 For a critical account of the imbalance from a labour law perspective, see Maupain (2013).
3 See, for example, Weiss (2013), p. 7.
4 Critically, see Langille (2019a).
5 See Davidov (2002).
6 See Maupain (2013).
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This article discusses some of the biggest challenges to the ILO caused by the 
altering scene of globalization and collective labour law regulation. It examines the 
recent transformation of collective bargaining regimes at national and transnational 
level and the consequences for normativities that characterize the relationship 
between labour law and the system of international labour standards. The transfor-
mation of labour law highlights developments that deserve attention when we con-
sider the role of the ILO at the beginning of its second centenary.
2  The Labour Question
Globalization and the changing nature of work and work organization have chal-
lenged national industrial relations systems and diminished the power of social part-
ners. Ongoing development has strongly affected collective bargaining regimes and 
altered their nature. At the same time, the traditional regulatory approaches of 
labour law have been challenged even more broadly, as managing changes in work-
ing life—caused, inter alia, by globalization, migration, an ageing workforce, 
urbanization, platformization, digitalization, climate change, and, most recently, the 
covid-19 pandemic—poses a central dilemma to national systems that were origi-
nally built for a more stable labour market. Importantly, the interplay between 
industrial relations and collective bargaining is undergoing complex change.7
Managing changes in working life caused by globalization poses a central chal-
lenge to labour law.8 Protecting workers has become more difficult in a globalized 
world but there appears to be something even more fundamental in this dilemma: it 
is as if the understanding of those in need of protection offered by labour law would 
not be enough to produce socially just outcomes.9 The dilemma could be illustrated 
with some observations of narratives that demonstrate the legal landscape where 
national labour law systems navigate.
The idea of embracing flexibility as a regulatory pattern in labour law involves a 
narrative of economic demands-based regulatory approaches meeting the needs of 
companies but increasingly also of individuals who are willing and capable to exer-
cise their autonomy in building their jobs and careers. States have increasingly 
begun to make more room for individual autonomy when developing regulatory 
strategies that aim at more flexible labour standards and bargaining regimes that 
favour local level solutions. These developments involve regulatory solutions that 
do not necessarily undermine the worker-protective dimension of labour law but are 
coupled with it in the search for better employability and labour resilience. However, 
in several labour law systems, striving towards greater flexibility has come to signal 
7 See Liukkunen (2019a), p. 6.
8 See Liukkunen (2005).
9 See Langille (2018), pp. 101–103.
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a strong individualization trend in regulation with adverse consequences for labour 
protection.10
Competition between states has advocated labour law reforms that pursue, to a 
variable extent, less binding regulation and more investment-friendly regulatory 
regimes. Importantly, economic considerations tend to be highlighted when seeking 
responses to globalization through adjustments to collective bargaining regimes. As 
a result, regulatory strategies that collective bargaining has traditionally offered in 
terms of developing social cohesion and equal labour standards are given more lim-
ited room.11
In its core, the labour question has been traditionally connected to unequal bar-
gaining power and the need to level the imbalance between employer and employ-
ee.12 However, this point of departure is becoming too narrow and is increasingly 
seen as demonstrating the rigidity of the limits of labour law. From the perspective 
of vulnerabilities, another perspective can be presented on the labour question. This 
tells a narrative where individuals do not determine their own path but are trapped 
in adverse conditions.13 While flexibility is often pictured as being associated with 
freedom, capability, individual choices and future prospects, vulnerability looms in 
the context of the past and burdening, or exploitation, something to be managed or 
eliminated. Migrant and posted workers are vulnerable groups throughout the global 
labour market but there is also structural vulnerability that has to do with choices of 
exclusion and inclusion in the decisive regulatory frameworks.14
Globally, working life is characterized by a widening divide between those being 
protected and those not. The need to pay heed to those who require protection 
beyond the constellation of an employment contract means a need to identify devel-
opment trends that do not become visible from the regulatory façade of societies. 
Two billion workers are working in the informal economy.15 Although there is diver-
sity in the circumstances of these workers, many lack decent working conditions. 
The narrative of vulnerabilities is pointing to a growing gap in the socio-economic 
position of individuals. Globalization has furthered problems relating to transna-
tional social dumping, and the labour dimension of human trafficking still remains 
largely unidentified.16 With forms of exploitation that do not have national borders, 
10 Liukkunen (2019a).
11 See Ibid., p. 40.
12 As characterized, “[t]he main object of labour law has always been, and we venture to say will 
always be, to be a countervailing force to counteract the inequality of bargaining power which is 
inherent and must be inherent in the employment relationship”. See Davies and Freedland 
(1983), p. 18.
13 The complexity of the dilemma of migration in relation to labour law has been observed, inter 
alia, by Costello and Freedland (2014).
14 On patterns of social exclusion and inclusion see, for example, Carr and Chen (2004). On migrant 
workers’ regulatory dilemma see Wolff (2018); and on posted workers’ regulatory dilemma see 
Chen and Liukkunen (2019).
15 See ILO (2018), p. 13.
16 See for example, ILO (2020) demonstrating this. See also ILO (2017).
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the narrative of vulnerabilities makes more inclusive regulatory responses highly 
significant to the ILO as an organization whose purpose is to promote social justice 
universally.17
3  Labour Law and Its Embedded Normativities
For the standard-setting work conducted by the ILO, it is not a matter of indiffer-
ence how we define labour law issues and on what foundations the protective sphere 
of labour standards is being set in state systems of labour law.18 In this sense, 
Western conceptions of labour law have not been fully at ease with the ILO in its 
global endeavours. First of all, labour law is traditionally a very domestically ori-
ented field of law, featuring domestically oriented actors, policy objectives and 
interests. There is a broad consensus on the diversity of regulatory models employed 
in different countries. This has emphasized the contextuality of national labour law 
models in different economic and social settings.
 Secondly, there are differences between labour law systems that easily become 
visible in comparative enquiries and mark different orientations to some basic ques-
tions of labour law. The difference between collective autonomy and contractual 
autonomy marks a noteworthy division of labour law approaches in domestic set-
tings. While the first highlights collective bargaining, the second places an employ-
ment contract in the central position.19 Collective bargaining is a cornerstone of 
several European labour law models, and the UK model shows itself as resting on 
contractual autonomy, with the legal role of collective agreements remaining 
voluntary.20
Along with well-established individual and collective dimensions, labour law 
has what could be characterized as a normative-institutional dimension illustrating 
labour market mechanisms that rest on particular institutional settings.21 Their 
mutual connectivity and their influence on norm creation and enforcement is—in 
many countries—highly significant. As a public law-related enterprise, labour law 
highlights institutional conditions for developing workers’ protection. It further 
emphasizes maintaining social peace and stability as important goals for social dia-
logue. Each dimension of labour law carries a systematic value but they can also be 
claimed to demonstrate embedded normativities which manifest themselves in legal 
practices highlighting the importance of viewing together substantive and 
17 See also Scelle (1930), p. 31.
18 See also Langille (2019a), p. 508.
19 See also Bogg et al. (2015), p. 4.
20 See also Collins (2015).
21 It should be noted that each division of labour law into different branches is shaped by legal-
cultural characteristics. Even where the often used basic division of labour law into individual and 
collective is accepted, there is variation in the meaning content given.
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procedural aspects of protection of workers.22 The latter aspect relates to legal 
regimes as enabling workers to choose to use their collective rights or not.23
For the ILO, all this poses a demand to adopt a carefully composed picture of 
labour law which is necessary to approaching and explaining labour market phe-
nomena without setting aside contextual nuances and underpinning values. The 
capability to speak the language of labour law has influenced not only the success 
of regulatory strategy but also the gradually developed working methods of the 
organization. To establish international labour standards, national diversity has 
required a particular sensitivity from the ILO as a regulator. An unspoken prerequi-
site has been to build the standard-setting work from the beginning on a strong tri-
partite basis and also to involve labour market parties in monitoring work.
The picture of labour law would remain incomplete if an approach based on 
labour rights were not to be noted. It is often emphasized that freedom of associa-
tion requires particular attention within this frame.24 For the ILO, the labour rights 
frame has provided an essential point of departure. The norm-setting structure of the 
ILO, together with its system of international labour standards, has heightened the 
special weight of social dialogue and collective bargaining, which forms an integral 
part of freedom of association, as highlighted by the ILO Constitution.25
The Philadelphia Declaration, as a part of the ILO Constitution, sets out the obli-
gation to further effective recognition of the right of collective bargaining.26 In the 
field of collective bargaining, too, the ILO approach has been characterized by not-
ing the diversity of national models that can build collective voice and capacity. Yet, 
at the same time, the organization has been clear with the key components of the 
22 Tuori makes a useful distinction between law and legal practices. See Tuori (2016), p. 6, where 
legal practices are defined as social practices specialized in the production and reproduction of law.
23 See also Langille (2018), p. 94, emphasizing the essence of the external legal structures labour 
law provides to bargaining regimes.
24 See Bogg (2015), p. 105.
25 See Constitution of the ILO which was adopted by the Peace Conference in April 1919, and 
became Part XIII of the Treaty of Peace of Versailles (28 June 1919). The Constitution has been 
amended in 1922, 1945, 1953, 1962, 1972, 1986 and 1997.
26 Several ILO conventions and recommendations of the ILO concern collective bargaining. See 
Convention concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise (No. 87) 
adopted on 17 June 1948; Convention concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to 
Organise and to Bargain Collectively (No. 98) adopted on 8 June 1949; Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work. Adopted by the International Labour Conference, 86th Session, 
Geneva, 18 June 1998 (Annex revised 15 June 2010); Collective Agreements Recommendation 
(No. 91) adopted on 29 June 1951; Convention concerning Protection and Facilities to be Afforded 
to Workers’ Representatives in the Undertaking (No. 135) adopted on 23 June 1971; Voluntary 
Conciliation and Arbitration Recommendation (No. 92) adopted on 29 June 1951; Rural Workers’ 
Organisations Recommendation (No. 149) adopted on 23 June 1975; Convention concerning 
Protection of the Right to Organise and Procedures for Determining Conditions of Employment in 
the Public Service (No. 151) adopted 27 June 1978; Labour Relations (Public Service) 
Recommendation (No. 159) adopted on 27 June 1978; Convention concerning the promotion of 
collective bargaining (No. 154) adopted on 19 June 1981; Collective Bargaining Recommendation 
(No. 163) adopted on 19 June 1981.
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right to bargain and the requirements to be set to the autonomous framework of 
bargaining. Although standard-setting work of the ILO involves issues that raise 
different opinions among the ILO member states and the social partners, the strength 
of the ILO’s approach has been connected to tripartite co-operation, which has 
made states and labour market organizations work together for certain goals. 
In essence, the vitality of the system of international labour standards is depen-
dent on the way the core area of labour  rights is defined and spelled out by the 
ILO. Although the ILO is a central builder of minimum protection for workers, the 
deepest layer deriving from the Constitution of the organization binds together 
rights at work and social development. In this pursuit, international labour standards 
that protect freedom, equality and safety of workers are associated strongly with 
legal action against any injustice at work. Lately, this approach has gained a rein-
forced global perspective.
4  The ILO Vision of Decent Work: An Inclusive 
View of Work
The concepts of employee and contract of employment are used in different ways 
by domestic labour law systems in defining the scope of application of labour stan-
dards and highlighting the special nature of the relationship between employer and 
employee. However, as globalization has led to an increase in forms of work that are 
not covered by traditional labour law, the fact that work is increasingly carried out 
in diverse ways that fall between the spheres of work in an employment relationship 
and work as an independent entrepreneur has made connecting the idea of protec-
tion with a certain pre-determined legal status inadequate. Moreover, globally, 
forms of work that stand outside the official systems of societies constitute a lar-
gening group beyond any formal groupings.27 Informal work is a significant form of 
employment, particularly in developing countries.28
As labour law with its protective elements has been unable to keep up with the 
changes in ways of working, a large number of workers have become unprotected. 
Workers in different positions share the same vulnerabilities.29 As the ILO 
Constitution states that labour conditions must be improved, this requirement is not 
dependent on the form of work, be it work in an employment relationship or some 
other way of working.
Decent work, originally introduced by ILO Director-General Juan Somavia at 
the International Labour Conference in 1999, covers non-employment contract- 
based forms of work and work in the unofficial sector.30 When Somavia introduced 
27 See ILO (2001, 2002a).
28 See Daza (2005), where diversity of approaches to informal economy and its conceptualization 
as well as diverse treatment of informality are pointed out.
29 See Davidov (2002), p. 417.
30 See ILO (1999a).
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the concept of decent work in the ILO it was constructed from four strategic objec-
tives: promotion of rights at work; employment; social protection; and social dia-
logue.31 From the beginning, there was an emphasis on the mutual interconnectivity 
between these objectives.
As far back as 2000 the ILO began a programme on decent work to pioneer ways 
in which decent work can be effectively promoted and applied in ILO member 
countries.32 Two years later, a pilot programme was initiated for integrating decent 
work into the poverty reduction framework.33 These moves were followed by an 
expansion of measures which manifested the centrality of the decent work agenda 
to the ILO as a means of renewal and modernization.
The decent work concept emphasizes that the social rights of labour are univer-
sal.34 While highlighting this, the ILO can be read to affirm that the mechanisms of 
traditional labour law are alone insufficient to tackle the labour question in an inclu-
sive way. Importantly, equality efforts behind the concept of decent work are based 
on the idea that employment cannot be separated from the quality of work.35
The ILO World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization adopted 
the idea of decent work as the basis of its proposals, and initiated decent work as the 
global goal of the multilateral system.36 The report of the World Commission, issued 
in 2004, is written in the spirit of the Philadelphia Declaration.37 The report reiter-
ated the same concerns that were raised when the ILO was being founded and that 
can be found in its Constitution—poverty and inadequate labour conditions—and 
affirmed the importance of increasing the ILO’s authority as a way of managing 
globalization.38
According to the World Commission, the management of globalization requires 
procedures that promote relating economic growth more closely with social prog-
ress and sustainable development.39 The Commission paid critical attention to the 
imbalance in the world economy resulting from a fundamental imbalance between 
the economy, society, and polity. To correct this imbalance, the Commission stated 
that better institutional frameworks and policies are required. In particular, the 
imbalance between the economy and society has a detrimental effect on social jus-
tice. Global rules are not balanced because economic rules and institutions are 
stronger than social rules and institutions.40
31 Ibid.
32 The eight countries selected for the Programme were Bahrain, Bangladesh, Denmark, Ghana, 
Kazakhstan, Morocco, Panama and the Philippines. See ILO (n.d.-b).
33 Awad (2005), para 4.
34 See also Hepple (2002), pp. 255–256.
35 See ILO (1999a).
36 See World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization (2004), p. ix.
37 The spirit of the Philadelphia Declaration of 1944 is often recalled by labour law scholars. See 
also Supiot (2012).
38 See World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization (2004). See also ILO (2004).
39 See World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization (2004), p. 2.
40 See Ibid., pp. 3–4.
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The most important task of the World Commission was to suggest concrete mea-
sures for managing the social dimension of globalization. The central vision of the 
Commission was a globalization process that would put people first, respect human 
dignity and consider everyone equal.41 The Commission report highlights that the 
basic principles which must guide globalization are democracy, social equity, 
respect for human rights and the rule of law. Importantly, the Commission’s labour- 
related proposals emphasize the objective of decent work for all as a global point of 
departure. They also highlight core labour standards as the minimum set of rules for 
which respect should be strengthened in all countries.42
The World Commission pointed out four factors that together form the concept 
of decent work. These are full employment, social protection, fundamental rights at 
work and social dialogue. According to the Commission, the concept of decent 
work is based on the idea that the development of social and labour policies requires 
a balance between employee protection, job creation, and competitiveness.43
Before conceptualization of decent work, which has become central to ILO glo-
balization policy, the strategy of the ILO rested on a different scheme which high-
lighted perspectives deriving from Western-embedded labour law settings that focus 
on employment contracts and their regulatory frame. With decent work, the ILO 
adopted an inclusive view of work, a view stemming from its Constitution.44 In so 
doing, the organization stressed the need to develop social and economic systems 
that guarantee basic security and employment but that also adjust to rapidly chang-
ing circumstances in a global market. The decent work agenda of the ILO builds on 
four pillars: (1) employment promotion, (2) social protection, (3) social dialogue 
and (4) rights at work. A synthetic perspective on the pillars has been strongly advo-
cated by the ILO.45
The Declaration on Social Justice for Fair Globalization of 2008 was the out-
come of tripartite consultations that began in the wake of the Report of the World 
Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization. The Declaration institution-
alized the decent work agenda, placing it at the core of the ILO’s efforts to reach its 
constitutional objectives. Freedom of association and effective recognition of the 
right to collective bargaining were held as particularly important to enable realiza-
tion of decent work.46
41 See Ibid., pp. 5–6.
42 See Ibid, p. 55, 91 and 110.
43 See Ibid., pp. 64–67 and pp. 108–114.
44 The Philadelphia Declaration of 1944, which forms an essential part of the ILO Constitution, 
extended the work of the ILO by stating that all human beings, irrespective of race, creed or sex, 
have the right to pursue both their material well-being and their spiritual development in conditions 
of freedom and dignity, of economic security and equal opportunity. It stated that the attainment of 
the conditions in which this shall be possible must constitute the central aim of national and inter-
national policy. See also Article 23 of the Universal Declaration of Human Right. Adopted by the 
United Nations General Assembly, 3rd Session, Paris, 10 December 1948. 
45 See also ILO (1999b).
46 Preface to the ILO Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization. Adopted by the 
International Labour Conference, 97th Session, Geneva, 10 June 2008.
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In the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, decent work is one of the 
indivisible sustainable development goals (SDGs), formulated as “Decent work and 
economic growth”. The wording of SDG 8 does not correspond to the ILO original 
point of departure and the goal  of decent work was included in the  Millenium 
Development Targets only in 2005. For the ILO, SDG 8 is, however, an achievement 
based on its efforts to have decent work adopted in the 2030 Agenda.47 Importantly, 
the idea of inclusivity was placed at the heart of sustainability. The UN targets for 
SDG 8 do not completely correspond to the decent work agenda of the ILO, and the 
perspective on fundamental labour rights advocated by the ILO would require 
broader attention.48 However, the UN 2030 Agenda has turned out in many ways 
important to the ILO, offering a longed-for opportunity to strengthen the position of 
the organization within the UN system.
With decent work, the ILO has gained a new voice within the UN system and the 
international multilateral system more generally. Thus, at the beginning of its sec-
ond centenary the organization has acquired an opportunity to build more authority 
on its renewed character of global orientation. While the decent work agenda has 
gradually grown to renew the way of approaching the labour question in the regula-
tory strategy of the ILO, it can be seen as having potential to reinforce the global 
role of the organization. In essence, decent work as an objective rejects the narrow 
conceptual frame of traditional labour law, reminding us that labour law cannot be 
far from any groups of working individuals.
The ILO Centenary Declaration for the Future of Work of 2019 constructs a 
commitment to decent work and sustainability by linking social, trade, financial, 
economic and environmental policies together. It states that the ILO must move 
forward into its second century by further developing its human-centred approach 
to the future of work, which puts workers’ rights and the rights of all people at the 
heart of economic, social and environmental policies. Moreover, it highlights the 
decent work agenda.49 However, there seems to be a need for a perspective of 
broader interconnections between decent work and climate change within the sus-
tainable development framework under construction. Although the ILO Guidelines 
for a just transition towards environmentally sustainable economies and societies 
for all,50 issued in 2015, present several ways of reinforcing these interconnections 
and “just transition” has been adopted as an objective of the ILO policy efforts 
towards sustainability, there would be a need for further elaboration.51 It is to be 
noted that the environmental perspective on SDG 8 is also still under 
47 See Frey and MacNaughton (2016), pp. 2–3.
48 See UN (n.d.). On the other hand, although the decent work agenda governs only core labour 
standards explicitly, several ILO conventions relate to and support the agenda. See also 
MacNaughton and Frey (2011), p. 446.
49 See ILO, Centenary Declaration for the Future of Work. Adopted by the International Labour 
Conference, 108th Session, Geneva, 21 June 2019.
50 See ILO (2015).
51 See also Doorey (2017), Doorey (2015), pp. 560–563.
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construction.52 There appears to be a need for a broader approach which puts 
weight on a decent life as a frame for decent work to assess and alter societal pro-
cesses that hinder humane conditions of work.
5  Fundamental Labour Rights: Tasks Ahead
Fundamental labour rights, or core labour standards, form a central pillar of the 
concept of decent work.53 They also integrate decent work in the core of the system 
of international labour standards. The decent work agenda highlights social dia-
logue and collective labour rights in dealing with inequalities.54 On this view, the 
demand for decency derives from the demand for democracy and participation, 
aligning with the ILO Constitution.
However, efforts surrounding the definition, goals, and content of the core stan-
dards were originally met with considerable international debate and controversy, 
which lasted until the end of the 1990s. Prior to the definition of core labour stan-
dards in the 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work,55 
a lack of clarity existed as to standards that could be considered central labour 
standards and whose global implementation should be promoted.
A central starting point for the 1998 Declaration was the UN World Summit for 
Social Development in Copenhagen in 1995. The Summit was the first time the social 
dimension of globalization was discussed at the highest political level. It approved 
the Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development and Programme of Action 
where governments agreed to promote the fundamental rights of employees. These 
were based on the central ILO conventions and included forced and child labour 
bans, freedom of association, collective bargaining rights, the principle of equal treat-
ment of men and women, and a ban on discrimination.56 It was the first time the 
content of core labour standards was defined on the basis of the central ILO conven-
tions. The Summit followed the first WTO Ministerial Meeting held in Singapore in 
1996, which also played an important role in the development. The Meeting approved 
the Singapore Ministerial Declaration containing a commitment to observe interna-
tionally recognized core labour standards. The Declaration also expressed the WTO’s 
approval of the ILO’s activities and accepted that preparing international core labour 
52 See for example the outcome of Weitz et al. (2019) pointing to difficulties of individual states in 
gaining an understanding of the environmental issues under SDG 8.
53 See Javillier (2003), p. 3.
54 See also Moreau (2013).
55 ILO, Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. Adopted by the International 
Labour Conference, 86th Session, Geneva, 18 June 1998 (Annex revised 15 June 2010).
56 See in more detail Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development and Programme of Action of 
the World Summit for Social Development 1995.
The ILO and Transformation of Labour Law
28
standards fell under the ILO’s authority.57 It brought clarity to the role of the ILO and 
included clear approval by the WTO of core labour standards.58
The Declaration of the WTO Meeting in Singapore formed a central source in 
preparing the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, 
indeed affecting its content. The ILO Declaration was approved at the 86th Session 
of the International Labour Conference in 1998 and the content of core labour stan-
dards was exactly the same as when they were defined for the first time at the 
Copenhagen Summit. Essentially, the core labour standards were a development 
which followed the 1996 WTO ministerial meeting in Singapore, where it was 
affirmed that the ILO is the competent body to set and deal with these standards. 
The four principles in the 1998 ILO Declaration, generally referred to as fundamen-
tal labour rights or core labour standards, are: (1) freedom of association and collec-
tive bargaining, (2) prohibition of forced labour, (3) elimination of child labour and 
(4) non-discrimination in employment. These core labour standards are included in 
a total of eight ILO conventions also referred to as the core or key conventions.59
The ILO Declaration transformed the way labour rights are viewed internation-
ally although there has not been consensus on what this has meant in legal terms.60 
Core labour standards are considered to be binding on ILO member states directly 
on the basis of the ILO Constitution and the principles of these standards are 
included in several international human rights conventions. The monitoring of core 
conventions that core labour standards derive from differs from that of other con-
ventions in that reports must be produced on core conventions annually, while most 
of the other conventions are reported on once every five years. The Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work introduced the Follow-up procedure 
that promotes implementation of core labour standards and involves regular reports 
on the implementation of ratified conventions as well as a complaints procedure 
based on the ILO Constitution. In addition, reports are requested every year from 
countries that have not ratified the core conventions. The Declaration aims to take 
57 See WTO, Singapore Ministerial Declaration, adopted on 13 December 1996. See also Fields 
(2003), p. 65.
58 See Leary (1997), p. 1.
59 These conventions are the Convention concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the 
Right to Organise (No. 87) adopted on 17 June 1948; the Convention concerning the Application 
of the Principles of the Right to Organise and to Bargain Collectively (No. 98) adopted on 8 June 
1949; the Convention concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour (No. 29) adopted on 10 June 1930 
(and its of 2014 to the Forced Labour Convention adopted on 28 May 2014); the Convention con-
cerning the Abolition of Forced Labour (No. 105) adopted on 5 June 1957; the Convention con-
cerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment (No. 138) adopted on 6 June 1973; the 
Convention concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst 
Forms of Child Labour (No. 182) adopted on 1 June 1999; the Convention concerning Equal 
Remuneration for Men and Women Workers for Work of Equal Value (No. 100) adopted on 6 June 
1951; the Convention concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation (No. 
111) adopted 4 June 1958.
60 See for example Alston (2004), pp. 457–521 for the characteristics of the well-known scholarly 
criticism of core labour standards.
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into consideration difficulties for developing countries to adopt international core 
labour standards on account of their lower stage of economic development. It 
stresses that core labour standards must not be used for promoting protectionist 
financial goals and that the Declaration must not be appealed to for such purposes.
Great economic, social and political differences of countries have had an impact 
on attitudes towards core labour standards, which have also been criticized for being 
too narrow in content and because concentrating on them can mean disregard for 
other central labour standards.61 Often, occupational health and safety have been 
highlighted as issues that would require priority along with the core standards. 
Although the absence of health and safety from core labour standards poses a dif-
ficulty, the linkage between collective labour rights and health and safety should 
be noted.
Collective labour rights build on capacities and participatory mechanisms that 
are important for ensuring safety and health at work. In addition to social dialogue 
at the workplace level, employee participation rights, information and consultation, 
contribute to developing health and safety. Health and safety management can be 
supported by an efficient employee participation system. The central idea behind 
collective labour rights is that they carry in them a capacity building character which 
enables regulatory development towards fairer terms and secure conditions of 
work.62 The influence of collective labour rights thus also highlights their relation to 
other labour standards.63
ILO Conventions Nos. 87 (freedom of association and the right to organise) and 
98 (collective bargaining) set together the fundamental frame for collective labour 
rights. The evolution of the number of ratifications of core conventions, however, 
shows that significant progress is lacking in their adoption and recent regulatory 
development has also posed problems to these two conventions. To illustrate, the 
workforce of countries that have not ratified Convention No. 87 amounts to over 
1.55 billion workers, and Convention No. 98 over 1.49 billion workers. Generally, 
protection of the right of freedom of association and collective bargaining has 
declined in recent decades.64 Notably, this kind of development is also visible in 
countries that have ratified these two core conventions.65
Adoption of the decent work agenda and the related strategy shift of the ILO can 
be seen as a kind of response to weak recognition of core labour standards and the 
relatively low number of ratifications of the recent ILO conventions.66 Even when 
conventions have been ratified, their enforcement has often been viewed inadequate. 
The 1998 Declaration is premised on the idea that core labour standards are global 
and they have been formulated to the effect that they can be universally applied.
61 See for example Alston and Heenan (2004).
62 See ILO (2002b).
63 Ibid., p. vi.
64 See ILO (n.d.-a).
65 See Liukkunen (2019a). See also Marx et al. (2015).
66 As regards most recent conventions, the number of ratifications can be found at ILO (n.d.-a).
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The development of ratifications of ILO core conventions raises a need to call 
for a more precise account of fundamental rights development, aligning it to the 
broader frame of labour market and societal changes in each country. One could 
also ask whether the perspective that is traditionally offered to an assessment of 
the influence of fundamental labour rights on national labour law regimes needs 
complementing. A broader perspective would bring together different actors as 
participants of legal practices: legislatures, labour inspectorates, courts and arbi-
tration committees as well as various non-state actors that shape and foster space 
for the evolution of labour rights in different and differentiated legal and societal 
contexts of work.67 There are countries that despite non-ratification of core con-
ventions, often with long-term country-specific technical assistance from the 
ILO, strive towards developing their laws to meet the core labour standards. On 
a broader view, the effects of international labour standards can be found at dif-
ferent layers of normativity, which highlights interaction, dialogue and mutual 
enforcement.68
Of the UN organizations, the ILO is unique in its tripartite nature. This adds 
special weight to the organization’s standard-setting work and monitoring mecha-
nism.69 Throughout its history, the ILO has carried out its work in different kinds 
of situations where the co-operation model has been put to the test. A recent devel-
opment posing a new kind of challenge to the ILO comes from outside the clas-
sic labour standard-setting paradigm. This concerns a need to take a stand towards 
new regulatory actors entering the international labour standard-setting arena. The 
ILO is present in a supportive role in the social development of individual coun-
tries, but its authority and presence would also be required in transnational regula-
tory settings where new labour standards are being created—often with remarkable 
speed and intensity. There is a need to more firmly anchor respect for fundamental 
labour rights to the area of cross-border privatization of labour law. The question 
of effective incorporation of core labour standards into transnational sets of labour 
standards created by various non-state actors has become increasingly central in 
terms of labour protection and the social dimension of globalization. While pro-
moting ratification of ILO conventions follows well-established operational 
modes, promoting transnational incorporation of core labour standards takes the 
ILO into unknown regulatory terrain. Yet the voice and authority of the ILO is 
needed in regulatory contexts where international actors independently organize 
and create new sets of rules of labour governance to ensure that the labour rights-
based perspective is not sidelined.
67 See an analysis of ways to approach the question of implementing international labour standards 
from a legal-cultural perspective, Liukkunen and Chen (2016), pp. 6–9.
68 See Liukkunen (2019a), p. 10.
69 See also in this volume Waas (2020).
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6  Collective Bargaining and Changing Regulatory Frames
Freedom of association and right to collective bargaining are facing challenges that 
derive from both international and domestic regulatory settings.70 Developments in the 
EU point to the vulnerability of domestic collective bargaining regimes along with a 
certain undermining of the right to exercise collective rights. There are many 
approaches to labour law in the EU, and the expansion of substantive EU labour leg-
islation has improved labour protection in many central issues. However, as strong 
economic integration has been held as vital to the competitiveness of the internal mar-
ket and EU Member States, it has resulted in overriding the respect for fundamental 
labour rights and values in the context of cross-border employment when the exercise 
of EU fundamental economic freedoms is involved. In the Viking and Laval cases, the 
CJEU handed down controversial judgments that demonstrate a tension between the 
right to collective bargaining, or the right to industrial action, on the one hand, and EU 
fundamental economic freedoms, on the other.71 These judgments inaugurated a new 
era of fundamental labour rights in the EU. Although the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights protects the right to bargain collectively, together with the right to industrial 
action, in these CJEU judgments collective labour rights have been subjected to cer-
tain limitations in a cross-border setting when fundamental economic freedoms are at 
stake but without a clear constitutional basis for this. The practice of the ILO supervi-
sory organs does not recognize the type of discretion that the CJEU has applied in its 
jurisprudence concerning the conditions set to the right to take industrial action.72
 CJEU jurisprudence in the Laval Quartet has been challenging in terms of the 
workers’ human rights commitments of the  EU Member States.73 Significantly, 
from the 1990s onwards, the ECtHR has developed the protective nature of the 
European Human Rights Convention and increasingly extended protection of the 
principles of the Convention to govern collective labour rights. To some extent, this 
has offered a counterforce to the destabilization of the protective framework of 
cross-border collective labour rights caused by the jurisprudence of the CJEU. In 
Demir and Baykara, the ECtHR confirmed that Article 11 of the ECHR governs the 
right to collective bargaining.74
70 Chapters 6 and 7 of this article draw partially on the author’s research published in Liukkunen 
(2019b).
71 CJEU (Grand Chamber), Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Svenska 
Byggnadsarbetareförbundets avdelning 1, Byggettan and Svenska Elektrikerförbundet (Case 
C-341/05), Judgment, 18 December 2007; CJEU (Grand Chamber), International Transport 
Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking Line ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti 
(Case C-438/05), Judgment, 11 December 2007.
72 See ILO Committee of Experts (2010), p. 209.
73 The Laval quartet constitutes of CJEU judgments Viking and Laval as well as CJEU (Second 
Chamber), Dirk Rüffert v Land Niedersachsen (Case C-346/06), Judgment, 3 April 2008; and 
CJEU (First Chamber) Commission of the European Communities v Grand Duchy of Luxemburg 
(Case C-319/06), Judgment, 19 June 2008.
74 See European Court of Human Rights (Grand Chamber), Demir and Baykara v. Turkey (App. 
No. 34503/97), Judgment, 12 November 2008.
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Moreover, recent development of domestic collective bargaining regimes is 
highly significant in terms of understanding the pressing challenges of labour law. 
Strong centralized collective bargaining systems are traditionally considered as a 
Continental and Nordic European phenomenon. There are also well-established 
systems based on decentralized bargaining, like those of North America and Japan. 
Importantly, each collective bargaining model should be seen in the context of the 
country’s labour rights status.75 Although the right to collective bargaining enjoys 
constitutional recognition in several national legal systems this does not necessarily 
translate into heightened protection.
The challenge of combining flexibility and safety penetrates collective bargain-
ing systems, and related balancing efforts have increasingly often unravelled to the 
benefit of flexibility. A shift towards more local level bargaining has been simulta-
neously occurring in many bargaining systems. Yet decentralization has occurred 
within remarkably diverse regulatory frameworks with different emphases and 
divergent locally-embedded solutions.76 In some countries, centralized models of 
collective bargaining have increasingly been replaced by decentralized ones, 
whereas in others the national or sectoral level still plays a key coordinative role.
Increasing pressure towards greater flexibility and tensions between flexibility 
and security appear common to bargaining systems worldwide. Mandatory mini-
mum protection of workers has been weakened in both systems that are decentral-
ized by nature and systems that have become increasingly decentralized.77 Several 
development trends are reshaping the subject matter of collective bargaining and 
narrow the protective sphere of collective agreements. Also the role of minimum 
protection afforded by the system of general applicability of collective agreements 
(erga omnes) in some states has been affected.
Several countries have altered their regulatory approach to collective bargaining 
in a situation where union density is declining and the coverage of collective agree-
ments is diminishing. The hierarchy between collective agreements at different lev-
els has changed and decentralization of bargaining structures has become a 
significant regulatory objective for many national legislatures. Opportunities to 
deviate from labour  legislation and from upper level collective agreements have 
been enabled to a larger extent by local agreements. This has brought about new 
kind of local labour governance models.
There are national legislatures that have actively sought to promote flexibiliza-
tion and decentralization of the collective agreement system through reforms that 
touch upon the core area of collective autonomy. In some cases the reforms have 
resulted in tension between sectoral or branch level and local level agreements, 
especially when strengthening the status of local level agreements at the cost of 
higher level agreements and their coordinative function has been sought. In addi-
tion, in peius deviations from mandatory labour legislation or higher level collective 
75 See Liukkunen (2019a), pp. 4–5.




agreements by local agreements have been enabled or expanded in some countries.78 
To a notable extent this has occurred against the legal tradition and basic labour law 
principles of these countries.79
Even when local agreements are concluded on the basis of the competence con-
ferred by a sectoral collective agreement, local agreements may lead to highly dif-
ferentiated rules between companies. Differentiation, which may continue within 
individual companies, treats issues that are traditionally regulated by collective 
agreements very differently. In some issues benefits can be reaped while in others a 
broader regulatory frame could be necessary.80 In some countries, decentralization 
has been partial and gradual and based on well-established tripartite law drafting 
processes whereas in others less balanced processes and outcomes have undermined 
the role of social dialogue. On the other hand, decentralization can be seen not only 
as a result of legislative reforms, but also of decreasing trade union density, changes 
in the power balance of bargaining and overall weakening of the role of the social 
partners. But in some cases, as the post-socialist countries in Eastern Europe dem-
onstrate, it can also be given particular historical explanations.81
6.1  Individualization in Decentralization 
of Collective Bargaining
The individualization trend in labour law is often offered with an explanation which 
relates to economically indispensable efforts to meet the needs of companies and 
individual workers, albeit from different angles. For companies, flexibility in different 
forms has become essential to ensure continuity of business and change management, 
and the increase of regulative flexibility is rooted in this demand. Workers’ perspec-
tive involves a broad range of issues including the influence of the spread of atypical 
employment. While a more individualistic regulatory approach relates to growing 
flexibility, there is a growing number of new categories of workers whose position 
differs from that of a traditional employee. Different and differentiated groups of non-
standard workers tend to have less bargaining power, but they may also have less 
opportunities of attending to collective efforts to improve labour standards. Although 
evidence is available that in some countries social dialogue involves developing new 
strategies to improve protection of atypical work, the transformation of work is so 
profound that it adds pressure to adopt more inclusive bargaining frameworks.82
78 See for example Kun (2019), Magnani (2019) and Mazuyer (2019).
79 See Liukkunen (2019a), pp. 16–20.
80 The ILO (2002b) points to the relevance of the level of bargaining in terms of health and safety 
issues. While much of the capacity building of health and safety protection occurs at the enterprise 
level, there are issues of health and safety where a national or sectoral level regulatory framework 
is needed to ensure necessary protection.
81 See Liukkunen (2019a), pp. 7–9.
82 Ibid., p. 54.
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The development of bargaining regimes in the direction of more flexibility is 
creating new kinds of vulnerabilities.  Decentralization leads to situations where 
issues that previously were negotiated between collective actors are increasingly 
decided between employer and employee at the workplace level. Individualized bar-
gaining agendas reflect a growing emphasis on the employer–employee relationship 
in decollectivization of labour law. Local bargaining is increasingly enabling dif-
ferentiation of the terms of employment on the basis of the needs of individual 
companies. As a result, locally bargained rules are more individualized than those in 
higher level agreements.83
New patterns and methods of setting terms of employment are evolving at the 
local level in a way that highlights both local procedures and bargaining as an indi-
vidualized process between employer and employee. As a result, the procedural 
protection offered by traditional means of collective bargaining systems is declin-
ing. Existing dispute resolution mechanisms are required to show adaptability in 
dealing with labour standards deriving from new kinds of contractual arrangements. 
While local bargaining allows much discretion, employees need procedural safe-
guards in order to ensure a sufficient balance of workplace-level negotiations.
It appears that the traditional mode of collective bargaining has lost sight of 
some aspects of the labour market change.84 This change calls for developing insti-
tutional settings and local bargaining capacities to enable negotiations based on a 
more equal footing between the parties and it  also calls for rethinking the sub-
stance. A clearer picture is needed of how local bargaining and employee participa-
tion could be integrated in order to advance the capacities of local bargaining. 
Connections which often exist between collective bargaining, on the one hand, and 
employee information and consultation, on the other, also speak for improving 
coverage of employee participation systems in terms of different forms of non-
standard work.85
6.2  Decollectivization of Industrial Relations
In many bargaining systems, both decentralized and centralized, declining collec-
tive agreement coverage and union density as well as institutional and regulatory 
changes are driving towards decollectivization of industrial relations. Even where 
decentralization has been organized, notable changes have occurred in the institu-
tional settings of bargaining frameworks. In some systems, the position of trade 
unions in local level bargaining has been weakened so that they can be bypassed 
when local agreements are negotiated.
83 Ibid., p. 32.
84 See also Estlund (2015), p. 260.
85 Liukkunen (2019a), pp. 54–55.
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Importantly, the interplay between industrial relations and collective bargaining 
is in the process of change. Well-established labour institutions have often had a 
multi-level impact on the development of labour standards not only within labour 
law regimes but also in making more room for a labour rights frame in societies. 
Often, long-term promotion of the interests of workers and bargaining have been 
required to enable the birth of the collective agreements, which have provided 
legally enforceable minimum standards. Today, decentralization decreases the bar-
gaining power of trade unions which has built collective capacities in an evolution-
ary way. 
Collective bargaining is increasingly understood as producing frameworks for 
individualized flexibility along with adjustments to labour standards required for 
ensuring employability, competitiveness and efficiency. At the local level, new pat-
terns and methods of setting labour standards are evolving in a way which high-
lights employer discretion. These developments have occurred simultaneously with 
a certain polarization of labour markets. However, it should also be emphasized that 
the transformation of industrial relations which relates to decollectivization has 
occurred in various degrees and modes in different bargaining systems.86
6.3  The ILO and the Challenge of Decentralization
National regulatory frameworks which were originally built to enable and maintain 
autonomous collective bargaining within the framework of corporatist arrangements 
have been increasingly transformed into frameworks which not only coordinate and 
manage but also set limitations on collective bargaining. This change derives from 
economic considerations that align businesses interests and state regulatory 
approaches or, in the case of the EU, international institutions exercising financial 
power, as the experience of the European semester demonstrates. As a result, less 
inclusive and less protective collective bargaining regimes are emerging, highlighting 
the adaptability of labour and the adjustability of the system. To illustrate, austerity 
measures adopted within the economic governance model of the EU have influenced 
the regulatory framework of collective bargaining and labour standards, in particular 
in Mediterranean countries.87 These measures have confronted a critical stand by the 
ILO Committee of Freedom of Association. In the case of Greece, the Committee 
noted significant interventions in the voluntary nature of collective bargaining and in 
the principle of the inviolability of freely concluded collective agreements.88
Some of the changes in collective bargaining regimes that  we are witnessing 
derive from regulatory adaptation to profound changes in work while some come 
from a certain economization of labour law  regimes. The scope and extent of 
86 See also Dukes (2014), p. 9.
87 See Liukkunen (2019a), pp. 29–31; Seifert (2014).
88 ILO Committee of Freedom of Association (2012), para 995.
The ILO and Transformation of Labour Law
36
protection that collective channels and institutions provide to workers are being 
challenged in ways that bear consequences for the protection of the rights of work-
ers. In many countries, including those with well-established centralized or decen-
tralized bargaining regimes, collective labour law mechanisms are in  complex 
transition. The development of individualization and decollectivization appears dis-
tant from the original idea of collective bargaining related to workers’ collective 
pursuit of labour rights. It can be argued that the pursuit of greater flexibility has 
come to undermine the labour rights perspective and values that are manifested in 
workplaces in the right to bargain collectively.
The principle of labour protection upon which labour law is built presupposes 
collective actors and institutions that can exercise collective power and pressure in 
order to manifest and defend the collective interest of workers. In essence, a set of 
key values, democracy, interest representation and autonomy, is involved.89 
However, it should be added that singling out and focusing on the collective interest 
is not alone enough to identify the labour question of our day. The regulatory frame-
work for collective bargaining needs to be viewed from a broader perspective in 
search of a response to changes in the labour market. In the future, we may face new 
types of labour institutions or reformed institutions and regulatory frameworks that 
replace or complement those based on a more stable working life. Reforms are 
required to build legal-institutional space for the development of meaningful 
employee participation in our time and to achieve an adaptable system of labour 
governance. Reforms could also be called for in order to advocate regulatory mod-
els to tackle most pressing issues of inequality in novel ways. Collective bargaining 
regimes have tended to focus minor attention on some areas of labour law. They 
could assume a greater role in promoting gender equality and women’s position in 
and contribution to the labour market, workers’ employability and protection 
regardless of age, race or other categorizations as well as other issues where more 
effective safeguards would be necessary.90
When asking what role the ILO should assume in this particular transition con-
text it has to be recalled that the organization is known for careful observance of 
working life development. It appears clear that the ILO is needed not only to speak 
for and explain the foundations of collective labour rights but also to increase our 
understanding of a normative development driven by changes in different regulatory 
surroundings with the broader labour rights scene in mind. The emphasis of social 
dialogue and collective labour rights has been central to understanding the well- 
being of workers as offered by the organization.
A deeper meaning of the right to collective bargaining in its distinctive charac-
teristic is that it introduces collective enabling capacity to labour relations and 
development of labour standards.91 The idea of labour protection as a collective 
phenomenon has been legitimizing the autonomy of collective bargaining and the 
social partners in their relation to the state. This, in turn, has shaped the strong status 
89 See Liukkunen (2019a), p. 60.
90 See Ibid., p. 60.
91 See also Langille (2019b).
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of collective agreements in many labour law systems. What has happened recently 
is that labour governance has given way to economic governance. Adjustments to 
bargaining frameworks placing great importance on economic factors have nar-
rowed the space of labour rights-oriented argumentation and values.92 There is a 
need to reconnect the requirement of labour protection to economic performance 
and productivity in order to achieve a broader understanding of mutual connectivi-
ty.93 This requires a deeper dialogue underlining the role of the ILO.
7  Transnational Dimension of Labour Protection
Some of the biggest challenges to labour law relate to the sway of its assumption of 
territoriality, which forces a broadening of horizons beyond domestically oriented 
considerations to transnational developments in labour law.94 Actors such as inter-
national financial institutions have entered the arena of international labour stan-
dards creation, shaking traditional assumptions of regulatory power and authority. 
As a consequence, labour law has increasingly come to operate as transnational law 
beyond the traditional national—international labour law dichotomy, resulting in 
regulatory developments that both supplement and compete with traditional legal 
frameworks. Within transnational private regimes, labour rights are addressed in the 
context of self-governance and contractual arrangements that are not guided by pub-
lic regulation. Private actors that lack a connection to the traditional system of inter-
national labour standards assume capability for shaping modes of labour standards 
within transnational normative frameworks where they would otherwise be absent.95
Globalization has raised several challenges for international labour law and 
poses a constant test of the legal applicability of international labour standards when 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) are operating on a transnational basis in vari-
ous countries and regions. The regulatory framework of MNEs is manifold, consist-
ing of multiple overlapping regimes with a reach broader than the law of national 
states. Important international documents providing guidelines for MNEs were 
already drawn up in the 1970s. A pioneer in providing guidelines for enterprises was 
the OECD, whose Guidelines were drawn to provide recommendations for MNEs 
and included in the Declaration on International Investment and Multinational 
Enterprises.96 A year later, the ILO presented the Tripartite Declaration of Principles 
concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (MNE Declaration),97 and 
92 Liukkunen (2019a), p. 54.
93 See also in this volume Waas (2020).
94 See Mundlak (2009).
95 See Liukkunen (2014) pp. 163–167.
96 See OECD, Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises. First adopted 
in 1976, and reviewed in 1979, 1984, 1991, 2000 and 2011.
97 See ILO, Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social 
Policy. Adopted by the Governing Body, 204th Session, Geneva, November 1977, and amended at 
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the UN launched negotiations for guidelines for MNEs.98 At this stage, business was 
still largely considered to be a bipolar operation involving home and host states.
The second phase of laying down guidelines for MNEs, which began in the 
mid- 1990s, stemmed from expanding globalization and the networking of business 
operations. Importantly, it was this phase that introduced the 1998 ILO Declaration 
and resolved the question of the content of core labour standards. The OECD pub-
lished a widely revised version of its Guidelines in 2000 to match the ILO 
Declaration, and renewed the Guidelines again in 2011.99 In the same year, the UN 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights were adopted.100 Later, core 
labour standards were included in the MNE Declaration and the incorporation of 
specific decent work issues occurred in 2017.101 In recent years we have witnessed 
significant reformulations of MNEs’ global production as well as a remarkable 
expansion of international documents that promote labour protection in the opera-
tions of MNEs. Today, all the major public international guidelines that seek to steer 
MNEs’ behaviour recognize the status of ILO fundamental labour rights.102
However, the voluntary approach to labour rights suffers from weaknesses. 
Corporate codes of conduct rarely include full references to core labour standards 
despite multiple international efforts to reinforce them. Although they were included 
in the OECD Guidelines and in the ILO’s MNE Declaration, we remain far from 
core labour standards forming the core of enterprise labour policies. The division of 
duties between states and MNEs as regards the execution of workers’ rights has 
become one of the central questions in managing the social dimension of globaliza-
tion.103 As privatization of labour standard-making proceeds, an increasing need 
exists to find ways to place fundamental labour rights protection more directly at the 
core of corporate social responsibility (CSR). There is a need to concretize other 
aspects of the decent work agenda in the operations of MNEs as well.
7.1  Transnational Collectivization of Labour Law
Transnational labour law has broadened the spectrum of collective contractual 
arrangements that relate to promotion of labour protection. Previously the domestic 
nature of collective bargaining systems was emphasized, and questions concerning 
the cross-border dimension of collective agreements typically arose either when a 
279th (November 2000), 295th (March 2006) and 329th (March 2017) Sessions.
98 The outcome of the negotiations was a Draft United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational 
Corporations. For more details, see Intergovernmental Working Group on a Code of Conduct (1982).
99 See OECD (2011) OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. OECD Publishing, Paris.
100 Human Rights Council (2011).
101 See ILO, Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social 
Policy. Adopted by the Governing Body, 204th Session, Geneva, November 1977, and amended at 
279th (November 2000), 295th (March 2006) and 329th (March 2017) Sessions.
102 See Liukkunen (2016), p. 157.
103 See also ILO, OECD, IOM, UNICEF (2019), p. 1.
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domestic collective agreement was made to concern work to be carried out abroad, 
or when the applicability of a domestic collective agreement to workers temporarily 
working abroad was to be resolved.104
Transnational agreements, falling outside the traditional categorizations and con-
ceptualizations of labour law, are brought about within transnational normative 
frames that cross countries and regions. These agreements strive from certain 
normative- institutional settings of company-level industrial relations. Both interna-
tional and domestic labour organizations as well as European Works Councils 
(EWCs) have been negotiating these agreements from the labour side with MNEs. 
Especially the role of EWCs, established in the EU countries on the basis of the 
EWC Directive105 for transnational information and consultation of workers in large 
Community-scale undertakings and groups of undertakings, has become significant 
in paving the way for transnational contractual arrangements promoting labour rights.
Generally speaking, transnational company agreements (TCAs) encompass a 
variety of forms of agreement concluded between an  MNE on the one side and 
international or national trade union federations or other parties representing 
employees on the other side. European TCAs, which normally apply to an MNE and 
its subsidiaries in the European countries where the multinational operates, typi-
cally reflect issues that are of concern in the European labour market, such as antici-
pating and managing social changes concerning restructuring.106
International framework agreements (IFAs), in turn, are a specific group of trans-
national agreements. They are concluded between an MNE and global union federa-
tions, and other parties such as an EWC or  a global works council representing 
workers, with a global reach. Often, IFAs seek to ensure respect for ILO core labour 
standards in MNE operations in all the countries where the company operates. 
However, despite international efforts to advance broader applicability in the opera-
tions of MNEs, they frequently lack governance over company supply chains.
IFAs derive firstly from centralized negotiating processes, which are dependent 
on functioning social dialogue at the MNE level, and secondly from sufficiently 
balanced employee representation within MNEs. Concluding these agreements 
requires certain reorganization of the regulatory power of trade unions at transna-
tional level. As they appear, IFAs conceptualize the transnational context of social 
dialogue, which significantly differs from contexts of national systems and balanc-
ing processes that lie behind collective bargaining in domestic settings.107 From the 
perspective of workers’ organizations, IFAs can be seen as strengthening not only 
industrial relations but also the global union federations themselves.108 They have an 
104 See Liukkunen (2019a), p. 44.
105 See Directive 2009/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 on the 
establishment of a European Works Council or a procedure in Community-scale undertakings and 
Community-scale groups of undertakings for the purposes of informing and consulting employees 
(Recast).
106 See Liukkunen (2019a), pp. 44–45.
107 See also Liukkunen (2019a), p. 44.
108 See Müller et al. (2008).
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important role in shaping transnational industrial relations and social dia-
logue.109 Altogether, transnational agreements can be viewed as offering a founda-
tion for collectivization of labour law in a transnational setting.
Transnational agreements are not concluded in a void but in interaction with 
diverse normative regimes. This makes it important to pay heed to larger institu-
tional and regulatory structures and their enabling character.110 These agreements 
have grown out of a need to ensure compliance with certain labour standards and 
basic social values, but many other normative dimensions have remained underex-
plored. For example, the impact of the broader normative frameworks of corporate 
governance on transnational contractual commitments has remained a largely unex-
amined area.111
Another important issue is how diverse domestic regulatory frameworks of col-
lective bargaining influence transnational negotiations. National collective bargain-
ing systems may involve regulatory, structural  or institutional constraints that 
restrict development of transnational contractual arrangements, as demonstrated by 
Brazilian experience of efforts to conclude a transnational agreement. In a case 
where an IFA was negotiated, Brazilian single trade union system, permitting only 
one trade union at each bargaining level, became a major obstacle to successful 
transnational negotiations until a contractual model to overcome this was devel-
oped.112 The institutional bargaining frame at the national level may also influence 
the development of transnational negotiations so that transformation of labour 
unions is required. Japanese experience shows that a decentralized bargaining 
model of enterprise-based unions may affect entering into transnational negotia-
tions so that transformation is required from industrial relations institutions to build 
transnational negotiating capacities.113
Several aspects of the content of IFAs deserve attention. In addition to focusing 
on fundamental labour rights, IFAs tackle other issues that are relevant to equality 
and expansion of substantive content of labour protection. They involve issues such 
as social dialogue, health and safety at work, career and skills development, train-
ing, anti-corruption, protection of personal data and internet policy. The expansion 
of labour issues governed is a noteworthy development in terms of labour standards 
coverage.
Although IFAs are associated with promotion of fundamental labour rights, the 
role of collective labour rights may be limited or absent. However, there is also 
evidence of opposite development. The first Spanish agreement covering a retail 
supply chain was the agreement between Inditex and IndustriAll Global Union, 
originally concluded in 2007.114 The objective of the agreement, which was renewed 
109 See (2019a), pp. 44–49. See also Blasi and Bair (2019), p. 40; Papadakis et al. (2008), p. 85.
110 See Liukkunen (2013).
111 On the normative activities of multinationals and the legal environment thereto, see, Danielsen 
(2005), p. 412.
112 See Maia (2019), p. 118.
113 See Araki (2019), pp. 393–395.
114 See IndustriAll Global Union (2014).
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in 2014, is to ensure respect for human rights within the labour and social environ-
ment by promoting decent work throughout the supply chain. What makes this 
agreement exceptional is that it emphasizes the relevance of the freedom of associa-
tion and the right to bargain collectively in improving labour protection within the 
supply chain. According to the agreement, these rights provide workers in the sup-
ply chain with mechanisms to monitor and enforce their rights at work.115 Lately, the 
agreement was renewed so that a global trade union committee was set up for imple-
mentation of the agreement at global level. In addition, the agreement sets out an 
establishment of joint training policies and programmes that involve the workers at 
Inditex factories and suppliers in order to make progress on the promotion of social 
dialogue and workplace equality.116
It is well known that problems of lack of monitoring and enforcement are a cen-
tral challenge for IFAs. Although some IFAs include implementation and enforce-
ment mechanisms, sometimes these agreements are loosely formed as a 
complementary part of the CSR documentation of an MNE. However, connections 
between IFAs and CSR strategies of companies vary, and a company-specific IFA 
may support company CSR strategy by concretizing it in social issues and boosting 
its enforcement.117 IFAs may transform the CSR policies of multinationals into 
more concrete and binding commitments. Many IFAs provide a complaints proce-
dure for workers if a violation of workers’ rights as stated in the agreement occurs.118 
These agreements are often based on the idea that any disputes or breaches of labour 
rights governed are handled in the company in cooperation with workers’ represen-
tatives. However, there is evidence of problems involved with the efficiency of 
company- specific dispute-settlement mechanisms. This raises a concern about the 
extent to which such agreements can be regarded as advancing transnational 
accountability without further developing their implementation and enforcement. A 
particular problem often lies in implementing IFAs in relation to suppliers.119 Often 
these agreements merely include a commitment to inform or encourage suppliers to 
respect the agreement or parts of it without stating the consequences of failure to do 
so. Moreover, although trade unions would seem to prefer monitoring compliance 
with IFAs by employees and trade unions themselves, related structures and 
resources are largely lacking.120
Altogether, the impact of IFAs on labour rights and protection remains limited 
but the potential involved cannot be overlooked. With advancing globalization and 
complex modes of global production, it is important that transnational agreements 
115 See Chacartegui (2019), pp. 547–548.
116 See Global Framework Agreement between Industria de Diseño Textil, S.A. (Inditex, S.A.) and 
IndustriAll Global Union on the implementation of International Labour Standards throughout the 
Supply Chain of Inditex. Available at: http://www.industriall-union.org/sites/default/files/uploads/
documents/GFAs/signed_gfa_inditex_-_english.pdf. Accessed 29 April 2020.
117 See Liukkunen (2014).
118 See Liukkunen (2019a), pp. 49–53.
119 See Blasi and Bair (2019).
120 See Liukkunen (2019a), p. 53.
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can be drawn to cover companies’ entire field of operations. They produce transna-
tional normativities that derive from denationalised social dialogue based on par-
ticular normative-institutional development in a transnational setting. However, 
their efficient implementation would need further action and structural solutions at 
the international level.121 The ILO could play a central role in these efforts.
7.2  Expansion of the Transnational Construction 
of Labour Standards
With privatization of labour standards-creation, several developments point to the 
expansion of regulatory approaches that influence labour protection and labour 
standards on a transnational level with a limited account of labour rights. These 
developments emphasize heterogeneous labour standards creation by widening 
number of non-state actors that claim regulatory authority. Transnational labour 
standards have evolved regardless of the traditional system of international labour 
standards, but they should be viewed against this system to evaluate their role. On 
the other hand, privatization development entails particular governance structures, 
as the Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh from 2013 demonstrates. 
This agreement, designed to make safe the working environment for the Bangladeshi 
Ready Made Garment Industry, was made between retailers and global brands and 
national as well as international trade unions.122 The Bangladesh Accord is legally 
binding and has a specific governance model which involves the ILO. The regula-
tory framework created brings together global and local strategies of labour gover-
nance and seeks to facilitate cross-border social dialogue in a novel way.
In the framing of labour governance at transnational level, foreign trade agree-
ments (FTAs) have gained noteworthy significance and visibility in setting goals 
that integrate pursuit of labour protection to trade and investment. For example, the 
recent EU Free Trade Agreement with Vietnam includes a sustainability chapter 
which governs (i) recognition of the beneficial role of decent work; (ii) facilitation 
of trade and investment in environmental goods and services, which are relevant for 
climate change; (iii) development and participation in voluntary initiatives and reg-
ulatory measures to establish high-level labour and environmental protection; and 
(iv) promotion of corporate social responsibility. As this agreement shows, the 
decent work goal has gained a foothold in recent developments of FTAs but with 
obvious imprecision. Although labour standards have found their way into trade 
agreement clauses the differentiation of outcomes is remarkable and their ultimate 
121 See Liukkunen (2014).
122 See the Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh, 2013. Available at: https://admin.
bangladeshaccord.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/2013-Accord.pdf. Accessed 29 April 2020; 
and the Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh, 2018. Available at: https://admin.ban-
gladeshaccord.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/2018-Accord.pdf. Accessed 29 April 2020.
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goal often blurred.123 There is also a trend of refraining from adding promotion of 
collective labour rights to FTAs. Generally, a vocabulary of labour standards instead 
of labour rights is preferred.124
In the transnational dimension, new kind of regulators and ways of regulating 
complement but also compete with regulatory approaches and contents advocated 
by the ILO. Moreover, they build a perspective on labour standards that leaves tra-
ditional labour rights frames in the shade. Importantly, the transnational dimen-
sion of labour protection is not only complementary to domestic and international 
approaches but also has its own normative setting from which it stems and evolves, 
fulfilling lacunas by creation of transnational normativities within labour law 
beyond state frontiers.
However, fundamental  labour rights integration with transnational normative 
development poses a challenge to the ILO. In a transnational setting, social justice 
cannot be achieved merely through material regulation as the institutional space of 
regulatory power gains additional significance. Hence, more attention needs to be 
placed on the procedural and institutional dimensions of regulatory efforts in a 
transnational regulatory environment.
8  Conclusion
The process of transnationalization of labour law affects the traditional labour law 
paradigm with profound consequences for our understanding of the purpose and 
role of labour law, consequences that derive from the growing significance of trans-
national norm-setting in a cross-border frame. In recent decades, normative devel-
opments have occurred that detach spatial dimension of labour protection from the 
territorial allocation of protection as the sole starting point.125 Despite legal ambigu-
ity and diverse experience in different states, transnational agreements add new 
regulatory frameworks and mechanisms to collective labour law. They involve a 
new kind of enhancement of regulatory instruments developing collective rule- 
making capacities and a normative-institutional dimension of labour law in a cross- 
border setting.
In the Western portrait, labour law reflects a certain tradition and culture, and a 
strong influence from labour market organizations. Against this background, an 
assessment of the changing legal landscape of labour protection requires a contex-
tual point of departure. However, globalization challenges this constellation and 
narrows its premises. Countries with a lower level of development cannot be left 
behind. The objective  of decent work requires inclusive responses to global 
123 See also Banks (2011), pp. 48–49.
124 See Brown (2015, 2016).
125 See Mundlak (2009).
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challenges of labour regulation.126 This challenges old models of labour law think-
ing and initiates a search for collective participation mechanisms that best fulfil this 
requirement.
Demands of flexibility posed to labour law have challenged old conceptual 
underpinnings and shaped the understanding of objectives set to labour standards, 
shifting the perspective from a labour rights-based frame towards a standards-based 
one. However, there is a growing need to pay heed to increasing vulnerabilities in 
order to develop ways to make regulatory frames of labour law more inclusive. This 
requires a shift back to labour rights-oriented thinking. As uncertainties are growing 
in the labour market, states need to reactivate in ensuring a better balance between 
flexibility and security. Simultaneously, instead of maintaining the level of formal 
categorizations a deeper account is required so that all who work or would like to 
work are taken at sight. This scene alters the perspective as to questions of exclusion 
and inclusion; and it should alter labour law talk too.127
We have a broadening picture of the ways in which decentralization is changing 
domestic collective bargaining regimes—a picture that draws attention to the basic 
functions of collective labour law. Work for fairer globalization has met one of its 
hardest setbacks in the area of collective labour rights, calling for the ILO to offer a 
clearer vision of the road ahead. There is a need to construct ways to develop regula-
tory responses that highlight not only economic necessities but also equality and 
protection for workers so that the objectives of collective bargaining are considered 
in terms of employability and competitiveness as well as in terms of labour protec-
tion and inclusivity. We should also seek to recognize the impact of the regulatory 
changes we are witnessing at the level of embedded normativities of labour law as 
this would better bring into the spotlight changes in the normative-institutional 
dimension of labour law.
The picture of the challenges to collective labour rights is different when their 
role in a transnational setting is viewed. The evolution of transnational negotiations 
and contractual arrangements at the level of MNEs has been an important develop-
ment adding a new transnational layer to industrial relations.128 Despite uncertain-
ties, conclusion of transnational agreements demonstrates transnational social 
dialogue and institutional development which contribute to promoting compliance 
with fundamental labour rights and international labour standards more generally. 
Transnational negotiations are capable of producing rights-based regulatory frames 
in a cross-border setting. However, core labour standards should be more firmly 
included in these developments. In transnational regulatory developments, much 
work remains to pursue the commitment to core labour standards. As the status of 
fundamental labour rights is particularly weak in cross-border settings, the interna-
tional commitment to foster regulatory development building on these rights would 
126 See also Hepple (2005), p. 19.
127 See for example Alan Bogg and Cynthia Estlund proposing novel ways to view and broaden the 
sphere of the right to the freedom of association, in Bogg and Estlund (2014).
128 Liukkunen (2019a), p. 55.
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require a renewed role for the ILO. In order to deal with vulnerabilities that escape 
the state law frame, the ILO decent work agenda should include a transnational 
dimension.
While historical explanations of the evolution of labour law in industrial societ-
ies can be built with a focus on domestic labour law models, the world of work has 
been so strongly affected by globalization that an isolated evaluation of individual 
national-level regulatory frames for labour protection has become inadequate. The 
risk of inequality, unemployment and poverty is an essential threat to every society, 
and labour standards are meant to offer a buffer against reduced protection.129 In 
essence, any sketch of the labour question of our time has a global face.130
Importantly, the regulatory frame of sustainable development based on the key 
elements of the ILO decent work agenda, employment creation, social protection, 
rights at work, and social dialogue, should be more firmly integrated into global 
perspectives of the labour question if it is to work. Within this frame, a more con-
crete regulatory pursuit initiated by the ILO would send strong signals although it 
would require adopting the goal of a decent life as a frame to address situations 
which hinder decent work.
Still, even in fostering these pursuits, regulatory strategies that are based on 
decent work provide a solid point of departure only if fundamental labour rights are 
strengthened. Decent work connects the fight against inequality to the social dia-
logue and enabling the collective voice of workers. As such, it brings together the 
core content of the system of international labour standards and aspirations deriving 
from the origins of the ILO.
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There has been debate on the international labour standards of the ILO for the whole 
hundred years of its existence. This has concerned the choice of topics themselves, 
the detail in which the norms have been set out, and their ratification and subsequent 
application and supervision. During the last 40 years the debate has been moving 
from one extreme to another. The post-World War II consensus on the need to main-
tain a balance between economic and social progress was an element in reconstruc-
tion and of industrialized countries’ growth and welfare. As of the 1980s, this 
consensus broke down. With increased emphasis on market forces, labour standards 
started being seen as rigidities and impediments to growth. Once the Cold War 
ended, a question in the early 1990s was posed in almost brutal terms: now that the 
common enemy—communist state power—was gone, was there still a need for the 
ILO and its standards?
Socialist political and economic structures crumbled as of 1989 at a pace no one 
had foreseen. This in turn brought about a new transparency and a new openness of 
the entire world economy, enabled by technological change and the utilization of 
real-time sourcing and production. However, the good news of the spread of democ-
racy and markets was accompanied by a shock when especially Western consumers 
found out that new and affordable products from emerging countries were—or 
could be—produced by very young children in miserable conditions. Consumers 
reacted for moral reasons; workers reacted because cheap imports affected their 
jobs. All of a sudden there was a call for universal rules on labour again. After hav-
ing first been sidelined in the frenzy of transition, fundamental rights at work 
became a hotly contested issue in globalization and international trade.
As the world trading system was being reorganized, the question of fundamental 
rights at work turned around the call for a “social clause”, which was designed to 
make access to world trade conditional on observance of labour rights. The world 
trade lobby succeeded in keeping the issue away from the World Trade Organization, 
which was set up in 1995. Efforts to keep the issue alive were largely confined to the 
ILO, which remained, as before, the custodian of international labour standards.
The contents of fundamental human rights at work were clarified by the ILO in 
the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, adopted in 1998.1 
The follow-up to the Declaration boosted these standards by promising technical 
cooperation, with which they now became increasingly linked. The ILO introduced 
an extensive programme of assistance to developing countries for freedom of asso-
ciation, the right to collective bargaining, freedom from forced and child labour and 
multiform action against all forms of discrimination at work.
These fundamental rights—or “core labour standards” as they were also called—
were universally accepted as an element of the new globalized world order. Support 
for applying them and even pressure to do so was assisted by extra-budgetary 
1 ILO, Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. Adopted by the International 
Labour Conference, 86th Session, Geneva, 18 June 1998 (Annex revised 15 June 2010).
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resources from the industrialized countries. For many of them, this was the second 
best option once trade sanctions were discouraged. Fundamental rights made their 
way into international documents governing trade, investment and cooperation. 
They were seen to translate the social dimensions of the new world economy, while 
promoting them was akin to the role of the ILO after the two World Wars.
To what extent this new focus on social justice was genuine or simply words, or 
opportunism, is anybody’s guess. Yet the formula of ILO technical cooperation for 
a level playing field for trade and a means of raising standards among the emerging 
participants of the trading system was appealing. Soon over half of the technical 
cooperation of the ILO was in the field of fundamental rights at work, most of it 
aimed at eliminating child labour.2
Since the financial crisis, which burst out in 2008, and since the recent world-
wide political slide towards extremism, nationalism, xenophobia and brutal egoism, 
we have again heard less about rights at work.
However, the spell of neo-brutalism that we are living through springs from the 
same source as the desire for social and labour rules. Both are driven by fear that the 
forces of globalization have become an existential threat to individuals and societ-
ies. These concerns arise from uncertainties about employment, incomes and main-
tenance of social status in an increasingly volatile world. Two images illustrate what 
has happened. Products from subcontractors with workers in shabby conditions in 
underdeveloped societies have been flooding the markets. Especially since 2015, a 
highly visible flow of migrants and refugees across borders has also been occurring.
These images have been destabilizing industrialized countries while at the same 
time allowing a glimpse of the hopes and despairs of the developing world. Both 
workers and entrepreneurs in all countries have been affected. Most vulnerable have 
been the categories accounting for a significant amount of employment: the self- 
employed and micro- and small and medium enterprises. At the same time, while 
the line dividing opportunity and exclusion has remained endemic in less fortunate 
countries, it has also cut through the richest societies of the world.
The question of fundamental principles and rights at work is an issue for each 
and every society, especially taking into account modern slavery and trafficking, 
zero hours employment contracts, “Uberization” of urban services, the platform 
and gig economies and profiling due to political suspicions, as well as harassment 
and violence at work. Our new divisions are between the wealthy and fortunate on 
the one hand and the struggling and excluded on the other hand at all points of the 
compass. One dividing factor remains the way and extent to which labour stan-
dards are applied. In this complex situation the linkages between standards 
designed as fundamental and other—more “technical”—standards are even more 
topical than in earlier times. In a nutshell, these are so interlinked that it is not 
possible to have any one without the others—as I shall aim to demonstrate in this 
chapter.
2 Tapiola (2018).
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2  Development of International Labour Standards
International labour law was a novel notion in 1919. The standards adopted by the 
ILO are derived from the labour principles of its Constitution.3 These principles had 
in turn been formulated by the trade unions during the First World War and were 
originally proposed as the “labour clauses” of the Peace Treaty. The Versailles 
Treaty did not produce a lasting peace or universal happiness, but at least the system 
of rights expressed in international labour standards was born.
The labour principles of 1919 are the basis of the International Labour Code. 
These principles cover a broad scope of labour rights, starting with freedom of asso-
ciation, hours of work, employment policy, maternity protection, labour inspection, 
social security provisions, minimum age for employment and the health and safety 
of different categories of workers. Most of the labour legislation and practice in the 
world today has been shaped by these principles.
For many decades the corpus of international labour standards grew at a regular 
pace. Most issues were treated by either a Convention or a Recommendation, or in 
a few cases a Protocol. Conventions become binding through national ratification; 
Recommendations form an integral part of the standards system and although they 
are not binding, in principle they should apply to everyone. Other instruments, such 
as Declarations and codes of practice, have complemented the ILO toolkit. They do 
not have the status of labour standards, but they do give guidance for treating labour 
and social issues at national level, including by labour legislation. From the outset, 
this system has been a combination of what we occasionally call “hard” and 
“soft” law.
3  Human Rights Standards
After the Second World War, the normative foundation of the ILO was aligned with 
the need to reaffirm democratic rights and promote development. What we know as 
fundamental rights at work were created by standard-setting on human rights after 
the 1944 International Labour Conference in Philadelphia. This coincided with the 
early years of the United Nations, democratization, decolonization and the Cold War.
Discrimination and forced labour had come into a new focus during the labour 
and extermination camps of the Second Word War. As decolonization proceeded, 
the heavy weight of discrimination and of imperial-age economic interests contin-
ued to hamper the achievement of true national sovereignty.
Decolonization created the African group in the United Nations and the 
ILO. When racial segregation not only continued but became increasingly brutal in 
South and Southern Africa, the issue of discrimination rose to the top of the agenda. 
South Africa was forced to withdraw from the ILO in 1964, but apartheid remained 
3 Article 427, Section II, Chapter VI, Part XIII of the Treaty of Peace of Versailles 1919.
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prominently on the agenda through special procedures in which trade unions and 
employers participated. At the same time, the United States had to accept significant 
measures for desegregation in its Southern States.
The shattering war-time experiences of racial discrimination, forced labour and 
denial of rights of not only workers but also employers played an important role in 
building a consensus on human rights at work. Employers had still been ambivalent 
about the role of Mussolini’s fascist corporations in Italy, but subsequently the 
course of the war showed that their organizations could be equally threatened by 
totalitarian régimes. In 1919, the language of the labour principles of the Constitution 
had affirmed that freedom of association was a right of workers and employers 
alike.4 In the early Cold War years, the ILO recognized that the independence of 
employers was also covered by the concept of trade union rights.5
The questions of freedom of association and forced labour found new relevance 
because of the practice of communist countries. What had been a reaction to the 
atrocities of the fascist regimes carried over to discussion on social, individual and 
economic liberties in reconstruction and economic development. In the labour field, 
during the Cold War, certain human rights—above all freedom of association—
defined the side on which you were between the market economy and communism. 
This placed the main part of the trade unions on the same side of the divide as 
employers. In practice this determined much of the standard-setting after 1948 well 
beyond the fundamental principles and rights at work. Multiple compromises were 
called for in the period between 1945 and 1989—between employers and workers, 
between industrialized and developing countries, and between radical and moderate 
elements of—especially—the Workers’ Group.
During the long tenure of David Morse as Director-General (1948–1970), the 
ILO stressed employment, skills and social policies which were guided by the tri-
partite engagement at the national level of governments, employers and trade 
unions.6 Significant normative work was done on labour inspection and administra-
tion, social security, occupational safety and health, employment and labour market 
policies, gender equality, paid educational leave and holidays with pay.
These were the building blocks of a liberal social development model, based on 
a negotiated balance of interests between and within different constituent groups of 
the ILO. Fifty years ago it earned the ILO the Nobel Peace Prize.
Soon thereafter, however, global changes and technological innovation conspired 
to change the parameters. Multinational enterprises moved production across 
national borders and, in extreme cases, could cause political upheavals, such as the 
coup d’état against Salvador Allende in Chile in 1973. Oil crises and debt crises 
started shaking expectations of stability and continuous growth and prosperity.
4 Ibid.
5 ILO, Resolution concerning the Protection of Trade Union Rights. Adopted by the International 
Labour Conference, 38th Session, Geneva, 1–23 June 1955.
6 Morse (1969), pp. 57–59.
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The result was a relatively rapid sea-change. One of the reasons for this was the 
realization that in large parts of the world trying to reproduce the industrialized 
countries’ development model did not lead to sustained employment. In the 1980s, 
with—especially—European growth lagging, calls for giving more freedom to mar-
ket forces were accompanied by new technology, which allowed real-time cross- 
border production and severed many physical employer-employee links. This was 
followed by accelerated liberalization of trade and capital movements.
4  Establishing the Social Dimension
In the new situation after the end of the Cold War and the global opening of markets, 
the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work of 1998 and its fol-
low- up activities expressed an underlying aim of the ILO: to strengthen the social 
dimension of international economic and social policies. After the First World War, 
the founding of the ILO had brought a social dimension to peacemaking. After the 
Second World War, the ILO had provided the social dimension of both reconstruc-
tion and—once decolonization got under way—of development. The Cold War 
ended without a political or social peace deal with “labour clauses”. The notion of 
universal fundamental rights at work had to assume much of the role of providing 
for a social dimension. In the debate on standards versus deregulation in the global 
market, it worked as a smart battle ram, piercing resistance to all kinds of standards. 
But it could not serve as a broad social contract.
The 1998 Declaration contained consensus on a short-list of “fundamental” 
social and labour rights: freedom of association, the right to collective bargaining, 
abolition of forced labour, elimination of child labour and rejection of discrimina-
tion in employment and occupation, including equal pay for work of equal value 
between women and men.
Each of these four categories of rights was linked to a Convention. Three of the 
four categories had Conventions which at least in principle were universally accept-
able: Nos 87/98 on freedom of association and collective bargaining, Nos 29/105 on 
forced labour and Nos 100/111 on discrimination and equal remuneration. Child 
labour was attached to this short list a bit later.
The years when David Morse, Wilfred Jenks and Francis Blanchard led the ILO 
saw discussion on trade and labour standards. The debate did not in any way start 
only in the 1990s. Additionally, both recognized that besides human rights at work 
such issues as a living wage, labour inspection, health and safety and basic social 
security should be addressed. These were all derived from the original Constitution 
of the ILO but the Conventions on them did not enjoy the same status and consensus 
as the human rights Conventions.
In the early 1990s it was politically necessary to have a manageable list of stan-
dards because of the de facto link to international trade. The OECD produced a 
study which showed how difficult it could be to deal with an extended list of up to 
ten categories of standards, in particular if the link to trade would mean intensified 
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enforcement measures through existing or new supervisory mechanisms of 
Conventions.7
Conventions on wages, social security or occupational safety and health were not 
as widely ratified, and even the leading ones covered only parts of the strategic 
decent work objectives to which they belonged. A large number of Conventions, 
which all had several technical provisions, could thus have become new arguments 
in trade policies. As the stated aim of the post-Cold War debate was liberalization of 
international trade, new entrants to the markets feared that raising too many social 
issues could negate their advantages. The four “fundamentals” were known and 
reasonably safe. A linkage with social security provisions, occupational safety and 
health or the need to ensure a living wage would have been one bridge too far.
Making an operative link to trade through any kind of sanctions mechanism was 
anathema both for emerging countries and employers. However, promoting the rati-
fication and application of fundamental Conventions was not. The four categories 
had been established at the United Nations Social Summit in Copenhagen in 1995, 
with heavy involvement by ILO constituents. The Conventions on freedom of asso-
ciation, collective bargaining, child and forced labour and discrimination were for-
mally recognized as human rights. All countries which had ratified them should 
fully respect their legal obligations while all others should do their best to live up to 
their principles.8
After Copenhagen, ILO Director-General Michel Hansenne launched a ratifica-
tion campaign on the relevant Conventions. At that moment the Minimum Age 
Convention No. 138 was quietly added to the list of “core” Conventions as the then 
applicable standard on child labour.
At the same time, a need clearly existed for an additional human rights standard 
on child labour. The earliest labour legislation at the beginning of the nineteenth 
Century had been on child labour. In the ILO, child labour had always been treated 
through Conventions on the minimum age for employment. This reflected the fact 
that the age of moving into full-time employment should permit compulsory educa-
tion, particularly after universal schooling had become the norm towards the end of 
the nineteenth Century. Sectoral Conventions adopted by the ILO were in 1973 
taken over by the Minimum Age Convention No. 138. However, the ratification rate 
of this Convention was meagre, and it had not been recognized as a priority 
Convention subject to more intense scrutiny.
When the need for benchmarks to define what was most intolerable in the work 
of children came up, the Minimum Age Convention was found to contain a useable 
formula establishing age limits as well as flexibility linked to levels of national 
development and the nature of work. When in 1999 a new Convention on the Worst 
Forms of Child Labour No. 182 was adopted, it built upon this Convention instead 
of revising it. The ratification rate of the Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention 
7 OECD (1996).
8 UN (1995), para 54 (b).
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has broken all records, also delivering ratifications of the Minimum Age Convention 
at a rate which had been unthinkable before.
Child labour was included in the four categories of fundamental rights because 
of the emotionally strong effect of finding out that child labour was a factor in trade. 
It was possible to argue that while it was a normative issue, its eradication called for 
time-bound technical assistance programmes. It was also the item which had the 
lowest level of political resistance: no régime was really threatened by its elimina-
tion. Even the Gulf States agreed to remove young children from camel jockeying 
in widely popular competitions, sometimes replacing them with robots.
The 1998 Declaration was also supposed to offer an easier way than ratification 
for countries to express their commitment. Countries could report annually to the 
Governing Body on their efforts to realize the principles of the Conventions, and 
they could signal the kind of technical cooperation they felt would be necessary to 
support these efforts. This innovative method could be seen as positive encourage-
ment instead of reporting on ratified Conventions, which tended to be more investi-
gative and often controversial.
Sometimes what happens is the unexpected. The new innovative and—presum-
ably customer-friendly—reporting mechanism was in practice soon overtaken by 
what could be called an escape into the safety of the established mechanism. In 
short, instead of availing themselves of the new and apparently “softer” opportunity, 
a large number of countries preferred to ratify the fundamental Conventions instead. 
This was a case of preferring the devil you know to the devil you don’t. As a result, 
the overall ratification rates of the eight fundamental Conventions shot up to over 
90%, with child and forced labour reaching nearly universal levels.
5  The Effects of Technical Cooperation
Such a change in the attitude to ratifications would not have been possible without 
increased linkage to technical cooperation. The traditional view had been that rati-
fication of a Convention would take place only after national law and practice had 
been made to conform to its requirements. When technical cooperation became a 
recognized part of this process, and was increasingly recommended by the stan-
dards supervisory mechanism, it became acceptable to ratify at an earlier stage once 
the political will was there. Technical cooperation would then ensure implementa-
tion. Financing was available, as the industrialized donor countries responded rather 
generously to what they saw as a positive link created between trade and labour 
standards.
What actually happened was that in many cases, instead of countries sliding into 
a conflict and economic and trade sanctions, deficiencies in labour standards led to 
agreements on technical cooperation; this in turn provided a compelling argument 
against sanctions. The credibility of such arrangements was seen to be guaranteed 
by the fact that reporting to, and discussion by, the standards supervisory bodies of 
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the ILO would soon reveal how sincere the engagement of the country con-
cerned was.
Since the early 2000s, fundamental principles and rights at work have become a 
part of a global aquis. Today it is almost unthinkable that, for instance, any politi-
cian or scholar could defend child labour by referring to cultural differences or even 
economic necessity. Likewise, a world-wide consensus has developed on the need 
to take action against human trafficking, which is one of the modern-day features of 
forced labour.
Despite the misgivings of the emerging world, labour standards as seen through 
the prism of the 1998 Declaration have found their way to trade legislation as well. 
This has not taken place so much through outright conditionality as through trade 
preferences accorded to countries which desire to respect fundamental labour stan-
dards. The European trade systems opted to use the ILO’s short-list for trade prefer-
ences. Most bilateral or regional free trade treaties have followed the same pattern, 
either referring to the fundamental Conventions or the 1998 Declaration. The United 
States, however, has continued to apply a broader set of criteria than the fundamen-
tals to its trade policies. This included labour inspection. When the US trade unions 
filed a trade petition because an ultraliberal 2006 Georgian Labour Code—later 
amended—violated freedom of association principles, the case was mainly about 
labour inspection which the Georgian reformers of the former communist system 
had scrapped.9
What I am arguing here is that the focus on fundamental rights at work safe-
guarded the role of international labour standards in general. The standards and 
their application were seen as a remedy to the problems of globalization and not as 
a complication or rigidity. In addition, the wave of ratifications of the fundamental 
Conventions led many countries to review their position on ILO Conventions in 
general. The factual blockage on new ratifications of all Conventions, which char-
acterized especially the 1980s and 1990s, is no longer there.
6  Beyond Fundamental Rights
If we assume that, by now, the case has again been made for standards, it should also 
be possible to expand the scope beyond fundamental rights. This does not mean 
going away from them, but rather beyond them. Actually, this needs to be done even 
for the sake of the fundamentals themselves. Their implementation needs to reach 
out to the full scale of decent work. Whether in the informal or the formal economy, 
anywhere we want to go with the fundamentals, we quickly arrive at the whole nor-
mative basis of society.
We are facing a situation which may at first appear to be contradictory. Frustration 
with detailed regulation, and the obligations of ratifying states compared with a 
9 Office of the United States Trade Representative (2019).
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large number of non-ratifying competitors, had led to a desire to simplify the basic 
rules of the game around a short-list of fundamental standards. This was by and 
large successful. It saved the credibility of the standards system of the ILO, not least 
due to assistance for countries which chose to admit that the problems they experi-
enced in applying standards were due to insufficient capacity and not inadequate 
political will.
However, assistance also showed that when you start to implement fundamental 
rights, you are faced with a large number of practical situations and have to venture 
into a field which is covered with other regulations and practices. To give a simple 
example: after 1998 some millions of US dollars were made available for freedom 
of association in Indonesia. One key tool of the ILO is the Committee on Freedom 
of Association of the Governing Body, but you do not spend millions on advising 
how to write complaints to the CFA. The outcome was a broad programme of social 
dialogue, which included support for the development of trade unions and employ-
ers’ organizations.
7  A Linkage to Adam Smith
It is instructive to note that both the case for workers’ right to organize and linkages 
between fundamental and other rights were outlined in 1776 by Adam Smith in his 
The Wealth of Nations. Smith was the prophet of liberal economics and free trade to 
the extent that British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher reportedly carried his book 
in her voluminous handbag. Writing about the wages of labour, Adam Smith 
observed that workers wanted to gain as much as possible in wages while employers 
conceded as little as possible. Both had an interest in combining (organizing) but 
Parliament had prohibited the workers from doing so. The masters in turn could 
always collude—and tacitly did so—to keep the price of labour down.10
If workers were bereft of their wages, their existence could become untenable in 
a matter of days while employers could weather long periods of conflict. Workers 
could act with the “folly and extravagance of desperate men who must either starve 
or frighten their masters into an immediate compliance with their demands”.11 As a 
result, employers would call upon local authorities who would impose a settlement 
far short of workers’ claims.
But Adam Smith went further. After having described the industrial discipline of 
the day, he also noted that there was a certain point below which wages could not be 
brought down. Workers had to earn enough to bring up a family, which might be at 
least twice the minimum needed for survival. What else is this than a link between 
organizing rights and a “living wage”?




8  A History of Linkages
In the early twentieth Century throughout Europe, the demand for an eight hour day 
was closely associated with the call for universal suffrage. Freedom to express a 
political view is an inalienable part of freedom of association. Another fundamental 
trade union demand was the right of workers to voluntary migration while securing 
equal treatment, i.e. non-discrimination, with national workers.
Factory safety has an intimate link with freedom of association. It is logical that 
workers are engaged through health and safety committees but also ensuring that 
special safety representatives, elected by the workers, have enough authority to 
intervene in a dangerous situation. This is one area where a look at history reminds 
us how much work remains to be done.
In 1911, a fire in New York City killed 146 workers, mainly young immigrant 
women, in the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory. Locked doors and lack of safety mea-
sures contributed to the high toll. The tragedy led soon thereafter to the adoption of 
factory legislation in New York. But it also had another consequence: it intensified 
organizing activities by the Ladies International Garment Workers’ Union, a promi-
nent American trade union. This showed that labour inspection, one of the original 
priorities of the ILO, is only one part of the solution. Empowering workers to defend 
their interests is another, and the most direct road to that is through agreements and 
bargaining between employers and duly authorized workers’ representatives.
Fast forward to our days: we continue to experience similar factory fires and 
disasters in South Asia. This culminated with the collapse in 2013 of the Rana Plaza 
factory building in Dhaka, Bangladesh, with a death toll of 1134. International 
accords for compensation and increased factory safety have since been concluded in 
Bangladesh,12 but there has been little progress in the fundamental question of not 
only hindering but assisting union organization. Also, as with the Triangle Shirtwaist 
Factory fire, factory owners have rarely if at all been made to answer for their 
responsibilities.
9  Taking a “First-Things-First” Approach
As noted above, for the ILO the main way of diminishing the use of child labour lay 
in applying standards on the minimum age for employment. When the opening up 
of global markets made child labour a priority, this standard was seen not to address 
with sufficient vigour the fact that large numbers of working children were well 
under any established minimum age, in conditions preventing education and harm-
ful to their health and morals.
12 Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh, 2013. Available at: https://admin.banglade-
shaccord.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/2013-Accord.pdf. Accessed 4 May 2020.
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A “first-things-first” approach13 was applied to legally prohibited and hazardous 
child labour by the Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention No. 182, which at the 
time of writing is only one short of ratification by all ILO member States. While the 
abolition of all child labour has remained the target, urgent action was to be taken 
against its worst forms. This time a degree of flexibility was accorded by the tradi-
tional provision that governments—together with the social partners—should deter-
mine what kind of work was hazardous and thus eliminated as a priority.
Addressing particularly urgent issues has characterized the standard setting of 
the ILO in the era of globalization. The ILO has increasingly focused on vulnerable 
groups and urgencies with such instruments as the HIV/AIDS Recommendation in 
2000 and the Conventions on Domestic Workers in 2010 and Violence at Work 
2019. The Protocol against trafficking, attached in 2014 to the Forced Labour 
Convention No. 29, belongs to this same category.
Different areas of social policy were extensively set out by Convention No. 102 
of 1952, which despite wide policy agreement has gained only a limited number of 
ratifications. In line with the “first-things-first” approach, a normative move towards 
universal social security coverage was undertaken by the adoption of a 
Recommendation on Social Protection Floors, 2012 (No. 202). While it is not pos-
sible to globally determine minimum protection levels that could be applicable to 
all, the Recommendation set out the principle that everyone in every country should 
have at least a basic level of protection. The Recommendation does not undermine 
or set aside the comprehensive Social Security Convention No. 102, which remains 
a state of the art instrument. Nor does it aim to set minimum levels which, if enforced 
as the minimum everywhere, would inevitably put more pressure on those who 
already have achieved higher levels of protection.
At the same time the coverage of standards has extended to the informal econ-
omy with a Recommendation adopted in 2015. The Recommendation aims to 
increase the organizing of all workers and economic units—enterprises and house-
holds—in the entire informal economy where 62% of the global workforce is to be 
found. Of particular importance, too, is the Decent Work for Peace and Resilience 
Recommendation, 2017 (No. 205). This replaced a Recommendation adopted by 
the International Labour Conference in 1944 on transition from war to peace. The 
Recommendation outlines measures for relief and reconstruction after not only war 
and conflict but also natural disasters. The employment and social effects of the 
COVID-19 pandemic have made this Recommendation particularly topical.
In the area of maritime labour, all existing instruments—binding and nonbind-
ing—were in 2006 combined in a coherent, living and continuously updated instru-
ment for an inherently globalized sector of work. It incorporates both obligatory 
measures and recommendations and has an in-built review and revision mechanism. 
The large number of ratifications of this Convention is persuasive evidence of the 





In adopting the Centenary Declaration on the Future of Work, the 2019 
International Labour Conference requested the Governing Body “to consider, as 
soon as possible, proposals for including safe and healthy working conditions in the 
ILO’s framework of fundamental principles and rights at work”.14 This does not 
necessarily call for amending the 1998 Declaration in some way.
One of the purposes of the 1998 Declaration was to achieve cohesion between 
the four categories of rights that it covers. With occupational safety and health, the 
next step might well be achieving more cohesion between existing standards and 
policy instruments. This could be done in several ways. A state of the art overview 
could lead into drafting a summary of principles which are common to existing 
instruments and can be linked to the ILO Constitution. The result could be either a 
Declaration or some other authoritative document, which could include a cross- 
reference to the 1998 Declaration. It would also be feasible to apply the “first- 
things- first” approach to determine action against the most dangerous but common 
hazards, rather in the way that the Social Floors Recommendation has done. The 
next recurrent discussion on occupational safety and health in the International 
Labour Conference would be a good place to propose decisions on future steps.
10  Where to Go Next with Standards?
The question has been often posed: to what extent has the International Labour 
Code already been completed? I would argue that the answer is, to some extent yes 
but there is always unfished business. In the last hundred years, we have covered 
virtually all of the basic elements of social justice as identified by the Constitution 
of the ILO. Yet we have to continue to adapt standards so that they maintain their 
relevance to structural, technological, economic and political changes in the world 
economy.
Work is a moving target, and the International Labour Code will never be com-
plete in any case. Some of the early maritime labour standards covered occupations 
which no longer exist. Some of the early protective approaches to the work of 
women, such as prohibiting night work, have been replaced by demands for equality 
and safety. Furthermore, the necessary adaptation does not always need to be 
done—and in some cases cannot be done—by drafting new standards.
The potential of Recommendations is being harnessed. But this may not yet be 
sufficiently matched by the fact that Recommendations, as standards, are subject to 
overview by the standards supervisory mechanism. It would be entirely feasible to 
focus more on the information that can be obtained under Article 19 of the 
Constitution from not only Recommendations but also non-ratified Conventions.
14 ILO, Resolution on the ILO Centenary Declaration for the Future of Work. International Labour 
Conference, 108th Session, Geneva, 21 June 2019.
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We cannot run behind each change in labour conditions, trying to put up a new 
standard here or there. If we try this, by the time a Convention is adopted and effec-
tive, the issue may well have mutated into something else. What we need instead is 
a combination of standards and social dialogue, which is the singular contribution 
of the ILO over the last hundred years.
11  Standards in the Twenty-First Century
In the 1970s, the ILO adopted 23 Conventions. In the next decade, the number of 
Conventions was 16. In the 1990s, a total of 13 Conventions were adopted, and the 
number of stand-alone Recommendations increased. In the first decade of this mil-
lennium six Conventions were adopted. The second decade of the millennium has 
seen two Conventions, one Protocol and three stand-alone Recommendations. On 
the other hand, since 1998 the ILO has adopted three Declarations. These are not 
standards in the legal sense of the word, but one of their aims is to give instructions 
on how standards should be universally applied.
Thirty years ago, the combination of globalizing markets and the end of Cold 
War confrontation brought the issue of regulation and labour standards into new 
focus. Ever since this soul-searching started, standard-setting has been behaving 
differently.
In the first 20 years of this century, all the different instruments available to the 
ILO have been used. The latest Conventions are on such issues as domestic workers 
and violence at work. Recent stand-alone Recommendations deal with HIV/AIDS 
in the workplace, social protection floors, the informal economy and post-conflict 
transition to peace. The concept of Decent Work, launched by ILO Director-General 
Juan Somavia and pursued by his successor Guy Ryder has entered the body of 
standards. Through the Protocol to the 1930 Forced Labour Convention, the ILO 
covered the issue of human trafficking and also revised the Convention. In addition, 
in 2018 the Conference for the first time abrogated obsolete Conventions.
The work on international labour standards is not drying up. It is alive and well, 
and is adapting to the economic, social, political and technological changes of a 
globalized economy.
12  The State and the Social Partners
It is necessary to further reflect on the role of the state as well as the ILO’s constitu-
ents, trade unions and employers. When in 2002 President Tarja Halonen came to 
Geneva to co-chair for the first time the ILO’s World Commission on the Social 
Dimensions of Globalization, she defined the task in a simple and sensible way. The 
aim of the exercise should be to rehabilitate the social state. Since the technological 
changes of the 1980s and post-Cold War liberalization, with its shock therapies, the 
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role of the state in guaranteeing basic welfare and services for its citizens has been 
under attack. Yet there are limits to how far the state can abandon or outsource its 
responsibilities. Crisis situations bring us rapidly to those limits.
All states of the European and Central Asian region have ratified the eight 
Conventions on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. This is a reaffirmation 
of the rule of law in their systems, which continue to aspire to the aims of a welfare 
state. Yet the economic, political and structural shocks of the last decade have had 
serious consequences. A feature of globalization is that prosperity and deprivation 
not only coexist but are increasing in all societies, whatever label we give to them.
One of the lessons of 20 years of technical cooperation on fundamental princi-
ples and rights is that their strength and sustainability depend on how they affect the 
individual and collective rights of workers and employers. For instance, freedom of 
association needs to be followed up by social dialogue and institution building. 
Eradicating discrimination calls for a competent labour inspectorate, gender equal-
ity and policies on migration and supporting different vulnerable groups. It also 
calls for a continuous effort to raise the social protection floors of societies. A case 
in point is the way in which health and safety measures have to rely on enabling 
workers to survey and intervene when conditions are inadequate and downright 
dangerous. This calls for competence-building for workers—and their right to con-
sultation, negotiation and organization.
A significant proportion of labour and social issues are resolved through negotia-
tions and social dialogue between the partners directly concerned. They make 
agreements which are legally binding on both parties. At times, in the discussion on 
what is binding and what is not, we seem to forget that voluntary bargaining pro-
duces legally binding outcomes.
International labour standards are negotiated, implemented and supervised 
through a process which is at times either bipartite or tripartite. With a combination 
of private and public actors and national and global pressures, participation by 
everyone is crucial. It is at workplaces where a universal principle becomes reality. 
Once we are clear about the principles, those directly concerned—employers and 
trade unions—are the ones who should find practical solutions to be applied. As 
before, it is in the self-interest of the state to support these processes with institu-
tional and economic support.
Consequently, the worst thing that we can do is to saw off the branch of social 
dialogue. Our economic salvation and prosperity lies in the way in which rules—
such as international labour standards—are implemented in practice. The state will 
continue to play a role in this, but we should increasingly enable the constituents of 
the ILO to determine how this is done. No central authority can have an overview 
and control of the endless amount of individual situations faced by employers, 
workers and local institutions. Here lies the real social responsibility of both man-
agement and labour.
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13  Annex: A Timeline of the ILO and Globalization
13.1  The Founding of the ILO
The ILO was founded in 1919  in response to demands that clauses dealing with 
labour would be included in the Peace Treaty after the First World War. In this way 
the ILO was to provide the social dimension of the settlement after the Great War, 
which was supposed to end all wars.
The founding principles of the ILO were based on proposals made during and 
after the War by the trade unions of the Allied and Central Powers as well as neutral 
countries. They were particularly clearly expressed at conferences held in Leeds 
(1916) and Berne (1917 and 1919). Most of these goals were shared by Labour 
Parties and socially progressive intellectuals, academics and politicians of the time.
The Constitution of the ILO declared that universal peace was possible only 
through social justice. The basic aim of the ILO was to guarantee social justice 
through a minimum level of standards which would avoid competition between 
countries at the expense of labour conditions.
One of the founders of the ILO, the Belgian legal scholar Ernst Mahaim, 
explained the international dimension in the following way: “The concept of inter-
national legislation is from the outset opposed to that of absolutely unrestricted 
international competition.The idea is to allow relative freedom of competition, 
based on some degree of equality in costs of production; certain humanitarian 
requirements are to be taken out of the sphere of competition. This means that 
health, life and human dignity are regarded as benefits of supreme value. 
Humanitarian ideals are given precedence over considerations of economic profit.”
Mahaim wrote these thoughts in the seminal history of the creation of the ILO, 
edited by James Shotwell in 1934. Shotwell—an influential negotiator on the 
American team in Paris in 1919—later recalled that the name of the “International 
Labour Organization” was something of a misnomer. What was created was an 
international economic organization to deal with labour problems.
The fact that different labour conditions affect trade had been discussed since the 
end of the slave trade and the beginning of industrialization. Labour issues were 
particularly urgent at the end of the First World War because of the Russian 
Revolution in 1917 and strikes by workers in many European countries. Tripartite 
cooperation thus became an acceptable alternative to conflict and revolution. This 
was supported by the non-revolutionary trade union movement, which was given a 
voice and a vote in decisions on laws and policies.
Throughout its history, the ILO has been confronted with the choice between 
revolt or reform. It has promoted the method of negotiations and incremental 
improvements as opposed to rejection and full-scale upheaval. Looking back 
today—with the experience of complex social, political and economic phenomena 
such as globalization—it has consistently searched to maximize the benefits of 
change while minimizing its negative consequences.
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13.2  Albert Thomas 1920–1932
A priority of the French first Director of the ILO, Albert Thomas, was to establish 
the ILO as an actor in its own right in international economic policy making. He was 
only partly successful in this, due to reluctance on the part of governments and 
employers. However, he succeeded in getting the ILO to the table at important eco-
nomic conferences in the 1920s, thus setting a pattern for ILO participation in world 
governance.
Thomas was more successful with promoting the rights of trade unions, which 
were often still viewed with suspicion, even hostility. Thomas supported integrating 
the unions in economic policy making, but he was criticized by employers, by the 
Soviet Union as well as by authoritarian and fascist political leaders.
The development of the new science of industrial relations further underlined the 
need to recognize and expand the role of trade unions. In his last report, in 1932, 
Albert Thomas explored the potential of both economic planning and industrial 
relations. However, it was difficult to defend the idea of planning because of the 
example of the Soviet Union, which remained a political threat and a challenge due 
to its stated support for revolutionary action by workers. Yet the ILO could show 
that, in times of crisis, the state had an important role in sustaining employment and 
production.
The United States stayed outside the ILO in 1919 although it had been instru-
mental in the peace negotiations. Yet some American businessmen were interested 
in engaging with it in studies on scientific management.
13.3  Depression and the New Deal 1932–1938
Unemployment was discussed regularly by the International Labour Conference 
and the ILO Governing Body. This focus soon widened from employment to the 
organization of production and the way in which economic policies were conducted.
With the Great Depression of the 1930s, the ILO’s response was close to that of 
John Maynard Keynes. During the time of both Albert Thomas and his successor as 
Director, the British Harold Butler (1932–1938), the ILO supported going beyond 
unemployment insurance by public works programmes. These were a key element 
of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal in the United States. They were also in line 
with the ILO’s belief in an organized but democratic managed market economy, 
which helped convince the USA to join the ILO in 1934.
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13.4  Interruption by War
The main contribution of the American Director of the ILO, John Winant 
(1938–1941) was to evacuate the ILO from Geneva to Montreal, Canada. The ILO 
faced an existential threat. Germany’s ambitions included replacing the ILO by a 
fascist international labour organization.
The ILO was unable to achieve an in-depth conference discussion on tripartite 
cooperation before the Second World War interrupted its work. The experiences and 
lessons of war-time tripartite cooperation in Allied and neutral countries were 
examined at an extraordinary ILO Conference in 1941 in New York. Edward Phelan, 
the Irish Acting Director and later Director General (1941–1948) presented a report 
arguing why the ILO and tripartite cooperation needed to have a role for when the 
time came for reconstruction after the war.
The ILO’s philosophy was in line with the democratic principles of the Allied 
countries. The Atlantic Charter of Roosevelt and Churchill, drafted in 1941, con-
tained a reference to labour standards.
The 1944 International Labour Conference in Philadelphia made the ILO fully 
functional again. The Philadelphia Declaration strengthened the ILO’s claim to be 
involved in all policy making. Tripartite cooperation was not limited to social ques-
tions; it extended to international economic policy as well as questions of war and 
peace. Eventually, the construction of European institutions involved consultative 
arrangements with employers and workers.
In this way the post-war role of the ILO was to provide the social dimension of 
reconstruction. In 1919–1939 tripartite cooperation had largely been a process at the 
international level, but now it became recognized as a national tool.
Despite the misgivings of the Soviet Union—due to the presence of free employ-
ers and independent trade unions—the ILO’s status was confirmed as the first 
Specialized Agency of the United Nations family in 1946.
The notion of human rights was expressed after Philadelphia in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights which the United Nations adopted in 1948. The ILO 
adopted Conventions on freedom of association and the right to collective bargain-
ing, forced labour and non-discrimination (including equal pay for work of equal 
value) in the 1940s and 1950s. If they had been adopted by the United Nations, 
employers and trade unions would not have had a role in drafting, promoting and 
supervising them.
13.5  The Golden Decades
The three decades following World War II are sometimes called “golden” or “glori-
ous”. This applied above all to Europe and the rest of the OECD area. The ILO was 
managed by the American David Morse (1948–1970), who had first-hand experi-
ence of German reconstruction. The global situation started to change rapidly due to 
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the wave of decolonization, which transformed the composition of the ILO. The 
multilateral system of the United Nations differed radically from that of the League 
of Nations.
The Western market economy produced unprecedented growth, including in 
terms of incomes and social security for workers who increasingly formed the mid-
dle class of industrialized societies. While decolonization changed the global com-
position of states, it did not bring prosperity and security which would have been 
comparable to reconstruction in Europe and Japan. It created new needs and expec-
tations for vast numbers of people, but it also provoked high levels of frustration.
The ILO participated from the beginning in the technical cooperation activities 
of the United Nations, which were aimed at helping the newly independent coun-
tries gain the necessary know-how to run their economies and societies. During the 
first two decades of its existence, the ILO had concentrated on international labour 
standards and knowledge and research. Now technical cooperation meant working 
physically on the ground, with governments, employers and trade unions in coun-
tries which had gained political independence but needed advice and help to man-
age their economy and society.
The human rights aspect of decolonisation was particularly marked in the case of 
apartheid in South Africa. African nations’ opposition to apartheid almost blew up 
the 1963 International Labour Conference. It was the last vestige of colonial rule. In 
the 1920s and 1930s, Workers’ Group members had pressured the ILO to take a 
stronger stand against forced labour in the colonies. The governments’ general atti-
tude had been to limit and regulate forced labour; the trade unions insisted success-
fully that the aim was to abolish it.
13.6  Rivalries Between Groups
Sovereignty was a significant concern for many of the newly independent countries. 
In many of them, the new leaders had participated in national liberation movements. 
They wanted assistance but not patronizing while the former imperial powers did 
not want to give up the benefits that years of dependence had generated. At the same 
time, the Cold War produced rivalries between the market economies and socialist 
systems.
The collective answer of the developing world was to aim at a New International 
Economic Order (NIEO). One of its cornerstones was sovereignty and strong gov-
ernment, which did not tolerate much internal opposition. Consequently, the NIEO 
was never accepted as such in the ILO where both employers and workers insisted 
on their autonomy and respect for international labour standards. In the ILO, the 
workers wanted to speak of a new international “economic and social order”.
The workers generally agreed with the developing countries on economic poli-
cies, while on standards and rights they agreed with the industrialized democracies 
as well as with employers who opposed state intervention. Much of the support by 
employers for freedom of association in the ILO during the post-war reconstruction 
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era was due to their insistence on free enterprise as opposed to communist state 
management.
13.7  Development or Rather Lack of It
In the newly independent countries, much of the body of international labour stan-
dards applied only for part of the economy. Independence alone and the growth of 
now indigenous activities did not produce jobs beyond a small circle. Industrialization 
thus increasingly proved not to be the solution. Neither the liberal market economy 
model nor the socialist development model could be successfully replicated in the 
developing world.
When the expected outcomes did not materialize, the ILO launched a World 
Employment Programme in the 1960s. This was a multidisciplinary approach to 
economic and social development problems, with an attempt at understanding the 
underlying factors of development.
At the same time, powerful new economic actors emerged on the world scene. 
The most significant were multinational enterprises, a factor with potential eco-
nomic as well as political consequences. Some of them served the interests of their 
home countries, to the detriment of host governments. The most notable case was 
Chile, where a US multinational enterprise was involved in the coup d’état against 
president Salvador Allende in September 1973.
As a result, a new consensus emerged: there had to be both national and interna-
tional guidance for the behaviour of multinational enterprises. The basic aim was to 
maximize the benefits of activities by international enterprises while minimizing 
their negative effects. This same principle has been later applied to technological 
change, structural adjustment—and to globalization.
Up to the end of the 1970s, the main hypothesis for future development was that 
of a mixed economy, with coexistence between private and public activities. In 
Sweden, plans were developed for wage earners’ funds which would control much 
of the economy. The German practice of co-determination, Mitbestimmung, inspired 
different proposals for industrial democracy. This was not socialism; at most it was 
convergence.
The ILO, with capitalist, socialist and developing countries and different con-
figurations of their workers and employers, tried to maintain a balance. The ideal 
outcome would have been convergence between the economic systems. But this did 
not happen. In fact, when capitalism and socialism “converged”, this did not take 




13.8  Market Forces Reassert Themselves (1980–1989)
In the late 1970s the socially successful European economy started lagging behind. 
The same happened in Japan. A number of developing countries (such as Mexico) 
were confronted with debt crises. This led to an ideological conclusion: the indus-
trialized countries and their economic models had allegedly developed rigidities 
because they had too much regulation for social and labour aims. It became fashion-
able again to speak of encouraging what John Maynard Keynes had critically called 
“the animal spirits” of the market.
This return to the markets was accompanied by significant technological change. 
This affected the way enterprises functioned. The model of management changed 
due to information and communication technology. Increased computerization 
enabled real time control of production in several locations in different countries. At 
the same time, traditional links were being cut between labour and management in 
the work collective.
Attempts to deal with what was labelled structural adjustment did not produce 
much tripartite consensus in the ILO. As Director-General (1974–1989), Francis 
Blanchard, from France, was successful with advancing technical cooperation with 
the developing world. He also brought China back into the sphere of ILO activities. 
However, he experienced more difficulties when the expectations and priorities of 
industrialized and developing countries differed increasingly from one another. At 
the same time, they were experiencing difficulties arising out of lack of employment 
and growth and persistent poverty.
The ILO was very much focused on the developing world while the basis of its 
activities in the industrialized countries weakened. The centralized state-led model 
of the communist countries was about to disappear. Since 1919 the ILO had played 
a significant role as an alternative to communism. Now, however, the threat of revo-
lution seemed no longer to be there. Instead, consensus strengthened around a mar-
ket economy model with more flexible social and labour rules.
In the industrialized countries, the post-World War II generation had come to 
believe that the ILO’s basic task was to deal with the developing world. That was 
where employment growth and social stability were needed. However, the same 
problems that they tried to cope with now started to resurface at home.
The dynamics in the 1980s in Europe were dominated on the one side by Margaret 
Thatcher’s United Kingdom, with a bitter miners’ strike and lingering class conflict. 
At the same time, the internal market of the European Economic Community (later 
the EU) was built up by Commission President Jacques Delors through the intro-
duction of social dialogue. Delors believed that a deepening internal market needed 
the support of the social partners, especially the trade unions. Margaret Thatcher 
was set on resurrecting a hard market economy despite trade union resistance. The 
beginnings of Brexit lie in these contradictory views about how to deal with labour 
and social questions.
Since the early days of the ILO, it had been accepted that social and employment 
concerns could legitimately slow down economic activity. In the 1980s, this belief 
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was being revisited. The factors that affected it were the increasing role of private 
economic interests, especially MNEs, which were usually supported by the govern-
ments of their home countries. However, the MNEs grew more transnational and 
less dependent on national governments. The alternatives were limited, as neither 
the communist model nor centralized public management produced prosperity.
By the end of the Cold War, multinational enterprises had been recognized as a 
new and powerful international phenomenon. Attempts by the United Nations, the 
ILO and the OECD to regulate these multinational forces had shown the extent to 
which the rules of the game could not be enforced.
After three decades of economic, social and employment growth, the 1980s led 
to a rehabilitation of market forces and private entrepreneurship and a demand for 
more flexible social and labour standards. The process of setting up the ILO in 1919 
had proved that international labour standards could be implemented only through 
national laws. There was no applicable jurisdiction over multinational entities. As 
the UN, the ILO and the OECD soon had to accept, the only way to get beyond non- 
binding recommendations was through follow-up mechanisms which provided for 
consultation and dialogue.
13.9  The Brave New Global Market Economy
The Berlin Wall started to crack at least a decade before it actually came down in 
November 1989. Parallel to the new technological and market-oriented policy in the 
West, the socialist countries had started realizing that their system no longer worked. 
In China, the reforms of the late 1970s led to inviting multinational enterprises to 
join partnerships between the market and social and political state control. The 
socialist countries of Europe, and Hungary in particular, sought a new balance by 
encouraging some market forces.
The systemic change led to both economic change and political democratization. 
However, the change went well beyond the dismantling of the European barriers 
between communism and the free market economies. Democratization took place 
almost everywhere. The apartheid system in South Africa was dismantled. Single- 
party systems in Francophone Africa came to an end, and former British colonies 
carried out multiparty elections. In Latin America there was a shift to the left, away 
from military rule.
On the economic side, the former socialist countries needed a radical new start. 
At the same time, the developing countries that entered the orbit of global trade 
wanted to gain maximum advantage in terms of what they had—one of them being 
abundant labour. The new global market economy came about through a rush to 
gain maximum advantage. One consequence of the changes was promotion of trade 
through the setting up of a new World Trade Organization in 1995. The expectations 
of the new participants in the global markets were vast. The general assumption was 
that there would be significant trade liberalization and no new trade restrictions.
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Throughout the 1980s, the emphasis on the sovereignty of independent countries 
had run into conflict with ever clearer signs of interdependence. The phenomenon 
of multinational enterprises had increased awareness of the constraints created by 
private entities, which were increasingly outside state control. The liberalization of 
financial markets and capital movements increased this trend. The leading industri-
alized governments pursued pro-market policies which either by design or as a con-
sequence diminished the state’s role in the economy and narrowed the space for 
social and labour policies.
13.10  Search for Social Rules of Competition
In contrast to the endings of the world wars in 1919 or 1945, there was no peace 
treaty when the Cold War evaporated, no settlement, and no social dimension. This 
was not on the agenda of the United Nations or other international bodies dealing 
with transition from state controlled to market economies and the opening of mar-
kets. The closest the world community came to that were the negotiations for creat-
ing a real World Trade Organization. There was only limited scope for social 
concerns in the process that led to the WTO in 1995.
In the industrialized countries, employment and prosperity of workers were 
being threatened by the new and unregulated operation of the global production 
system. When walls came down, what appeared on the other side was that the prob-
lems that the ILO had wrestled with throughout its lifetime were still there: child 
labour, forced labour, discrimination and limitations on freedom of association. Not 
only were they there: the trade of several countries was boosted by unacceptable 
labour standards.
The result was a discussion on a possible social clause in trade agreements so 
that trade liberalization would be conditioned by respect for certain fundamental 
labour standards. There were different views on whether this should be managed by 
the WTO or the ILO, or both, and how.
Michel Hansenne, from Belgium, who was Director-General of the ILO 
1989–1999, presented to the 1974 International Labour Conference a report which 
recognized the new context and explored ways to deal with it. He disagreed with the 
idea of a social clause in the WTO but maintained that the social dimension of trade 
liberalization could be encouraged. The immediate focus was on trade, but the 
agenda was soon redirected into a more general discussion on globalization. It was 
at this stage that the concept of globalization entered the multilateral vocabulary.
The ILO has always striven to find a negotiated, consensus-based solution to 
situations which are inherently conflictual. Since the early 1990s the ILO had 
increasingly tried to help put an end to child labour, which had become an acute 
issue due to the opening of world markets. There were popular calls for banning the 
imports of all goods produced by children or boycotts of imports from countries 
which did nothing against child labour.
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In stressing technical cooperation to eliminate child labour, to monitor produc-
tion and education and training as an alternative for children who had not yet fin-
ished their basic schooling, the ILO acted in exactly the way in which labour 
standards and tripartite cooperation were used as an alternative to revolutions and 
disruption. In 1919 there had been attempts to export (and import) revolutions. This 
time the question was of trade, which was seen to undermine incomes and minimum 
safety for workers.
The WTO stated categorically that labour standards were a matter for the ILO 
and called on all Member States to assist the ILO in setting and supervising them. 
This led to a Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, adopted by 
the International Labour Conference in June 1998. The Declaration determined that 
every member of the ILO had to respect the principles of freedom of association and 
the right to collective bargaining, abolition of forced labour, elimination of child 
labour and non-discrimination in employment and occupation (including equal 
remuneration).
The novelty of the Declaration was that it concerned not only those countries that 
had ratified the Conventions of these four human rights categories. The obligations 
extended to all. Those who had no legal obligations through ratifications had the 
obligation, arising out of the ILO Constitution, to strive to realize the principles. 
Reports were requested and examined from all countries. This led to debate, espe-
cially on China, the Gulf States and the United States. In addition, the Declaration 
recommended technical cooperation as the way to resolve shortcomings in the 
application of fundamental standards. This opened the road to using technical coop-
eration on a large scale for human rights problems in the labour field. In general, the 
countries concerned recognized that technical cooperation could be a real alterna-
tive to trade or other boycotts.
13.11  Decent Work
The notion of Decent Work was developed by the Chilean Director-General of the 
ILO, Juan Somavia, in his first report upon taking office in 1999. The aim was not 
to change the aims of the ILO but to repackage them. The ILO budget had expanded 
to 39 major programmes, and Somavia concluded that an organization with so many 
priorities had no priorities at all. He cut the number to four: employment, social 
protection, standards, and social dialogue. “Decent Work” was a convenient way to 
express these aims—but especially after Amartya Sen’s recognition of it as a devel-
opment paradigm at the 1999 International Labour Conference, it became the 
framework for managing and carrying out ILO activities.
Decent Work remains a shorthand way of expressing the ILO’s purpose. It also 
underlines the interdependence between actions in these fields. To succeed in the 
sustainable promotion of Decent Work, it was necessary to engage all four areas of 
action. Gradually the notion of Decent Work became accepted by the multilateral 
system, including the United Nations.
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13.12  The Globalization Commission 2002–2004
The international dimension of Decent Work—or in other words, the link between 
decent work and globalization—was examined in depth by a tripartite World 
Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization, co-chaired by Presidents 
Tarja Halonen of Finland and Benjamin Mkapa of Tanzania. The Commission sur-
veyed the full range of social and labour issues. It built on the traditional aim of 
maximizing benefits and minimizing negative effects. One of its messages was that, 
to be acceptable, globalization must be fair—and it must be seen to be fair.
The World Commission also commented on the fundamental principles and 
rights at work of the 1998 Declaration, pushing them one step further. While the 
Declaration had noted that these rights should not be used for protectionist pur-
poses, the Commission added that nor should denial of these rights be used to gain 
competitive advantage.
In 2008, this principle was included in the ILO Declaration on Social Justice for 
a Fair Globalization. This Declaration was designed to be the compass for promo-
tion of fair globalization based on Decent Work.
13.13  The Financial Crisis and the Global Jobs Pact
The 2008 Declaration underlines that the four objectives of the ILO—the objectives 
of Decent Work—are inseparable, interrelated and mutually supportive. This prob-
ably was the strongest recognition of interdependence up to that date in the official 
positions of the ILO. Furthermore, it created a follow-up in the International Labour 
Conference. Henceforth each strategic objective would be regularly and in turn dis-
cussed by the Conference. The aim was to determine how the issues have devel-
oped, how ILO programmes were working, and what improvements—including 
new or revised international labour standards—would be needed.
So far this system of recurrent items has led to adoption of a Recommendation 
on Social Protection Floors; a protocol against Trafficking of people for the Forced 
Labour Convention 1930 (No. 29); and an agreement to work further on labour 
conditions in global supply chains. In other words, the different negative aspects of 
globalization are being tackled by the ILO with concrete normative action and tech-
nical cooperation.
The era of globalization provoked tripartite discussions which, in turn, led to 
instruments and action on which there was broad consensus. A consensus was 
reached on the Global Jobs Pact, adopted at the International Labour Conference in 
2009, which included a Jobs Summit of several Presidents. However, it did not lead 
to extensive follow-up measures. This is all the more regrettable, as the initiative 
came from employers—especially from national employers who had started feeling 
the pressures of the financial crisis. Yet one consequence has been that, since 2009, 
the ILO has regularly been invited to participate in the G20 Leaders’ Summit 
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meetings. The Labour and Social Affairs Ministers of the G20 group also meet, and 
they consult with international employers’ organizations and trade unions.
There is a difference in the approach of the Employers’ and Workers’ Groups. 
For the workers, the natural model of a follow-up has been the international labour 
standards system, which can reach out to legal or at least semi-legal conclusions 
concerning violations of rights. The employers’ vision generally is more of systems 
of information and consultation, without sanctions or legal obligations. It is not 
surprising that, for a hundred years, the workers have been advocating adoption of 
Conventions whereas, for the employers, the preferred form of instrument has been 
a Recommendation.
13.14  The Future of Work and the Centenary Declaration
Juan Somavia’s successor, Guy Ryder from Great Britain, was elected Director- 
General of the ILO in 2012. He has directed much attention to the future of work. A 
new tripartite Global Commission—set up to study the topic—made its recommen-
dations in January 2019. They were the basis for the Centenary Declaration, adopted 
by the International Labour Conference in June 2019.
In that Declaration, the word “globalization” is mentioned only twice. Does this 
mean that priorities have shifted? The context is more important than the frequency 
of mention. The Declaration is quite honest in asserting the basis of the world econ-
omy as it has developed over the last three decades. It supports the private sector as 
“a principal source of economic growth and job creation” while the public sector is 
“a significant employer and provider of quality public services”.
This could be seen as the definite end to a period of competition between private 
and public development models. In this context, Decent Work appears as the key to 
sustainable development, conflict resolution and prevention, and cohesive nation 
building. In the context of globalization, the Centenary Declaration reaches out to 
one of the main Constitutional assertions, namely that the failure of any country to 
treat its workers humanely is an obstacle to all other countries which desire to do so. 
Fittingly, the Declaration weaves together the threads from over one hundred years 
to produce a narrative which, while not new, is the result of continuous review and 
updating.
In this light, it is logical that after the years of adjusting the principles of social 
justice to the challenges of a globalized world, it is important to determine what 
kind of concrete action needs to be taken. The Conference of 2019 adopted a new 
Convention on Violence and Harassment at Work. This Convention (No. 190) 
reminds us that freedom from violence and harassment at work is a human right, 
and in working life the rules have to cover everyone, irrespective of the contractual 
form of their employment. In addition, the Conference asked for further strengthen-




This can be seen as a logical trajectory for the ILO. A hundred years ago the ILO 
was first preoccupied by such questions as hours of work, minimum age for employ-
ment, and protection against unemployment as well as conditions before and after 
active years of work. The brutality of World War II highlighted the role of interna-
tional labour standards for democracy, thus promoting recognition of universal 
human rights. This was followed by decolonization and technical assistance and, 
later on, the search for social principles of globalization.
The principles have been clarified but have not changed. Their application must 
be adapted to economic and social realities—both national and international. The 
ILO would be well advised to move ahead with as concrete application as possible 
of the principles which were for the first time adopted in its Constitution in 1919 and 
recognized as guidelines for social justice ever since. The rule of law must be main-
tained as the basic framework. Within it, any consensus at the parliamentary and 
macro-economic levels needs to be translated into specific agreements and real 
action at the national, sectoral and local level. Tripartite cooperation and collective 
bargaining play a crucial role here. This is the way to promote universal principles 
at the level of workplaces and enterprises—and society in general.
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1  Introduction
International labour standards are important and deserve every effort to ensure mon-
itoring and enforcement. The fundamental objective of the ILO, which owes its 
existence to the Treaty of Versailles and is therefore directly linked to the tragedy of 
World War I, is set out in the preamble to the Constitution. Its first sentence reads: 
“In the long run, world peace can only be built on social justice”. Who would deny 
that today? A certain reorientation of the goals of the ILO then took place, under the 
impression of the Second World War, with the Philadelphia Declaration of 1944. Its 
much quoted first principle is: “Work is not a commodity”. This statement seems 
more relevant today than ever. Global value chains, the increasing importance of 
artificial intelligence and the expanding platform economy clearly open up opportu-
nities, but at the same time they are accompanied by considerable risks for working 
people. These risks should remind us of our task to ensure that work does not 
become a commodity in the future.
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To achieve this, two things are needed: first, the existence of international stan-
dards that take into account the realities of current labour markets, and second, 
adequate monitoring and effective enforcement of those standards. This chapter is 
devoted to the issue of monitoring and enforcement. It starts by outlining the exist-
ing system (Sect. 2) and then looks at how better monitoring and enforcement could 
be ensured in the future (Sect. 3). Three issues will be addressed in this regard: 
improved cooperation between international organisations and, in particular, 
enhanced dialogue between courts and other supervisory bodies; the EU’s contribu-
tion to the enforcement of international labour standards; and the role of the private 
sector in the monitoring and enforcement of these standards. Let us start with a 
stocktaking exercise.
2  State of Play
2.1  The Current System
Within the ILO, monitoring and enforcement of international labour standards have 
changed over time. The system in place today works well on balance. However, the 
system is quite complex, at least at first sight: different bodies are responsible for 
monitoring standards and there are specific as well as general monitoring mecha-
nisms. This cannot be set out here in detail. Instead, I will limit myself to a 
brief sketch.
If there is a possible violation of freedom of association, the Committee on 
Freedom of Association (CFA) will be responsible. So far, the Committee has com-
mented on about 3200 cases.1 The Committee was established in 1951 by the 
Governing Body of the ILO. This decision was based on an agreement between the 
ILO and the UN that a specific procedure should be established to ensure effective 
monitoring of Member States’ obligations to ensure freedom of association.2 The 
Committee’s task is to determine “whether any given legislation or practice com-
plies with the principles of freedom of association and collective bargaining laid 
down in the relevant Conventions”.3 The establishment of the CFA reflects the fun-
damental importance that the ILO attaches to these guarantees. The Committee on 
Freedom of Association has a tripartite structure and its members are representa-
tives of the governments of the ILO member states as well as representatives of 
workers and employers. The Chairman of the Committee is independent.
In addition to the Committee on Freedom of Association, there are two other 
main players. As part of the general monitoring process, these actors have shared 
1 Cf. ILO (2018).
2 Cf. Beaudonnet (2010), p. 73.
3 ILO, Special procedures for the examination in the International Labour Organization of com-
plaints alleging violations of freedom of association – Annex 1 (no. 14).
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responsibilities: The Committee of Experts on the Application of Convention and 
Recommendations (CEACR or Committee of Experts) and the Conference 
Committee on the Application of Standards (CAS). General monitoring is based on 
reports which, under the Constitution of the ILO, the members have to submit at 
regular intervals.4 The report must contain the following information: an indication 
of the relevant laws, regulations and other legal sources (including copies); excep-
tions and the like, where permitted by the relevant Convention; information on the 
implementation of each individual provision of a Convention in national law; details 
of the legal effects of ratification of the Convention under national law; responses to 
possible opinions of the Committee of Experts; information on the bodies respon-
sible for enforcement of a Convention; relevant decisions by courts and administra-
tive authorities; details of any results of assistance or advice given in the context of 
ILO technical cooperation projects; a general assessment of the application of the 
Convention (including extracts from official reports, statistics, details of violations, 
prosecutions, and the like).5 In addition, the reports must be accompanied by copies 
of observations made by employers’ and workers’ organisations.6
As already mentioned, the task of monitoring standards is carried out on the one 
hand by the Committee of Experts and on the other hand by the Conference 
Committee on the Application of Standards. Both committees are strictly separated, 
but work together. There is, however, a clear division of roles. This is explained by 
the different structures and tasks of the two bodies: the conference committee has a 
tripartite structure and bases its decisions partly on aspects of opportunity. The 
Committee of experts consists of independent experts. It carries out its assessment 
exclusively from a legal point of view. This background is necessary in order to 
understand that the Committee of Experts has repeatedly invoked in its reports a 
“spirit of mutual respect, cooperation and responsibility”7: the wording takes 
account of the joint responsibility of the two institutions for monitoring interna-
tional standards, but at the same time makes it clear that the Committee attaches 
importance to its independence.
Anyone who deals with future issues should also consider the past. This also 
applies to the question of future monitoring and enforcement of international stan-
dards: In the early days of the ILO, there was no system for monitoring standards. 
It was not until 1926 that, against the background of an increasing number of 
4 See Art. 22 of the Constitution of the ILO: “Each of the Members agrees to make an annual report 
to the International Labour Office on the measures which it has taken to give effect to the provi-
sions of Conventions to which it is a party. These reports shall be made in such form and shall 
contain such particulars as the Governing Body may request.”
5 Cf. ILO (2019a), p. 25 et seq.
6 Cf. Art. 23(2) of the Constitution of the ILO: “Each Member shall communicate to the representa-
tive organizations recognized for the purpose of article 3 copies of the information and reports 
communicated to the Director-General in pursuance of articles 19 and 22.”
7 See, e.g., Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (2018), 
para 13.
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ratifications, the ILO was to establish such a system.8 Two institutions were formed 
at that time: The Conference Committee and—initially only on a temporary basis—
the Committee of Experts, which met for the first time in 1927 (with eight mem-
bers). As already indicated above, the (tripartite) Conference Committee was always 
understood to be a political body. On the other hand, the Committee of Experts 
should ensure an independent legal analysis9 and, in particular, uncover different 
interpretations of the provisions of the Convention in the Member States.10 The 
Committee should include its observations in a “technical report” to be submitted to 
the Director. Great care was taken to set narrow limits for the Committee: Under no 
circumstances should the Committee be allowed to subpoena government represen-
tatives. It should also limit its work entirely to the information provided by govern-
ments.11 From the outset, there were concerns that the new committee could 
undermine members’ sovereign rights and interfere in other ILO bodies’ reserved 
areas. These concerns were allayed, in particular, by emphasising that the commit-
tee should in no way be a court-like body.12 A fundamental reform then took place 
as a result of far-reaching changes to the ILO Constitution in 1946, which greatly 
expanded the reporting obligations of its members. As a result, the mandates both of 
the Conference Committee and of the Committee of Experts were extended. The 
task of the Committee of Experts is to indicate to what extent the legislation and 
practice of each member is in conformity with the ratified conventions and to what 
extent the members have fulfilled their norm-related obligations under the ILO 
Constitution. The Committee of Experts should serve as an “intermediate stage in 
8 Cf. Resolution concerning the methods by which the Conference can make use of the reports 
submitted under Article 408 of the Treaty of Versailles, submitted by the Committee on Article 
408. In: ILO (1926) International Labour Conference, Record of Proceedings, 8th Session, Geneva, 
26 May–5 June 1926, p. 429.
9 Cf. ILO (1926) International Labour Conference, Record of Proceedings, 8th Session, Geneva, 26 
May–5 June 1926, p. 396: “Further, it may be observed that the Conference and its Committees are 
essentially deliberative and political bodies, composed of the representatives of various interests, 
national or occupational, and that in general such bodies are not the best suited for the technical 
work now under consideration.” Cf. also, p. 398: “The Committee of Experts might therefore be, 
not a committee set up directly by the Conference, but a committee created by the Director, on the 
instructions of the Conference and with the approval of the Governing Body, to carry out a particu-
lar task in view of the technical preparation of one part of the work of the Conference. The 
Conference itself would conserve its proper political functions, but it would be advised as to the 
facts by this technical expert Committee, and it would, either directly, or through one of its own 
Committees, decide upon its attitude and upon what appropriate action it might take or indicate.”
10 Ibid., p. 401: “Its examination will certainly reveal cases in which different interpretations of the 
provisions of Conventions appear to be adopted in different countries. The Committee should call 
attention to such cases.”
11 Ibid., p. 401: “[…] there is and can be no question of convoking Governments or their representa-
tives before the proposed Committee, which would base its reports entirely upon the information 
which the States have undertaken in ratifying the Convention, to supply.”
12 Ibid., p. 405: “It was agreed […] that the Committee of experts would have no judicial capacity 
nor would it be competent to give interpretations of the Conventions not to decide in favour of one 
interpretation rather than of another.”
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the monitoring process” and prepare the review of the application of the Conventions 
by the Conference Committee.13
The Committee of Experts, currently composed of 20 independent members, 
meets once a year for some 3 weeks to review the reports submitted by members. 
The meetings of the Committee are not open to the public. Committee deliberations 
and documents are confidential.14 The Office provides the Committee members with 
considerable support in fulfilling their tasks. In fact, one simply cannot praise the 
office and its staff enough for its input. The work of the Committee of Experts 
results in opinions, for which a distinction is made between observations and direct 
requests. Observations are usually used in serious or long-standing cases of non- 
compliance. They are included in the report of the Committee, which is submitted 
to the Conference Committee each year in June of the following year and is also 
published as part of the Annual Report. Direct requests, on the other hand, are sent 
directly to the government concerned. They are not included in the annual report.15 
Unlike direct requests, observations are normally used in serious or protracted cases 
of non-compliance. In this regard, so-called “special notes”, which are traditionally 
referred to as footnotes, are of particular importance. In the case of a so-called sin-
gle footnote, the Committee requests an earlier report from the government. A dou-
ble footnote even asks a government to provide comprehensive and detailed 
information at the next International Labour Conference. In answering the question 
whether one or the other type of footnote should be considered, the Committee 
takes into account, among other things, the seriousness of the problem (in particular 
with regard to the interests involved); the persistence of the problem; the duration 
and urgency of the situation; and the type of reaction by a Member State.16
The comments of the Committee of Experts form the basis for the work of the 
Conference Committee. The Conference Committee discusses problems arising in 
the implementation of agreements and recommendations on the basis of the report 
submitted by the Committee of Experts. Most importantly, the comments of the 
Committee of Experts form the basis for selection of cases to be further discussed 
at the International Labour Conference, which takes place every year. In practice, 
the Conference Committee selects approximately 20 cases each year for closer 
inspection. Since 2012, discussion of these cases by the International Labour 
Conference Committee has started with cases which have been given a double foot-
note by the Committee of Experts.17
It should not be concealed that the mandate of the Expert Committee is not 
uncontroversial within the ILO. Dispute was sparked by the fact that the Committee 
derives a right to strike from Convention No 87, although that right is not explicitly 
13 International Labour Office (1947) Minutes of the 103rd Session of the Governing Body, Geneva, 
December 1947, p. 169 et seq.
14 Cf. ILO (2019a), p. 35 et seq.
15 Cf. Ibid., p. 36.
16 Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (2018), para 
45 et seq.
17 Cf. ILO (2019a), p. 38 et seq.
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mentioned in the Convention. It has to be said, without any accusation of guilt, that 
the dispute is highly regrettable because it creates the danger that the credibility and 
authority of the supervisory bodies could be damaged. The Committee of Experts 
itself takes the following view with regard to its mandate: 
The Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations is an 
independent body established by the International Labour Conference and its members are 
appointed by the ILO Governing Body. It is composed of legal experts charged with exam-
ining the application of ILO Conventions and Recommendations by ILO member States. 
The Committee of Experts undertakes an impartial and technical analysis of how the 
Conventions are applied in law and practice by member States, while cognizant of different 
national realities and legal systems. In doing so, it must determine the legal scope, content 
and meaning of the provisions of the Conventions. Its opinions and recommendations are 
non-binding, being intended to guide the actions of national authorities. They derive their 
persuasive value from the legitimacy and rationality of the Committee’s work based on its 
impartiality, experience and expertise. The Committee’s technical role and moral authority 
is well recognized, particularly as it has been engaged in its supervisory task for more than 
90 years, by virtue of its composition, independence and its working methods built on con-
tinuing dialogue with governments taking into account information provided by employers’ 
and workers’ organizations. This has been reflected in the incorporation of the Committee’s 
opinions and recommendations in national legislation, international instruments and court 
decisions.18
2.2  Deficiencies
It was stated above that the standards monitoring system works. This does not mean, 
however, that there is no room for improvement. For example, it is clear that many 
Member States are not meeting their reporting obligations, are not meeting them on 
time, or are not meeting them to the required extent. The report of the Committee of 
Experts for the year 2018 reports with concern the high number of reports that were 
not received on time so that cases had to be deferred.19 At the same time, the work-
load of the Committee of Experts and the Office is enormous. As a result, a consid-
erable number of reports cannot be dealt with promptly by the Committee. Instead, 
their examination is postponed to the following year. To remedy this or at least miti-
gate the adverse consequences is an ongoing task that has led to a number of 
changes, particularly in recent times. For instance, the decision was taken a while 
ago to extend the so-called “reporting cycles”.20 There have also been some reforms 
18 Cf., e.g., Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations 
(2018), para 19.
19 Ibid., para 25 et seq.
20 The Governing Body of the ILO decided some time ago to extend the reporting cycle to 6 years. 
See International Labour Office (2018) Fifth Item on the Agenda  –  The Standards Initiative: 
Implementing the workplan for strengthening the supervisory system Progress report. In: Decisions 




of a more technical nature, such as increased use of electronic tools or the creation 
of teams of members of the Committee of Experts or the grouping of Conventions 
for the purpose of examination by the Committee members.
In all this, it should also be borne in mind that the Committee of Experts does 
have considerable room for manoeuvre in its work as the committee has no rules of 
procedure. Rather, the committee itself decides on its own “working methods”. To 
this end, a subcommittee was set up in 2001 to deal in detail with issues relating to 
the organisation of the work of the Committee. In practice, all members of the 
Committee of Experts attend meetings of the Subcommittee, which may serve as an 
indication that working methods are understood to be of utmost importance.
3  Questions for the Future
The problem of monitoring and enforcing international standards is (almost) as old 
as the standards themselves. However, this task will not be easier to accomplish. 
With the rapid advance of digitisation, work is becoming a shy deer, making it 
increasingly difficult not only to regulate, but also to monitor and enforce the rele-
vant standards. The fact that technological advances also offer some opportunities 
in this respect—the Global Commission in its report refers, among other things, to 
the virtues of blockchain technology21—is a rather weak consolation. What is cer-
tain is that international standards will increasingly aim to regulate transnational 
issues and that, accordingly, cooperation between the ILO member states across 
borders will be necessary in the enforcement of these standards, as is already the 
case today, for example, within the framework of the Maritime Labour Convention 
of 2006, where the enforcement regime is based on shared enforcement of maritime 
labour conditions by flag and port States.22
3.1  Cooperation Between All International Organisations
Bur monitoring of standards requires more, namely ever-intensive cooperation 
between all international organisations. The first step should be to develop an 
approach that goes beyond individual policy areas to ensure that efforts in one area 
are not thwarted by efforts in another. Rather than that, synergies should be sought.
21 ILO (2019b), p. 44.
22 See Title 5 of the Maritime Labour Convention, 2006.
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3.1.1  A Comprehensive Policy Approach
Such fruitful cooperation already exists on many levels. The OECD deserves a posi-
tive mention in this respect.23 Here there are examples not only of the fact that core 
labour standards have been given additional legitimacy, but also of the fact that 
independent pressure has been exerted to urge states to comply with labour stan-
dards. In one case, for example, membership of the organisation was made condi-
tional on the particular state showing greater respect for freedom of association. The 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises in its Commentary section explic-
itly acknowledge the work of the ILO by expressly stating that it is the ILO which 
is “the competent body to set and deal with international labour standards, and to 
promote fundamental rights at work”. The Guidelines, the text goes on to say, “have 
a role to play in promoting observance of these standards and principles among 
multinational enterprises”.24
While in the relationship between the ILO and the OECD the idea of cooperation 
is predominant, the picture is less positive when it comes to other international 
organisations which are also becoming increasingly involved in the social arena.25 
The relationship between the IMF and the World Bank and the latter’s position with 
regard to international labour standards has been relatively well researched in the 
literature. There, it has repeatedly been pointed out that compliance with interna-
tional labour standards is in a certain tension with the deregulation of labour mar-
kets, which is predominantly favoured by both the World Bank and the IMF.  In 
addition, a number of studies suggest that structural adjustment programmes fos-
tered by the two institutions have come with a decline of labour rights protection in 
the countries concerned.26
The relationship between the ILO and WTO and the importance of international 
standards in the area of free trade agreements is a chapter in itself. It is well known 
that attempts to integrate “social clauses” into such agreements within the frame-
work of the WTO have so far been unsuccessful.27 This is mainly due to the fact that 
the member states assess such clauses very differently. Developed countries are 
usually in favour. Developing countries, however, argue that the attempt to bring 
labour issues into the WTO is actually a bid by industrial nations to undermine the 
comparative advantage associated with lower social standards and that efforts to 
bring labour standards into the arena of multilateral trade negotiations are little 
more than a smokescreen for protectionism. At the same time, there is a fear among 
them that the proposed standards may be too ambitious. That a consensus could 
emerge in the near future seems unlikely. But perhaps we can still allow ourselves a 
23 Cf. in this regard Thouvenin (2015), p. 385.
24 OECD (2011), p. 37. On the other hand, the revised Tripartite Declaration of Principles concern-
ing Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy includes a reference to the OECD Guidelines.
25 Cf. Chen (2018), p. 184.
26 Cf. Ebert (2018), pp. 273–274 with further references (footnote 3); see also Ebert (2015), p. 124.
27 Cf. Stoll (2018), pp. 11–27.
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brief dream and imagine for a moment that progress could indeed be made within 
the framework of the WTO on international standards whose justification as such 
must be completely undisputed. Think, for example, of proposals from legal circles 
aiming at establishing a joint ILO-WTO implementation mechanism to combat 
child labour. It has been suggested in the literature that such a mechanism in certain 
cases such as export-related child labour could be subject to dispute settlement 
resulting in trade measures as measures of last resort. In addition to the intergovern-
mental dispute settlement system, there would also be a private complaints mecha-
nism where non-governmental organisations on behalf of children could bring 
certain complaints against companies and governments. Panels would include ILO 
experts and decisions would be based on UN and ILO jurisprudence. Complaints 
against governments could result in dispute resolution ending with trade measures.28 
If only such a scenario could come true!
In any case, any attempt to bring about more intensive cooperation is worth-
while. In view of this, one can only endorse the Global Commission on the Future 
of Work. It writes in its report: 
We recommend in particular the establishment of more systemic and substantive working 
relations between the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Bretton Woods institutions and 
the ILO. There are strong, complex and crucial links between trade, financial, economic and 
social policies. The success of the human- centred growth and development agenda we 
propose depends heavily on coherence across these policy areas.29
There is nothing to add to that.
3.1.2  Enhanced Dialogue Between Supervisory Bodies
However, it is not only international organisations as such that are called upon to 
intensify cooperation, but also the courts and other international supervisory bodies 
set up to monitor international standards should enter into intensified dialogue with 
each other. In particular, these bodies would be well advised not to lead a life of 
their own, but also to orient themselves to findings by others in the performance of 
their supervisory tasks. In this regard, one could take a leaf out of the book of the 
practice of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).30 In 2008, for example, 
the Court, in its decision in Demir and Baykara (on the establishment of a trade 
union by employees of a municipality), expressly stated that in interpreting the pro-
visions of the ECHR, the Court “can and must take into account elements of inter-
national law other than the Convention, the interpretation of such elements by 
competent organs, and the practice of European States reflecting their common val-
ues”. The Court went on to say: “The consensus emerging from specialised interna-
tional instruments and from the practice of Contracting States may constitute a 
28 See Humbert (2018), pp. 93–109.
29 ILO (2019b), p. 14.
30 For more details, see Teklè (2018), p. 236; Waas (2019), pp. 123–147.
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relevant consideration for the Court when it interprets the provisions of the 
Convention in specific cases.”31 In doing so, the ECtHR orientates itself not least on 
the rulings of the CFA and CEACR. All this does not mean that differences between 
the different panels should not be taken into account. The ECtHR itself at times has 
emphasised differences between the Court of Justice on the one hand and ILO 
supervisory bodies on the other. According to the ECtHR, ILO supervisory bodies 
have “to review the relevant domestic law in the abstract”, whereas the court has to 
decide on a concrete legal dispute.32 In spite of these differences, the Court takes the 
rulings of ILO supervisory bodies into consideration. In the Enerji Yapi-Yol Sen 
case, for example, in 2009 the Court recognised the right to strike for civil servants 
by, among other things, referring to the ILO supervisory bodies.33 The most recent 
example of a reference by the ECtHR to the findings of the Committee of Experts is 
the decision of the Court of Justice in the Ognovenko case concerning the legality of 
strikes in Russian rail transport. In this respect, the Court recalls that the Committee 
does not regard the railway sector as an “essential service” in which strikes could be 
banned and that the Committee has for some time been calling on Russia to ensure 
that railway workers could exercise their right to strike.34
Basically, the same applies to the European Committee of Social Rights. This 
will not be substantiated in detail here. Instead, I would like to take the liberty of 
quoting Monika Schlachter, a former long-standing member of the ECSR.  In a 
recent article, she came to the following conclusion:
The ILO Committees […], the ECHR and the ECSR are increasingly orienting themselves 
towards the goal of greater convergence in the concretisation and development of social 
rights by using the historically close link between social protection rights for their interpre-
tation. This applies in particular to the interpretation results developed by the ILO monitor-
ing bodies, which are used at both international and national level to concretise social 
rights.35
The CJEU stands in striking contrast to this. For instance, in the “famous” Laval and 
Viking rulings, the CJEU derived a right to strike from, among others, ILO 
Convention No. 87, although that right is not expressly mentioned in the 
Convention.36 In this respect, it would have been self-evident to refer to the stance 
31 European Court of Human Rights (Grand Chamber), Demir and Baykara v. Turkey (App. No. 
34503/97), Judgment, 12 November 2008, para 85.
32 European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), National Union of Rail, Maritime and 
Transport Workers v. The United Kingdom (App. No. 31045/10), Judgment, 8 April 2014, para 95.
33 European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), Enerji Yapi-Yol Sen v. Turkey (App. No. 
68959/01) (Enerji Yapi-Yol Sen/Türkei), Judgment, 21 April 2009, para 24.
34 European Court of Human Rights (Third Section Ognovenko v. Russia (App. No. 44873/09), 
Judgment, 20 November 2018, para 22 et seq.
35 Schlachter (2019), pp. 491–494.
36 CJEU (Grand Chamber), Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Svenska 
Byggnadsarbetareförbundets avdelning 1, Byggettan and Svenska Elektrikerförbundet (Case 
C-341/05), Judgment, 18 December 2007, para 90; CJEU (Grand Chamber), International 
Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking Line ABP and OÜ Viking 
Line Eesti (Case C-438/05), Judgement, 11 December 2007, para 43.
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of the Committee of Experts, which in fact affirms that very right. However, this is 
precisely what the CJEU did not do.
3.2  The Role of the EU
A look at the limited reception of international labour law directs attention to the 
European Union as such. What could the EU do to help enforce international stan-
dards? Let us dream for a moment and ask: Would anything perhaps be gained if the 
EU as such were to join the ILO and then ratify all the ILO conventions? The ques-
tion seems bold, almost absurd. But to raise such questions is the privilege of the 
academic. Nevertheless, the idea should not be pursued here. Apart from the ques-
tion whether accession really would have predominantly positive effects on the 
enforcement of standards, there would be so many legal and political obstacles to 
accession that one can immediately say goodbye to that idea. By contrast, it would 
seem somewhat more realistic to open ILO conventions to future accession by 
regional organisations such as the EU. There would even be a role model for that. 
For the first time in a human rights convention with worldwide validity, the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities of 2006 allows “regional 
integration organizations”37 to also accede to the convention.38 And indeed, the EU 
is the first international organisation that made use of the possibility of accession 
and ratified it, in 2011.39 Ever since, the CJEU has repeatedly used the Convention 
to interpret Union law.40
Instead of binding itself externally, however, the EU could also enter into a kind 
of “self-commitment”. There would also be role models for this. In fact, there are 
already two directives which, by taking over a large part of the content of a conven-
tion, produce an almost identical result to ratification by the EU. Both directives 
concern issues of maritime labour law. To begin with, Directive 2009/13/EC was 
adopted to implement an agreement between the relevant social partners in the 
industry, which for its part largely adopts the 2006 ILO Maritime Labour 
Convention.41 As a result, the Directive incorporates large parts of the Maritime 
37 See Art. 44(1) of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: “‘Regional integra-
tion organization’ shall mean an organization constituted by sovereign States of a given region, to 
which its member States have transferred competence in respect of matters governed by the present 
Convention.”
38 Ibid., Art. 42.
39 See Council of the European Union, Council Decision 2010/48/EC of 26 November 2009 con-
cerning the conclusion, by the European Community, of the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities. In Official Journal of the European Union (2010) L 23, p. 35.
40 See, e.g., CJEU (First Chamber), DW v Nobel Plastiques Ibérica SA (Case C-397/18), Judgment, 
11 September 2019.
41 Council of the European Union, Council Directive 2009/13/EC of 16 February 2009 implement-
ing the Agreement concluded by the European Community Shipowners’ Associations (ECSA) and 
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Labour Convention into Union law. As a matter of fact, EU representatives were 
actively involved in the preparation of the Maritime Labour Convention. Following 
adoption of the Convention by the International Labour Conference, the EU Council 
then authorised the Member States to ratify the Maritime Labour Convention. This 
authorisation was necessary internally, as areas that are regulated by the Convention 
fall within the exclusive competence of the Union, thus giving the EU exclusive 
external competence. Almost identical to incorporation of the Maritime Labour 
Convention into Directive 2009/13/EC is the incorporation of important provisions 
of Convention No. 188 on work in the fisheries sector into Directive 2017/159/
EU. Convention 188 was adopted by the International Labour Conference in 2007. 
Despite the low level of ratification by EU Member States at the time, in 2012 the 
relevant social partners reached agreement to incorporate Convention 188 into 
Union law.42 The agreement is largely identical in wording to the Convention and 
was incorporated into Directive 2017/159/EU. The Directive entered into force at 
the same time as Convention No. 188, on 16 November 2017. It is also welcome, by 
the way, that the European Commission recently encouraged Member States to 
ratify the Violence and Harassment Convention, 2019 (No. 190) of the ILO.43
An examination of the relationship between the ILO and the EU would be incom-
plete, however, if one did not also say a word about the significance of ILO stan-
dards in the area of the EU customs system. This leads us to the so-called Generalised 
System of Preferences of the European Union, which grants special tariff advan-
tages to developing countries. According to this system, developing countries 
receive simplified access to the European market from the EU (so-called “standard 
GSP”), while the least developed countries are in principle completely free to import 
into the EU the so-called EBA, the acronym standing for “Everything But Arms”, 
the special arrangement for least developed countries, providing them with duty- 
free, quota-free access for all products except arms and ammunition. Countries in 
the GSP category can be granted additional trade benefits provided they comply 
with certain special arrangements for sustainable development and good gover-
nance (so-called “GSP+”). In any case, access to the EU market is conditional on 
compliance with the eight Conventions that specify the ILO core labour standards. 
For example, a country wishing to obtain additional benefits under the GSP+ system 
must ratify and comply with the eight Conventions.44 In the event of “serious 
the European Transport Workers’ Federation (ETF) on the Maritime Labour Convention, 2006, 
and amending Directive 1999/63/EC. In Official Journal of the European Union (2009) L124, p. 30.
42 Council of the European Union, Council Directive (EU) 2017/159 of 19 December 2016 imple-
menting the Agreement concerning the implementation of the Work in Fishing Convention, 2007 
of the International Labour Organisation, concluded on 21 May 2012 between the General 
Confederation of Agricultural Cooperatives in the European Union (Cogeca), the European 
Transport Workers’ Federation (ETF) and the Association of National Organisations of Fishing 
Enterprises in the European Union (Europêche). In Official Journal of the European Union (2017) 
L25, p. 12.
43 European Commission (2020).
44 See Annex VIII of Reg. (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 
October 2012 applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences and repealing Council Regulation 
B. Waas
91
breaches in the effective application” of the Conventions, the Commission may tem-
porarily withdraw GSP+ status.45 In all other cases, the conventions do not need to 
be ratified. However, should “serious and systematic breaches of principles” of the 
Conventions be identified, these preferences may also be temporarily suspended.46 
Compliance with the agreements is monitored by the Commission. In accordance 
with the explicit provisions of Regulation 978/2012, the Commission should in par-
ticular also take into account the conclusions of the ILO committees.
On paper, this system seems highly convincing. However, there are doubts as to 
its practical effectiveness in light of the fact that so far none of the beneficiary coun-
tries seems to have lost their GSP+ status due to violations of the CLS conventions 
or other human rights conventions.47 However, there is also another cause for con-
cern: while the Commission has dealt in detail with assessments of the ILO super-
visory organs in the past, the current report, for the years 2016 and 2017, disturbingly 
no longer refers to the conclusions of the ILO committees to the same extent. And 
while the country-specific reports for 2016 and 2017 provide a precise account of 
the latest observations and direct requests by the CEACR that exist for each of the 
countries, the Commission does not take into account that in both 2016 and 2017 
one GSP+ beneficiary country was included in the list of the most serious violations 
of conventions by the CAS.
3.3  Privatisation
If one considers the monitoring and enforcement of international standards, one 
cannot avoid a phenomenon that is often described as privatisation.48 The numerous 
codes of conduct and labels relating to good working conditions are particularly 
relevant in this context. Privatisation is now so significant that some people are 
already claiming that a “consumocratic labor law” has emerged. Dumas described 
this as follows: 
(EC) No 732/2008.
45 See Art. 9(1) of Reg. (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 
October 2012 applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences and repealing Council Regulation 
(EC) No 732/2008: “A GSP beneficiary country may benefit from the tariff preferences provided 
under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance […] (b) 
if it has ratified all the conventions listed in Annex VIII (the ‘relevant conventions’) and the most 
recent available conclusions of the monitoring bodies under those conventions (the ‘relevant moni-
toring bodies’) do not identify a serious failure to effectively implement any of those conven-
tions […].”
46 See Ibid.: “The preferential arrangements referred to in Article 1(2) may be withdrawn temporar-
ily, in respect of all or of certain products originating in a beneficiary country, for any of the fol-
lowing reasons (a) serious and systematic violation of principles laid down in the conventions 
listed in Part A of Annex VIII […].”
47 See for more details Stolzenberg (2019), p. 207.
48 Cf. Diller (2015), p. 329.
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It is called to supplement protective state law when the latter is inappropriately enforced, 
but also when inappropriately designed, whether the state is incapable or simply unwilling 
to protect these populations more efficiently. Under a traditional approach to corporate 
governance, corporations are indeed free to engage in any kind of profitable activity, pro-
vided that they do so in accordance with applicable state laws – even if such activity is 
known to be socially or environmentally harmful by large segments of the citizenry. To an 
appreciable extent, the resulting detrimental effects are justified by the inaction of more or 
less representative states. Consumer regulatory power can be seen in this regard as a serious 
challenge to a deficient though enduring ideology, one under which it is assumed that the 
failure by the state to correct common market failures leads to undesirable results deemed 
(wrongly) to be inevitable.49
To be honest, I find the concept interesting, but I do not see “consumocratic law”, if 
there is such a thing, as a fully-fledged substitute for robust international standards.
Privatisation of international standards is in any event often also based on the 
ILO itself. There are now a number of new models of cooperation between the ILO 
and governments, workers’ representatives and industry representatives in which 
both national and transnational actors work together. One example is the textile and 
clothing sector, where a number of projects are now aimed at protecting workers 
interests: The Better Work program is based on a partnership between the ILO and 
the International Finance Corporation, a member of the World Bank Group. Under 
that program, buyers in the apparel industry sign up to ILO-monitored inspections 
of their factories, and agree to public reporting of results. Better Work is governed 
at international level by a Management Group comprised of ILO and IFC officials, 
and is guided by an Advisory Committee of representatives of donor governments, 
international employers and workers organisations, buyers and independent 
experts.50
Another example is the Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh. This 
agreement was signed in 2013 in the aftermath of the Rana Plaza building collapse 
that led to the death of more than 1100 people and injured more than 2000. In 2017 
a further agreement was concluded, which builds on the previous one.51 The agree-
ment consists of six key components: A five-year legally binding agreement between 
brands and trade unions to ensure a safe working environment in the Bangladeshi 
ready-made garment industry; an independent inspection program; public disclo-
sure of all factories, inspection reports and corrective action plans; a commitment 
by signatory brands to ensure sufficient funds are available for remediation and to 
maintain sourcing relationships; establishment of health and safety committees in 
all factories; worker empowerment through an extensive training program; a com-
plaints mechanism; and the right to refuse unsafe work. The Accord is governed by 
a Steering Committee with equal representation from trade unions and companies. 
49 Dumas (2013), pp. 67–73. See also Dumas (2015), p. 374.
50 See the Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh, 2013. Available at: https://admin.
bangladeshaccord.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/2013-Accord.pdf. Accessed 25 Mar 2020.
51 See the Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh, 2018. Available at: https://admin.
bangladeshaccord.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/2018-Accord.pdf. Accessed 25 Mar 2020.
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The ILO serves as a neutral chair.52 An NGO set up by the Accord parties oversees 
an inspection system financed by the signatory companies. The Government and 
local industry, though not parties to the agreement, are to be consulted in adminis-
tration and management of the program. While the Government’s inspection stan-
dards apply in principle, the ILO helps to coordinate their application in practice 
among the actors involved and advises on relevant international labour standards.
Privatisation can also be observed in other ways. For instance, the ILO partici-
pates in activities to develop private transnational regulatory instruments. The 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO), which is increasingly devel-
oping voluntary standards in areas of social and public order, deserves particular 
mention in this respect. However, this is a double-edged sword. Since these stan-
dards frequently address issues that are also the subject of international labour stan-
dards, there is an increasing need to ensure that such initiatives do not conflict with 
the provisions of the ILS. Without fundamental coordination, the resulting interplay 
between industrial standards and national ILS-based labour standards could impair 
the effectiveness of both systems. On the whole, a final judgement on privatisation 
still seems too early. For instance, it appears to be very promising in the textile and 
clothing industry. However, the question arises as to whether the success achieved 
there can easily be transferred to other areas.
International framework agreements can also play a role in the enforcement of 
international labour standards. In this respect, one should not be discouraged by the 
fact that the legally binding effect of such agreements is doubtful, so that it is open 
whether and to what extent it can be enforced before a court or another dispute 
settlement institution if necessary. Nor does the lack of a transnational legal frame-
work for the enforcement of such agreements necessarily speak against their effec-
tiveness. This does not mean that framework agreements would be ineffective as 
such as soft law. At least if embedded in “strong and resilient industrial relations”, 
a framework agreement can certainly develop into a flexible instrument and possi-
bly even encourage the actors to come up with new common solutions.53 If these 
conditions are not met, however, there is a real danger that the agreements will 
remain a “dead letter”.
4  Conclusions
To conclude with a few final remarks, I would maintain that monitoring and enforce-
ment of standards within the ILO work quite well. But the system is constantly 
under scrutiny. And that is a good thing. Closer cooperation between international 
organisations would be desirable. That way, conflicts could be avoided and 
52 See No. 4 of the Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh, 2013. Available at: https://
admin.bangladeshaccord.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/2013-Accord.pdf. Accessed 25 Mar 2020.
53 Cf. Krause (2018), pp. 319–334.
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synergies could be exploited. A deeper dialogue between all relevant courts and 
supervisory bodies could contribute to a certain convergence of standards. This 
would not least be in the interest of those subject to the standards themselves. More 
could also be done at European Union level to enhance the impact of international 
standards. The successful cooperation between the ILO and the EU could and 
should be further intensified. Non-governmental actors—non-governmental organ-
isations, the social partners, consumers—can make a major contribution to the 
enforcement of international labour standards. The importance of these standards 
cannot be overestimated. Let us always remember: “In the long run, world peace 
can only be built on social justice”.
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1  Introduction
What marks the international labour protection of the past two decades has been the 
upsurge of transnational labour standards outside the formal scheme of the 
ILO. Labour standards are increasingly to be found in free trade agreements, invest-
ment arrangements, policy documents of international financial institutions (IFIs), 
and social missions of multinational corporations. Recognizably, a growing body of 
labour standards has been nested into transnational settings such as the human rights 
regimes, trade or investment agreements, development finance, or corporate social 
responsibility.1 The promotion of labour standards has suddenly become a fashion-
able cause to pursue. Like it or not, mushrooming transnational labour standards 
leads to fragmentation, conflicts and competition, both normative and institutional.
While remaining the intellectual centre and normative champion for interna-
tional labour protection, the ILO no longer enjoys a monopolistic position. As the 
leading institution in setting and promoting international labour standards, the ILO 
with its law-making activities has been long appreciated by states, trade unions and 
other international organizations. However, the making of labour standards has 
become decentralized. The ILO itself has slowed down its pace of producing 
1 See generally Hepple (2005) and Craig and Lynk (2006).
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international labour conventions in recent years. This is in sharp contrast to the pro-
liferation of labour standards outside the ILO. Along with the diffusion of transna-
tional labour standards comes the issue of fragmentation of normativity. The ILO’s 
standards, however authoritative, are not necessarily superior to those formulated in 
transnational settings. This is aptly described as “competition between mandates 
and objectives”.2
In the post-national constellation, labour protection has been mainstreamed as a 
powerful language for governance and distribution, and international actors have 
strategically presented themselves as actors of labour governance. The enactment 
and enforcement of those transnational labour standards are largely self-standing. 
They are useful supplements, as well as strong competitors, to the international 
labour conventions and to the existing ILO supervisory mechanisms. They open 
new paths of global labour governance. These new developments have led to the 
emergence of transnational labour law as a pertinent field of research.3
This chapter examines the possible role of the ILO in the face of fragmentation 
of labour standards. It starts with a historical account of the institutional transforma-
tion of the ILO in the aftermath of the Cold War. Section 2 highlights how the proc-
lamation of fundamental labour rights has equipped the ILO with a managerial 
vocabulary. Then Sect. 3 traces the trajectory of the diffusion of labour standards in 
transnational settings, notably in trade agreements and international financial poli-
cies. Section 4 examines the relationship between transnational labour standards 
and ILO standards against a background of institutional competition between regu-
latory authorities. Section 5 further examines how the fragmentation of labour stan-
dards may lead to the institutional politics of substantive labour standards. Section 
6 concludes with some critical reflection on the possible strategies the ILO might 
employ to promote greater consistency and coherence of labour standards in 
globalization.
2  Coining Fundamental Labour Rights: Inventing 
a Managerial Vocabulary
The ILO had experienced a bitter institutional transformation in a quest for rele-
vance in the post-Cold War world order.4 Internally, the usefulness of the ILO was 
put into question by its Western members as well as the employers’ group. Once 
conceived as an institution of anti-communism,5 with the collapse of the former 
2 Maupain (2013), p. 18.
3 See, for example, Blackett and Trebilcock (2015).
4 Michel Hansenne, who served as Director-General of the ILO from 1989 to 1999, in his several 
reports to the international labour conference, openly reflected upon various challenges the orga-
nization was facing in the post-Cold War era. See, for example, ILO (1994).
5 This opinion is unambiguously testified by J.  Ernest Wilkins, then the Assistant Secretary of 
Labor for International Labor Affairs with the Eisenhower administration before the Senate of the 
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Soviet Union the ILO was suddenly seen as being “costly and archaic”, and “ill- 
suited to an era in which the role of labor unions is vastly diminished”.6 The employ-
ers’ group turned hostile towards the making of international labour standards as 
well as the operation of ILO supervisory mechanisms.7 Internationally, the policy- 
making of economic and financial institutions, taking structural adjustment as an 
example, was observed to have a larger bearing than the ILO on the conditions of 
workers.8 The ILO was simply side-lined in the regulatory vocation of economic 
globalization.9 It is useful to recall an internal observation by an ILO official in 1994 
that the ILO was facing the challenges of “competing organizations”, “competing 
standards”, and ultimately, “competing visions”.10
Ironically, it was the unresolvable labour/trade debates that reinstated the ILO 
to the forefront of international policy-making in the mid-1990s. The proposal by 
the United States at the Uruguay Round to include “internationally recognized 
labour rights”11 was strongly resisted by developing countries. Yet the labour/
trade debates continued both within and outside the newly established WTO. While 
the Marrakesh Agreement of 1994 did not include a labour clause, the North 
American Agreement on Labor Cooperation came into effect on 1 January 1994 
as a side deal to the North American Free Trade Agreement. An 1995 OECD study 
on core workers’ rights and international trade suggested that the negative impact 
of labour rights enforcement on economic competitiveness was unfounded.12 At 
the same time, Asian-Pacific countries and developing countries were increas-
ingly concerned over the possibility of labour standards being used for trade pro-
tectionist purposes. This led to the decision at the Singapore Ministerial 
Conference in 1996 to relocate the labour issue back to the ILO. In pronouncing 
their commitment to “internationally recognized core labour standards”, the WTO 
members expressly acknowledged the ILO as being “the competent body to set 
and deal with these standards”.13
United States in 1957. See United States Senate (1957), p. 19.
6 Quoted from a letter by Jesse Helms, Chairman of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
sent to Pete V. Domenici, Chairman of the US Senate Budget Committee, dated 26 April 1995. The 
letter is reproduced in United States Senate (1995), pp. 333–338.
7 The crisis of tripartism with the ILO continues to this day. See La Hovary (2018).
8 The ILO tried to initiate institutional dialogue with the World Bank and the IMF as early as the 
late 1980s. As part of its efforts, the ILO, in cooperation with other parts of the UN system and the 
Bretton Woods institutions, organized a High-level Meeting on Employment and Structural 
Adjustment in November 1987, yielding no concrete result.




13 WTO (1996) Singapore Ministerial Declaration adopted on 13 December 1996, Ministerial 
Conference, Singapore, 9–13 December 1996. Available at: https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/
minist_e/min96_e/wtodec_e.htm. Accessed 6 May 2020.
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The ILO itself worked proactively to revitalize its institutional role in the face of 
globalization. As early as June 1994, the Governing Body of the ILO set up the 
Working Party on the Social Dimensions of the Liberalization of International 
Trade.14 The ILO vigilantly followed the involvement of other international organi-
zations in labour issues. In collaborating with the Secretariat of the United Nations, 
the ILO was substantially involved in preparation for the 1995 World Summit for 
Social Development. The Copenhagen Declaration and Programme of Action not 
only affirmed the leading role of the ILO in labour standards, but also for the first 
time in history formally pronounced the term “basic rights of workers”.15 From the 
perspective of the ILO, the 1995 World Summit and the 1996 WTO Declaration 
imbued the ILO with a renewed sense of political meaning and relevance. Seeing 
the call as an historic opportunity, the then Director-General Michel Hansenne in 
his 1997 report to the International Labour Conference immediately proposed that 
the ILO should adopt a declaration pronouncing a list of fundamental labour rights, 
be selective and strategic in standard-setting, and, most importantly, set the “social 
rules of the game of globalization”.16
In 1998 the International Labour Conference had before it the agenda of adopt-
ing a declaration on fundamental labour rights. Yet the clash of governmental posi-
tions continued from the WTO to the ILO.  A Committee on the Declaration of 
Principles was established by the Conference to reconcile the differences among 
different groups. The industrialized market economy countries were the active pro-
ponents of the declaration. It was asserted that fundamental labour rights were “uni-
versal, not relative”, “absolute, not conditional”, while their promotion constituted 
“a universal commitment irrespective of the economic, social or cultural conditions 
of any member State”.17 Moreover, enforcement of those labour standards would 
not rule out the possibility of recourse to trade measures in addition to the ILO’s 
existing mechanisms.18 This position was strongly countered by the Asia Pacific 
Group as well as many developing countries. They were deeply concerned that the 
WTO might incorporate labour standards and therefore highlighted the ILO as 
being “the sole competent international organization mandated to set and deal with 
labour standards”. The measures to realize fundamental labour rights should be 
strictly “promotional and not complaints-based”, and not introduce “unilateral or 
multilateral trade measures”.19
After lengthy debate, the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at 
Work was adopted by the International Labour Conference on 18 June 1998. The 
Declaration embodies, for the first time in the ILO’s history, a set of labour rights 
14 See ILO (1994) Governing Body Working Party on the Social Dimensions of the Liberalization 
of World Trade (GB.261/WP/SLD/1), Governing Body, 261st Session, Geneva, 1994.
15 UN (1995).
16 ILO (1997), p. 26.
17 As opined by the government member of Canada, see ILO (1998), p. 20/13.
18 See the opinion of the government member of the United States, ibid., p. 20/108.




characterized by fundamentals, i.e., freedom of association and collective bargain-
ing, prohibition of forced labour, prohibition of child labour, and non-discrimina-
tion in respect of employment and occupation.20 Moreover, the Declaration 
highlights the universality of fundamental labour rights as they emanate from the 
ILO constitution. States “have an obligation, arising from the very fact of member-
ship in the Organization, to respect, to promote and to realize” those fundamental 
principles and rights. It was to the satisfaction of developing countries that the 
Declaration also states that “labour standards should not be used for protectionist 
trade purposes”.
The Declaration is a self-proclamation of the ILO’s constitutional authority on 
labour regulation in the division of labour among international organizations. By 
incarnating a set of fundamental labour rights the ILO had successfully reinvigo-
rated its international foothold in globalization.21 The concept of fundamental labour 
rights is not primarily addressed to member states, as the Declaration—being “a 
political statement of a non-binding nature”—does not establish new obligations on 
ILO members. The genuine audience for the 1998 Declaration, actual or potential, 
goes beyond ILO constituents, but would reach all relevant international actors such 
as international trade or financial institutions. The Declaration has enabled the ILO 
to associate itself with a set of managerial vocabulary, and to have a fair share in 
regulatory competition in deepening globalization. In this sense, the Declaration is 
indeed a step towards revitalization, not retreat.22
The adoption of the 1998 Declaration also marks a profound institutional trans-
formation of the ILO.23 Since then, the ILO has reformed its traditional approach to 
international labour standard-setting. The ILO is no longer obsessed with making 
hard international labour conventions. The number of labour conventions produced 
by the ILO has steadily declined over the past two decades. The ILO also increas-
ingly uses declarations, recommendations and other soft documents for its norma-
tive activities. In addition to setting standards for states, the ILO increasingly 
addresses international organizations, social partners and others. The ILO does not 
only provide the forum for states to debate and formulate labour standards, but has 
also turned itself into a developmental organization to promote labour standards.24 The 
20 The core labour rights enshrined in the Declaration are embodied in and endorsed by eight ILO 
fundamental conventions, chronologically, the Forced Labour Convention, adopted 28 June 1930 
(No. 29); the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention, adopted 
9 July 1948 (No. 87); the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention, adopted 1 July 
1949 (No. 98); the Equal Remuneration Convention, adopted 29 June 1951 (No. 100); the Abolition 
of Forced Labour Convention, adopted 25 June 1957 (No. 105); the Discrimination (Employment 
and Occupation) Convention, adopted 25 June 1958 (No. 111); the Minimum Age Convention, 
adopted 26 June 1973 (No. 138); and the Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, adopted 17 
June 1999 (No. 182).
21 See de Wet (2010).
22 See Maupain (2005).
23 For a useful account of the origin, history and reality of the 1998 Declaration from an insider’s 
perspective, see Tapiola (2018).
24 See Standing (2008).
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ILO has transformed from a relatively closed inter-state institution to a dynamic 
global actor.
With the adoption of the 1998 Declaration and its follow-up, the ILO embarked 
upon fundamental labour rights advocacy. This includes two strategies. One front is 
the campaign with the member states for universal ratification of ILO fundamental 
labour conventions, a recognizable success if measured by the growth in the number 
of treaty ratifications. On the other front, the ILO has initiated dialogues on the pos-
sible integration of labour standards with international organizations whose work 
may have significant labour ramifications, including international financial institu-
tions. A growing international recognition of fundamental labour rights was 
observed as of the beginning of the new millennium.
Since then, the leading role of the ILO in labour issues receives broad recogni-
tion from other international organizations. In 2008 the ILO further adopted its 
Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization, asserting the ILO’s “respon-
sibility to examine and consider all international economic and financial policies in 
the light of the fundamental objective of social justice”.25 Inter-agency cooperation 
between the ILO and international financial institutions, despite their continued dif-
ferences in terms of approaches to labour, was further deepened after the 2008 eco-
nomic crisis.26
3  The Proliferation of Labour Standards: The Rise 
of Transnationalism
As the ILO endeavoured to reinvigorate its role in international labour regulation, an 
observable trend has been the global diffusion of labour standards in transnational 
settings. Indeed, the recognition and enforcement of labour standards in transna-
tional settings can hardly find its role in the traditional procedures of ILO standard- 
setting practice. The process started with the signing of the North American 
Agreement on Labor Cooperation by Canada, the United States, and Mexico on 14 
September 1993.27 While the level of protection defers largely to national labour law 
and cooperation was provided for exchanges of information, technical assistance 
and consultations, the Agreement nevertheless established a dispute settlement pro-
cedure for dealing with “persistent patterns of failure” to effectively enforce techni-
cal labour standards on occupational safety and health, child labour and minimum 
25 ILO, Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization. Adopted by the International Labour 
Conference, 97th Session, Geneva, 10 June 2008.
26 The Summit of G20 at London in April 2009 requested the ILO to assess the labour impact of the 
actions taken and advise on further measures. See G20 Leaders’ Statement, The Global Plan for 
Recovery and Reform, 2 April 2009. Available at: https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/inter-
national/g7-g20/Documents/London%20April%202009%20Leaders%20final-communique.pdf. 
Accessed 6 May 2020.
27 For an early account, see Compa (1995).
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wage.28 Backed by the possibility of trade sanctions, a third-party mechanism as 
such was not only progressive and innovative, but also seen by many as aggressive 
and intrusive.
The second treaty of the United States that referred to labour waited until its free 
trade agreement (FTA) with Jordan in 2000. The labour chapter of this FTA is suc-
cinct. It made express reference to the commitment of the parties to the 1998 ILO 
Declaration. In terms of substantive protection, it covers “internationally recognized 
labor rights” and parties are under a specific obligation not to “encourage trade by 
relaxing domestic labor laws”.29 As the US Trade Act of 2002 requires the govern-
ment to pursue promotion and enforcement of international labour rights, almost all 
subsequent FTAs concluded by the United States incorporate a labour chapter. 
Examples include the United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement of 2003, the 
United States-Central America Free Trade Agreement of 2004, and a number of oth-
ers. The most ambitious labour chapter was probably the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Agreement of 2016 under the Obama administration,30 although the signature of the 
United States was shortly withdrawn with the change of administration.
Since 2008, states have been more receptive towards the inclusion of a labour 
provision in FTAs. The number of FTAs with a labour provision has grown rapidly. 
According to the ILO, by 2016 there were “a total of 77 trade agreements with 
labour provisions, involving 136 economies”.31 Notably the United States, Canada, 
and the European Union have been the most active promoters in this regard. It is 
also observed by the ILO that the majority of labour provisions are to be found in 
agreements between developed and developing countries, accounting for 70.1% of 
the total number of FTAs with a labour provision.32 Yet most FTAs on labour relates 
to information, cooperation and technical assistance. The application of dispute 
settlement procedure to the enforcement of labour standards is still rare, and often 
only if and to the extent that violation of labour standards has directly affected trade 
between the parties.33
Outside trade agreements, a parallel development has been the changing attitude 
of IFIs and their growing engagement with labour protection. The incorporation of 
labour protection into the work of IFIs has been a fairly recent phenomenon. The 
change of position is largely a response to growing external pressure wrought on 
28 Canada-Mexico-United States: North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation. In: American 
Society of International Law (1993) International Legal Materials 32(6): 1499–1518.
29 United States (U.S.)-Jordan: Agreement Between The United States of America and the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area. In: American Society of 
International Law (2002) International Legal Materials 41(1): pp. 63–85.
30 Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, 4 February 2016.
31 International Labour Office (2016) Third Item on the Agenda – labour-related provisions in trade 
agreements: recent trends and relevance to the ILO (GB.328/POL/3), Governing Body, 328th 
Session, Geneva, 27 October–10 November 2016.
32 ILO (2017), p. 12.
33 See Bolle (2016).
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IFIs. The neo-liberal prescriptions of IFIs met with doubts from borrowing coun-
tries and were increasingly challenged among scholars in 2000s. Pressure from the 
trade unions in large shareholders, such as the American Federation of Labor and 
Congress of Industrial Organization (AFL–CIO),34 also plays an influential role in 
pressing for the policy changes of the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF).
Labour protection started to enter into the work of IFIs only after the 2000s. This 
was pioneered by a modest reference to core labour standards in the social protec-
tion strategy of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in 2001. The ADB committed 
to ensuring that its procurement of goods and services, contractors, subcontractors 
and consultants would be in compliance with core labour standards.35 Full recogni-
tion of labour standards had to wait until the adoption of Performance Standards on 
Social and Environmental Sustainability by the International Finance Corporation 
(IFC) in 2006.36 Labour and working conditions are featured as a self-standing per-
formance standard under the IFC. This was the first time a significant IFI had given 
its full endorsement to labour standards in an operational policy.
The successful incorporation of labour standards by the IFC is largely attribut-
able to the fact that the IFC engages exclusively in private sectors. Those potential 
clients who gain access to the IFC are usually economically better-off, administra-
tively well-organized companies. These IFC policy requirements are often in align-
ment with existing corporate policies on social responsibility and their 
implementation does not raise insurmountable difficulties from the perspective of a 
company. Moreover, in essence, the labour policy of the IFC usually goes little 
beyond requiring companies to comply with existing national laws where they oper-
ate. The scenario would get much more complicated if an IFI which engages princi-
pally in public lending tries to extend its policy to labour issues.
The example set by the IFC was quickly followed by the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) in 2008.37 The EBRD adopted its first 
environmental policy in 1991.38 A renewed version of the Environmental and Social 
Policy was adopted in 2008, with labour and working conditions inserted as a sepa-
rate standard.39 The EBRD acknowledges its due diligence obligation not to finance 
projects in contravention of the host country’s international legal obligations on 
environmental protection and human rights. At the same time, the European 
Investment Bank (EIB) in 2009 adopted Environmental and Social Principles and 
34 The AFL–CIO has repeatedly requested the World Bank and IMF to commit to international 
labour standards. See, for example, AFL–CIO (1998); AFL–CIO (2000).
35 ADB (2003), pp. 15–16.
36 IFC (2006).
37 The EBRD expressly acknowledged that its policy review is partly driven by the adoption of 
performance standards by the IFC in 2006. See EBRD (2008a), p. 42.
38 It is to be noticed that in the previous version of the Environmental Policy of 2003, the EBRD 
had already addressed “worker protection issues” including occupational health and safety, harm-




Standards and expressly acknowledged ILO core labour standards.40 The EIB policy 
applies to both public and private sectors, albeit the ensuing obligations of clients in 
different sectors do differ in nature.41
The precedents set by the IFC, the EBRD and the EIB were inspiring and encour-
aged other IFIs. Since then, there has been a growing acceptance of labour standards 
among IFIs. Of course, a number of IFIs have refrained from instituting a labour 
policy so far—the IMF and the International Fund for Agricultural Development 
(IFAD) being prominent examples. As for those IFIs that incorporate labour stan-
dards, there are roughly two categories. In some cases, a comprehensive framework 
for labour protection has been pursued. For example, in 2013 the African 
Development Bank (AfDB) Group42 adopted its Integrated Safeguards System.43 Its 
policy on labour protection is also comprehensive and is close to that of the IFC and 
of the EBRD. Another high profile case was the adoption by the World Bank of its 
Environmental and Social Framework in 2016 after several years of consultation 
and debates. In those cases, labour protection is established as a highly elaborate, 
substantive, and self-standing standard.
In some other cases, a succinct version of an environmental and social policy is 
enacted with a brief reference to labour standards. An example here might be the 
Sustainability Policy of the Nordic Investment Bank (NIB) adopted on 1 September 
2011, with the NIB requiring its clients to respect the four core labour rights and to 
provide safe and healthy working conditions.44 The Black Sea Trade and 
Development Bank (BSTDB) also upgraded its Environmental and Social Policy in 
2013 and openly committed to “respect for human rights in a working environ-
ment”, as embodied in ILO core labour standards.45 In 2016 the New Development 
Bank (NDB) adopted its Environmental and Social Framework which sets occupa-
tional health and safety at the centre of labour protection.46 And in the same year, the 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) approved its Environmental and 
Social Framework and prescribed labour standards for both public and private sec-
tors. In addition, projects involving use of forced labour or child labour are expressly 
listed on the AIIB’s list of exclusions from financing.47
It is safe to summarize that the development of international labour protection 
during recent decades is characterized by the proliferation of labour standards in 
transnational settings. The body of transnational labour standards is not monolithic, 
but rather amorphous. It is not a single set of uniform labour standards, but an 
40 EIB (2013), pp. 18–19.
41 Ibid, p. 15.
42 The African Development Bank Group includes the African Development Bank (AfDB) and 
African Development Fund (AfDF).
43 African Development Bank Group (2013).
44 NIB (2012).
45 See BSTDB (2014).
46 NDB (2016).
47 AIIB (2016).
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aggregation of various sets of independent labour standards practised in transna-
tional settings. To group all those standards under the label of transnational labour 
standards risks reduction and oversimplification of the richness, diversity and 
nuances of labour standards in transnational settings. Yet, they share the sentiment 
that labour standards may grow and develop outside the ILO conventions, and may 
not rely on the ILO for their implementation.
One should not overlook the heterogeneity and richness of those transnational 
labour standards. Yet, some core elements may be observed. Firstly, the ILO con-
ventions and standards, prominently the 1998 Declaration, have been the cen-
trepiece of the normative project of transnational labour standards. Most of them 
have made express reference to the 1998 Declaration.48 In most cases, all four cat-
egories of fundamental labour rights are acknowledged. Yet, it is still not very clear 
from a normative perspective whether this reference would endow those fundamen-
tal labour rights with an additional layer of normativity. It is also interesting to 
observe that the substantive labour rights covered by the FTAs and IFIs are in grow-
ing convergence.
Secondly, those transnational labour standards usually go beyond the purview of 
fundamental labour rights. Typically, these may involve safe working conditions. 
This is the least politically sensitive and morally uncontested part of labour stan-
dards. It is among the first cluster of labour standards received by the IFIs. The 
World Bank’s current standards on occupational health and safety are extensive. 
They require, among others things, identification of potential hazards, preventive 
and protective measures, preparedness for and responses to emergencies, and effec-
tive remedies for occupational injuries, deaths, disability and disease. Other stan-
dards may involve workers’ rights related to hours of work, minimum wages, 
overtime compensation and benefits,49 social security,50 and the protection of 
migrant workers.51
Thirdly, these transnational labour standards are designed with autonomous 
mechanisms of enforcement. In the case of FTAs, labour standards are enforceable 
through cooperation, technical assistance and labour consultation, or even by 
recourse to dispute settlement procedures or unilateral trade sanctions. In 2014 the 
United States brought the first labour dispute case against Guatemala, utilizing the 
dispute settlement procedure under the Dominican Republic-Central America- 
United States Free Trade Agreement, yet failed to establish the failure of Guatemala’s 
enforcement of its labour law in a sustained or recurring manner according to the 
48 International Labour Office (2016) Third Item on the Agenda – labour-related provisions in trade 
agreements: recent trends and relevance to the ILO (GB.328/POL/3), Governing Body, 328th 
Session, Geneva, 27 October–10 November 2016; Agustí-Panareda et al. (2014).
49 International Labour Office (2016) Third Item on the Agenda – labour-related provisions in trade 
agreements: recent trends and relevance to the ILO (GB.328/POL/3), Governing Body, 328th 
Session, Geneva, 27 October–10 November 2016, p. 54.
50 See EBRD (2008b).
51 See EIB (2013), p. 70.
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final report of the arbitration panel in 2017.52 In the case of IFIs, labour standards 
are enforceable through a variety of means and procedures, including prior plans or 
commitments of the borrower, a project-specific on-site grievance mechanism, 
independent labour inspection, or an IFI complaint mechanism. This means that 
these transnational labour standards are not only independent from the ILO, but also 
may be more effective than ILO supervisory mechanisms.
In the course of diffusion of labour standards, the ILO has played an indispens-
able role. It has been not unusual that the ILO gets involved or is consulted in the 
labour provisions of FTAs. The ILO itself has confirmed that “trade partners have 
requested the ILO’s advice through technical assistance on various questions related 
to labour standards and practices”.53 This applies even more so in the case of IFI 
labour standards. For example, the EBRD actively resorted to ILO expertise when 
designing its labour standards. In 2006, a thematic meeting on labour issues was 
hosted by the ILO where EBRD staff met with representatives from trade unions, 
employers, and ILO experts.54 Another prominent example can be found in the for-
mulation of the Environmental and Social Framework of the World Bank. The 
World Bank has organized three labour expert meetings respectively in Jakarta 
(2013), London (2015) and Washington (2015).55 In all these meetings, ILO repre-
sentatives were present.
Inter-agency learning is also an important factor accounting for the spread of 
labour standards in the case of IFIs. The Multilateral Finance Institutions Working 
Group on the Environment (MFI-WGE) was initiated in the 1990s and serves as a 
useful platform for senior IFI managers to discuss and coordinate policies towards 
environmental and social issues. As social issues are increasingly included in safe-
guards policy, this working group was recently renamed as the Multilateral Finance 
Institutions Working Group on Environmental and Social Standards (MFI-WGESS). 
This working group is rather informal but has been instrumental for institutional 
learning on environmental and social standards. For example, the African 
Development Bank expressly acknowledged that its earlier drafts of safeguards 
policies “have been reviewed by the IFC, World Bank, Asian Development Bank 
and other members of the MFI Working Group on the Environment (MFI-WGE)”.56 
The World Bank also expressly acknowledged that its labour standards are “derived 
from provisions of other MDBs [multilateral development banks]”.57
52 Arbitral Panel established pursuant to Chapter 20 of the CAFTA-DR (2017).
53 International Labour Office (2016) Third Item on the Agenda – labour-related provisions in trade 
agreements: recent trends and relevance to the ILO (GB.328/POL/3), Governing Body, 328th 
Session, Geneva, 27 October–10 November 2016.
54 See EBRD (2006), p. 11.
55 See World Bank (2013, 2015a, b).
56 See the statement in African Development Bank Group (2013), Acknowledgements.
57 World Bank (2014a), p. 11.
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4  In Relation to ILO Standards: The Ambivalence 
of Transnational Labour Standards
An interesting aspect of transnational labour standards is their relationship with ILO 
standards. More specifically, when transnational labour standards give concrete 
expressions to core labour standards, should reference be to the ILO fundamental 
labour conventions and the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights 
at Work of 1998, or should transnational labour standards simply embody the sub-
stance of the core labour standards without resorting or referring to specific ILO 
documents?
The practice has been diverse. Some IFIs tend to make a full reference to the ILO 
fundamental labour conventions. This is the case for the IFC’s Performance 
Standards of 2006. The IFC expressly acknowledges that its labour standards “have 
been in part guided by a number of international conventions negotiated through the 
ILO and the UN”. A further reference to all eight ILO fundamental labour conven-
tions was detailed in a footnote.58 The same applies more or less to the EBRD’s 
Environmental and Social Policy of 2008, and to the AfDB Group’s Integrated 
Safeguards System of 2013. Some other IFIs with a relevant succinct policy docu-
ment may avoid explicit reference to the ILO conventions, as in the case of the 
NIB’s Sustainability Guidelines of 2012. Another way of looking at the matter is by 
examining the portfolios and activities of the IFIs. Those IFIs engaged more, or 
exclusively, with the private sector are more inclined to refer to the ILO conven-
tions. On the contrary, those engaged more with the public sector are more cautious 
in referring to the ILO conventions.
It seems that FTAs are more receptive towards referring to the ILO Declaration 
and fundamental labour rights. Most recent FTAs with labour provisions have made 
reference to the 1998 Declaration. It has been customary for Canada to refer to the 
1998 Declaration in its FTAs with labour provision. Yet, the degree of integration 
varies under different FTAs, as do the legal effects of the ILO Declaration.59 For 
example, the North American Free Trade Agreement of 2018 makes repeated refer-
ence to the 1998 Declaration.60 In the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and 
Trade Agreement of 2016, the agreement actually calls upon the states to “make 
continued and sustained efforts to ratify the fundamental ILO Conventions if they 
have not yet done so”.61
To refer or not to refer to ILO standards is not just a matter of formality or theo-
retical interest. Rather, this will largely affect the normative operation of transna-
tional labour standards, as well as their foundational authority. Are transnational 
labour standards simply to be understood as no more than a transposed expression 
of established ILO labour standards, or rather, does their authority derive from the 
58 IFC (2012), Performance Standard 2 Labor and Working Conditions, para 2.
59 Agustí-Panareda et al. (2014).
60 North American Free Trade Agreement, 30 November 2018.
61 EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, 30 October 2016.
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labour provisions themselves and as such constitute a set of labour standards sui 
generis? And if there should arise differences of opinion on certain labour stan-
dards, would the IFIs or trade partners have to resort to the ILO conventions and 
relevant jurisprudence to search for a correct interpretation, or would the IFIs or 
trade partners be entitled to develop their own institutional standards and 
jurisprudence?
When the World Bank drafted its labour standards, a number of Western coun-
tries requested the World Bank to link its labour standards to the ILO conventions.62 
The United States urged the Bank to incorporate reference to the ILO Declaration 
on the Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.63 The ILO also actively lobbied 
for the inclusion of the ILO conventions. An obvious advantage of reference to the 
ILO conventions is that the very content of IFI labour standards has a reliable source 
and solid ground. To borrow the ILO standards could avoid re-opening many debates 
that were already concluded at the time of drafting ILO conventions. At the end of 
the day, since IFIs are not specialized in labour protection, it may be desirable to 
heed the knowledge and expertise of the ILO. Moreover, as the ILO standards are 
internationally recognized, it may also be conducive to a uniform application of 
labour standards.
Yet, the proposal to incorporate the ILO conventions in World Bank social poli-
cies was viewed with much vigilance among developing countries. The major con-
cern is that this might amount to a de facto imposition of the ILO conventions and 
bypass ratification procedures.64 In other words, the ILO fundamental labour con-
ventions may be enforced through World Bank policies against a borrowing country 
even if the country has not acceded to all the ILO fundamental conventions. The 
traditional ILO approach to the promotion of labour standards relies upon voluntary 
ratification of labour conventions by states. And to ratify, or not to ratify, a treaty is 
always an essential feature of the sovereign prerogative. However, if the ILO con-
ventions are referred to in the labour standards of the IFIs, then sovereign borrowers 
are obliged to implement those labour standards in the role of clients irrespective of 
their non-ratification. World Bank labour standards would be equivalent to a coerced 
application of the ILO conventions. It is therefore in the consultation phase that 
China suggested the Bank confine itself to reference to general principles, but not to 
the ILO conventions.65
At the same time, there is another important aspect to the matter. It would not 
only have normative relevance on the operation of transnational labour standards, 
but also has strong implications for the relationship between international actors 
and the ILO. It is in the interest of the ILO to develop a body of ILO-centred labour 
62 See for an example, World Bank (2014b).
63 World Bank (2015c).
64 For example, the ADB considers the core labour standards as automatically applicable. 
“Internationally recognized labor standards, when ratified, are also part of the legislative frame-
work of a DMC. With regard to the Core Labor Standards, no explicit ratification is needed for 
them to be part of the legislative framework of a country.” See ADB (2003), p. 15.
65 World Bank (2015d).
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standards at the global level. A reference to the ILO and its work would naturally 
reinforce the authority of the ILO in labour matters. To a certain extent, a strength-
ened role for the ILO is also in the interest of the international community in gen-
eral. The emergence of autonomous labour standards outside the ILO system could 
possibly divert and compete with the ILO and its standard-setting authority.
Seen in this light, one may gain a better appreciation of the institutional rivalry 
between the World Bank and the ILO. The World Bank in its Environmental and 
Social Framework decided against direct reference to any ILO instruments.66 In 
explaining its decision, the World Bank made it very clear that it is exactly the 
autonomy of labour standards and of the Bank that animates such a political 
decision:
It is Management’s view that the requirement for both World Bank and Borrower to comply 
with the ES [Environmental and Social] Framework should be self-standing, and should not 
require reference to external sources to make this judgment.67
The ILO was profoundly disappointed at this decision. Immediately after the 
World Bank published its Environmental and Social Framework, the ILO publicly 
pronounced its dissatisfaction. It stated that “from the outset the ILO expressed 
concern with Bank Management’s decision to exclude direct references to ILO core 
labour conventions from the ESF [Environmental and Social Framework].”68
The case of the World Bank makes a good example that highlights the autono-
mous status of transnational labour standards. The legal validity of these labour 
standards does not depend on the ILO conventions or other normative documents. 
Nor is the substance of those transnational labour standards defined or constrained 
by the ILO conventions. Transnational labour standards constitute a set of indepen-
dent, self-contained labour standards with distinct sources, procedures and mecha-
nisms, in parallel to the traditional concept of international labour law centred on 
and formulated by the ILO. Although these labour standards do strengthen labour 
protection at global and transnational levels, they are necessarily associated with the 
ILO standards. In this sense, even though the substance of transnational labour stan-
dards might be identical to those in ILO standards, they are capable of supplement-
ing, or even competing with, ILO standards. They are not at all simply a repetition 
of existing standards.
The difference between the World Bank and the ILO is not concerned with actual 
labour standards, but about who is entitled to prescribe labour protection in an 
increasingly globalized world. While the authority of the ILO is highly acknowl-
edged, the World Bank has refused to concede the ILO a monopolized say on labour 
standards. Putting it differently, the ILO does not have higher authority than the 
World Bank in speaking to labour standards. It can be expected that close 
66 The attitude of the World Bank towards external institutions has been consistently conservative. 
A known example is World Bank’s explicit rejection of the binding force of the resolution of the 
United Nations (UN) Security Council acting under the Chapter VII of the UN Charter.




cooperation between the World Bank and the ILO will increase and grow steadily in 
the future. Meanwhile, with assistance from the ILO, the World Bank is likely to 
develop its own expertise and knowledge in labour protection in connection with its 
own labour policy and project implementation.
5  Institutional Politics of Labour Standards
Even though core labour standards receive broad endorsement, their substance and 
actual enforcement exhibit profound differences in practice. For example, it is 
noticed that different countries have very different approaches to the workers’ right 
of unionization. There was, and probably still is, hesitation among IFIs to include 
freedom of association and collective bargaining, which is considered a highly 
political and sensitive issue in borrowing countries. Even for those rights of a seem-
ingly less political nature, such as the prohibition of child labour, the matter may 
also be received with divergent attitudes in different cultures.
Freedom of association is probably the most politically sensitive right of work-
ers. For many countries, freedom of association lies at the heart of labour protection. 
And freedom of association is deeply embedded in the liberal political tradition. 
Labour protection through institutionalized unionization of labour has functioned in 
a highly effective manner in countries like Sweden and Finland.69 Yet in some other 
countries the right to organize is not purely a matter of labour protection and its 
exercise is restricted by law or in practice.70 This may include prior approval or 
registration of the formation of trade unions, and other forms of restriction. The dif-
ference of positions among states towards the right to organize is also demonstrated 
by the fact that a number of countries have not ratified the Freedom of Association 
and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention (No. 87) or the Right to Organize 
and Collective Bargaining Convention (No. 98). Out of the eight ILO fundamental 
conventions, these two conventions have received the least number of 
ratifications.71
The initial attitude of IFIs towards freedom of association has also been deeply 
cautious. The labour rights tackled by IFIs used to have a limited spectrum with a 
special focus on safe working conditions and prohibition of child or forced labour. 
An explicit reference to freedom of association was often absent. As observed by 
69 See for example Fahlbeck and Mulder (2009), pp. 16–18.
70 See the observations of the ILO in its global report on the freedom of association, in ILO 
(2008), p. 11.
71 By the end of May 2020, 155 countries had ratified the ILO Convention No. 87. See ILO (n.d.-a). 
167 countries have ratified ILO Convention No. 98. See ILO (n.d.-b). These numbers are much 
lower than other 6 ILO fundamental conventions. In contrast, the Worst Forms of Child Labour 
Convention (No. 182) has received 186 ratifications so far.
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Francis Maupin, the former legal counsel of the ILO, “freedom of association and 
collective bargaining continue to be regarded as civil rights which [World] Bank 
activities might facilitate, but it still believes that it is not in its mandate to actively 
promote them, and even less so where they might interfere with economic 
performance”.72 This is partly due to the economic perspective of seeing trade 
unions negatively as free riders.73 Moreover, many developing countries where the 
IFIs operate hold a conservative position towards freedom of association, and those 
IFIs engaging with public sectors are barred from interfering in the internal affairs 
of the borrowing sovereigns. This was still the case when the World Bank proposed 
its first draft of the Environmental and Social Framework in 2014. In its standard on 
labour and working conditions, the World Bank refrained from mentioning freedom 
of association among its objectives, instead adopting a deferential attitude to the 
borrowing country. It expressly limited its support to freedom of association, that is, 
only if the national laws of the borrowing country recognize it.74
This cautious approach by the World Bank met with fierce criticism from labour 
NGOs and experts, the ILO and developed countries.75 The main arguments are 
summarized as follows. To start with, all core labour standards are indivisible and 
as a whole they constitute the floor of protection for workers. There is no reason to 
segregate freedom of association from other standards. Secondly, freedom of asso-
ciation and collective bargaining are political rights by nature, as indeed are other 
core labour standards. Freedom of association cannot justifiably be excluded on the 
grounds of its political nature. Thirdly, the silence of the World Bank might be con-
strued as being permissive of suppressive or retaliatory measures against workers 
seeking to exercise freedom of association. Fourthly, the obligation to promote core 
labour standards arises from states’ membership in the ILO. As such, neither the 
World Bank nor the states themselves should refuse to implement freedom of asso-
ciation on the basis of national laws.76
The World Bank quickly yielded to this pressure after the first round of consulta-
tion. The Bank switched to the opposite position in the second draft of the 
Environmental and Social Framework and provided unqualified support to freedom 
of association as part of its labour policy. This radical change of position generated 
great concern among developing countries. The primary concern was the unquali-
fied nature of the World Bank statement. It is suggested by countries such as China 
that the exercise of freedom of association and collective bargaining should be in 
accordance with the national laws of borrowing countries.77 Some also suggest that 
the arrangement concerning freedom of association and collective bargaining should 
72 Maupain (2013), p. 78.
73 It used to be the mainstream opinion of the World Bank, see Murphy (2014), pp. 405 and 417.
74 World Bank (2014c).
75 See World Bank (2015f).
76 ITUC/Global Unions (2014), pp. 2–3.
77 For the opinions of China, see World Bank (2015g).
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be expressed so as not to frustrate project implementation.78 In response, the World 
Bank decided to qualify its wording to “support the principles of freedom of asso-
ciation and collective bargaining of project workers in a manner consistent with 
national law”.79 This formula entered the final text of the World Bank’s Environmental 
and Social Policy in 2016. Yet, this formula does not satisfy the ILO and trade 
unions, who see this as a concession from the internationally accepted standards.80
One may further suggest that the challenge for IFIs in terms of incorporating 
labour standards is not only institutional, but also intellectual and philosophical. 
The most difficult part is how to integrate labour protection into the mainstream 
economic theories of IFIs. Typically, an economic perspective treats labour as a fac-
tor of production and is usually in favour of flexibility of labour markets and deregu-
lation of social protection.
The controversies surrounding the World Bank publication “Doing Business” 
provide another illustrative example of embedded neoliberal economic thoughts 
among IFIs.81 “Doing Business” is a flagship publication of the World Bank, 
launched in 2004, aiming to measure the business environment across the world 
with quantitative indicators. In its early years, the “Employing Workers” indicator 
largely measured rigidity of hiring and firing workers and their employment condi-
tions. Its underpinning philosophy is that rigid labour regulation leads to unemploy-
ment in formal sectors, and ultimately reduction in productivity growth.82 
Accordingly, the more regulatory and protective a country’s labour regulations are, 
the lower the ranking it receives.83 And among the recommended reform measures 
are introduction of part-time and fixed-term employment contracts, and reduction of 
the minimum wage for young workers.84
This provoked fierce protests from the ILO, trade unions and labour law scholars 
in general.85 The ILO criticized the methodological flaws of the Employing Workers 
indicator and expressed the concern that the ranking system would “discourage 
countries from ratifying and abiding by international labour Conventions and 
Recommendations”.86 The international trade unions are profoundly concerned with 
the fundamental bias against labour regulation of the Employing Workers indica-
tor. They condemned in particular the fact that the World Bank, in using the 
78 World Bank (2016a), p. 4.
79 World Bank (2016b), p. 22.
80 The qualification of “in a manner consistent with national law” was harshly criticized by the ILO 
for the reason that the formula as such “undercuts the universal principles adhered to by the ILO’s 
187 member states and jeopardizes the purpose of having such an objective”. See ILO (2016).
81 For the ongoing controversy regarding the publication, see Murphy (2014).
82 See World Bank (2003), p. 29.
83 On the politics of knowledge behind the ranking and a case study of the Doing Business 
Indicators, see Davis et al. (2012).
84 See World Bank (2003), p. 30.
85 See Kryvoi (2009), pp. 47–59.
86 See International Labour Office (2007).
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indicators, was eliminating workers’ protection.87 In response, the World Bank con-
ceded a more balanced approach to labour protection, committed to a better align-
ment with ILO core labour standards,88 and subsequently broadened the spectrum of 
measurement to include protective elements such as job quality. As of 2011, “Doing 
Business” has removed labour regulation from the measuring criteria of ranking. 
Instead, labour regulation is included in the publication only as a referential annex.
Both examples referred to above fully illustrate that labour standards, when 
transplanted in transnational settings, are constrained and affected by institutional 
philosophy, culture and norms. Transnational labour standards live different norma-
tive lives of their own. They may borrow the ILO standards at their convenience, but 
are not reluctant to challenge ILO’s claim of normative superiority. The politics of 
labour standards is not only normative and institutional, but also ideological and 
philosophical.
6  The Future of the ILO: Leadership in Intellectuality 
and Normativity
When established in 1919, the ILO was undoubtedly the only regulatory authority 
for labour and social life at that time. Entering into the new millennium, the interna-
tional regulation of labour has turned out to be a crowded field. In addition to the 
proliferation of normative standards, there is also competition for regulatory compe-
tence, and struggle for institutional ideologies. This generates the risk of legal 
uncertainty, the possibility of forum shopping, as well as inflation of labour rhetoric.
The proliferation of labour standards does not necessarily by itself promise a 
world of better labour protection. The actual effect of transnational labour standards 
usually does not offset the adverse impact caused by international economic 
arrangements. Labour provisions in FTAs could be incorporated to appease antici-
pated criticism and used to legitimize FTAs,89 but may not be able to deliver the 
aspirations promised on paper. They are even more radically criticised as an instru-
ment of “mutually assured non-compliance”.90 While adoption of the labour stan-
dards by the World Bank was applauded, the limited scope of application among 
other things also raised doubts as to its practical effectiveness.91 Concern was also 
expressed that the challenge for IFIs in fully incorporating labour standards are 
87 ITUC/Global Unions (2007).
88 See World Bank (2009), pp. 22–23; World Bank (2010), p. 94.
89 See Santos (2019), pp. 140–174.
90 See Tham and Ewing (2020).
91 See, for example, Ebert (2018).
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philosophical, constitutional and cultural.92 There is indeed a danger of “economisa-
tion of core labour rights”.93
The foremost challenge ahead for the ILO is less about fragmentation of norms, 
but more about the philosophy of and approach to labour. The difference between a 
neoliberal approach and a rights-based approach is indeed structural. Another tell-
ing example is the attitude of IFIs towards trade unions. The trade unions are con-
sidered to be free riders in the view of the World Bank.94 The IMF is reported to hold 
the same opinion.95 In essence, trade unions are difficult to analyze in economic 
terms of efficiency and productivity. In the 2017 evaluation of the IMF on its social 
policy, some IMF staff members were reported to have felt that the IMF and ILO 
staffs “did not speak the same language”.96
To fully integrate labour protection in economic globalization would require a 
profound change in economic thinking to reconceptualize labour protection as an 
inherent good. Labour should be approached not purely as a factor of production in 
economic terms, but also as one of the very foundational values upon which eco-
nomic activities are based. In other words, trade arrangement and financial institu-
tions have to embed labour protection into their economic work from their 
foundational philosophy, that is to say, what are the elements of a sound economy 
and where the boundary of economic activities lies.97 This in practice would mean 
modifying or even rewriting the philosophy of mainstream economic theory, which 
is a formidable task, if not an impossible one. It would also require the ILO to 
engage boldly not just in setting labour standards, but in formulating competing 
economic and social theories against those currently accepted.
At the technical level, the ILO also bears a special responsibility to promote 
coherence of and genuine respect for labour standards at the global level. First of all, 
the ILO may wish to further strengthen its normative grip on fundamental labour 
rights. What the ILO did in its 1998 Declaration was to emphasize the universality 
of those rights by linking them to the ILO membership of states. Yet this universal 
approach has the shortcomings of being soft and vague. It places undue emphasis on 
principles rather than rights, and is also detached from the international labour con-
ventions.98 It has been increasingly felt that a reference to the 1998 Declaration does 
little to clarify the rights as set out in labour provisions.99 It may be time for the ILO 
to review its soft law approach and reconsider the possibility of adopting a 
92 See Chen (2018).
93 See Breining-Kaufmann (2007).
94 See Murphy (2014), pp. 405 and 417.
95 See Ebert (2015).
96 IMF (2017), p. 30.
97 For example, the integration of environmental protection in the policy of the World Bank is 
greatly facilitated by the publication of “Development and the Environment” in 1992, which “pre-
sented environmental issues in a language that economists (inside and outside the Bank) could 
understand”. See Wade (1997), pp. 712–713.
98 See Alston (2004).
99 See, for examples, Ushakova (2018); also Tham and Ewing (2020).
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 comprehensive fundamental labour rights convention. This convention could be 
open to states and international organizations alike for accession.
Secondly, at the inter-agency level the ILO might also be more actively engaged 
in the enforcement of transnational labour standards. Some trade agreements actu-
ally conceive such a role for the ILO. For example, the EU-Canada Comprehensive 
Economic and Trade Agreement stipulates that, when the dispute settlement proce-
dure is resorted to for settling issues related to fundamental labour rights, “the Panel 
of Experts should seek information from the ILO, including any pertinent available 
interpretative guidance, findings or decisions adopted by the ILO”.100 This is a self- 
conscious effort to promote greater legal certainty in the field. It is also recognized 
in the North American Free Trade Agreement of 2008 that in the dialogue procedure 
the parties may request the ILO for independent verification of compliance.101 
Proliferation of labour standards does not necessarily lead to normative fragmenta-
tion and institutional confrontation.102 International actors are generally cautious to 
not overrule one another’s standards too lightly.
Thirdly, the existing supervisory mechanism of the ILO, which evaluates the 
performance of member states under ratified ILO conventions, could also provide a 
useful reference as to the observance of ILO standards by states under other com-
mitments. The Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations may also “serve as a source of guidance” when it comes to the 
interpretation of labour provisions.103 It is acknowledged in FTAs that trade partners 
“may establish cooperative arrangements with the ILO and other competent interna-
tional or regional organisations to draw on their expertise and resources”.104
Proliferation of labour standards has brought many challenges to the door of the 
ILO. The ILO should endeavour to reinstate itself as a central institution for eco-
nomic and social theories as well as for labour standards. Its intellectual capability 
is as essential as its normative mandate. It is important for the ILO to perform a 
legal-diplomatic role in promoting convergence of normative understandings about 
labour, economy and society among different institutions. In doing so, stressing the 
social dimension of globalization would, one may hope, lead to the revitalization of 
not only the ILO but workers at large in the economic and political life of the world.
100 EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, 30 October 2016.
101 North American Free Trade Agreement, 30 November 2018.
102 For example, in the US-Guatemala labour arbitration, the arbitration panel expressly refers to 
the ILO 1998 Declaration to ascertain the meaning of right to strike. See Arbitral Panel established 
pursuant to Chapter 20 of the CAFTA-DR (2017).
103 Agustí-Panareda et al. (2014).
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1  Introduction
Contrary to popular opinion, the role of law, both in domestic societies and in inter-
national affairs, is not first and foremost about constraining action. Law is not about 
telling people how to behave, and inflicting punishment when they behave differ-
ently—not solely, at any rate. To think this, as many do, is to view criminal law as 
the template for law generally. Instead, much of the law, both in domestic societies 
and in international affairs, follows a different template, and is about facilitat-
ing action.
What is more, in addition to (or in the process of) facilitating action, law also 
helps to structure the way we think about things. We cannot begin to think of the 
state without invoking the criteria for statehood; we cannot seriously discuss agree-
ment without bearing legal concepts of treaty or contract in mind; and we cannot 
characterize the military presence of state A in state B without some term from the 
legal vocabulary, and it matters a great deal which exact term we employ, for calling 
something an “invasion” or an “attack” evokes different associations than labelling 
the same act an “intervention”.1 That is not to say our conversations should stop at 
1 Klabbers (2015a), pp. 488–506.
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those legal concepts, for sometimes doing so might lapse into awkwardness or 
worse, as when a court proves unable to think of genocide in terms other than those 
of the 1948 Genocide Convention and thus suggests that an earlier genocide was 
probably not “really” a “genocide”.2 That said, though, rules, norms and decisions3 
set the tone for any social conversation. Rules, norms and decisions also tend to 
have distributive effects. Any authoritative decision will allocate something of 
value, whether financial or social. A decision by a country club to admit someone as 
a member will change that individual’s relative standing in the community, and a 
decision by the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 
to admit Palestine as a member adds legitimacy to Palestine’s position in global 
politics. A decision by a pizza parlour to change its opening hours or update its 
menu will convenience some and inconvenience others. Enacting a rule that inau-
gurs driving on the right side of the road will disadvantage some car manufacturers, 
even if one might hold that the rule is a textbook example of a coordination rule. 
And a decision by the World Health Organization (WHO) to declare a pandemic 
will come to affect the producers of vaccines, may send shockwaves through the 
tourism industry, and may even inaugurate a full-blown economic crisis, as the 2020 
Covid-19 crisis vividly illustrates.4
Given that rules, norms and decisions invariably have distributive effects, they 
are typically employed as weapons and arms in struggles for power and hegemony 
between people (states, companies, organizations, individuals) with diverging polit-
ical agendas. Those weapons may have long fuses, and their effects may only mani-
fest themselves over time, but this makes them only more effective, for the most 
effective form of power is the power to influence how people think about things.5 No 
lesser authority than John Maynard Keynes was well aware of this, explicitly dedi-
cating his analysis of the Versailles settlement to influencing the minds of future 
generations of policy makers.6
With this in mind, the creation of the ILO can be seen as a crucial step in the 
development of public international law, and its singular relevance resides in having 
sensitized international law to addressing the situation of individuals, whether as 
employers or as workers. The relevance of the ILO is not just that it helped create 
and enforce labour rights, although it did and does that too. But part of its relevance 
also resides in something else, on a deeper level so to speak; this has little to do with 
labour rights per se, but rather more with opening up international law, with making 
visible that international law is not just about inter-state relations. The ILO is prob-
ably the first international organization—the first manifestation of international 
2 See European Court of Human Rights (somewhat softened by the Grand Chamber), Perinçek v. 
Switzerland (App. No. 27510/08), Judgment, 15 October 2015; for discussion, see Klabbers 
(2017a).
3 This refers to the classic study by Kratochwil (1989). See also Kratochwil (2018).
4 Klabbers (2020).
5 Lukes (1974).
6 Keynes (1920), p. 279: “[…] the true voice of the new generation has not yet spoken, and silent 
opinion is not yet formed. To the formation of the general opinion of the future I dedicate this book.”
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law—to take individuals and companies seriously, thus paving the way for the 
involvement of international law in more recent years with individuals, something 
we now almost take for granted. Human rights involve the individual, as do inter-
national criminal law, EU law, the law on investment protection, et cetera. It is 
impossible to prove (and silly even to try) that none of this would have happened 
without the ILO. But what can be demonstrated is that the ILO marked a signifi-
cant step in the creation of the individual as an entity of relevance to interna-
tional law.7
In what follows, I will substantiate that particular claim, demonstrating first that 
the international legal vocabulary prior to the ILO’s creation did not facilitate think-
ing about individual rights under international law, in thrall as it was to the idea that 
international law only operated between states and would only affect states, in their 
capacity as states. Thereafter, I will discuss the creation of the ILO, indicating just 
how creating the ILO marked a seismic shift. This is followed by a discussion as to 
how and why the international legal vocabulary—the landscape—changed with the 
establishment of the ILO.
2  Dualism and Its Discontents
Traditionally, international law was always nominally concerned with relations 
between states. International law, in a collated textbook definition from the late 
nineteenth century, was the law made by states, to regulate relations between states, 
and for the benefit of those states. Oppenheim, e.g., in the second edition of his clas-
sic treatise published in 1912, defined international law as “the body of customary 
and convention rules which are considered legally binding by civilized States in 
their intercourse with each other”.8 And he adds that international offices are created 
to give effect to treaties establishing unions between states.9 There was not a hint of 
a suggestion here that international law, or the work of those international offices, 
might come to affect others than states. States enjoyed, one might say, considerable 
epistemic priority. Other actors never even entered the picture in any serious man-
ner, except as religious or historical exceptions.10 After all, so the logic went, only 
states can go to war. Only states can conclude treaties. Only states can proclaim 
territorial waters.
7 I will studiously refrain from using the term ‘subject’ of international law, as this often merely 
functions as a placeholder.
8 Oppenheim (1912), p.  3. Oppenheim’s influence can hardly be over-estimated: see García-
Salmones Rovira (2013).
9 Oppenheim (1912), p. 516.
10 Think of the Holy See or the Maltese Knights. Intriguingly, upon its creation the League of 
Nations was categorized in the same manner in one of the great historical overviews of interna-
tional law. See Verzijl (1969).
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The epistemic priority of the state also extended to international organizations. 
These were always derivative creatures, deriving their existence and powers from 
the states that founded them.11 What is more, international organizations were not 
supposed to have any outward-radiating effect. If the early international organiza-
tions were not endowed with international legal personality, it was because no one 
considered such personality necessary, for the good reason that organizations were 
not supposed to interact directly with anyone other than their member states—not 
with third states, not with other international organizations, and not with the citizens 
of their member states either. And for much the same reason, they had no treaty- 
making powers to speak of. Each organization was supposed to be a universe onto 
itself (res inter alios acta), with the only relationships envisaged being those 
between the organization and its member states, but never with the outside world.12 
This still applied, in 1945, to the UN, set up as an entity of universal scope both 
substantively and in terms of geographical reach, but with few treaty-making pow-
ers or even provisions recognizing that there existed a world outside the organiza-
tion (military agreements were envisaged to regulate troop contributions, and some 
coordination with other organizations was planned, but not much more) and no 
explicit grant of international legal personality. The latter only came about after the 
intervention of the International Court of Justice, in 1949.13
And when international law even deigned to think about individuals, it was only 
in relation to the state, only as state representatives. This applied formally with 
respect to protection of diplomats or the conclusion of treaties. It applied more arti-
ficially with the protection of property abroad: injuring the individual was seen as 
injuring the state, and entitling the state (though not the individual) to take action.14 
Not everyone was convinced. Philip Jessup could write in the late 1940s that if 
injury to the state was the true basis of responsibility for injury to aliens, then “the 
measure of damages to be paid for an injury would vary with the importance of the 
role played by the injured individual in the life of the state of which he is a citizen.”15
All this suggested that international law and domestic law would never need to 
be in touch with one another: international law stayed on the inter-state level, and 
the rest was the concern of domestic law.16 The logic of thinking of international and 
domestic law as separate systems made some sense, on the surface level—otherwise 
it could not have survived for very long. It did however rest on one condition: it only 
11 Klabbers (2015b).
12 Klabbers (2016), pp. 618–634.
13 International Court of Justice, Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United 
Nations, Advisory Opinion, 11 April 1949. In International Court of Justice Reports of Judgments, 
Advisory Opinions and Orders 1949. See also Klabbers (2017b), pp. 105–121.
14 Permanent Court of International Justice, Case of the Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, 
Judgment, 30 August 1924. In Publications of the Permanent Court of International Justice, Series 
A, No. 2.
15 Jessup (1948), p. 9.
16 And when the UK started to pioneer the prosecution of slave traders, it did so largely on the basis 
of its domestic law, even if to some extent bilateral treaties proved supportive. See Martinez (2014).
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made sense as long as no one asked why states would go to war and who would be 
affected by war; or why states concluded treaties or proclaim territorial waters, and 
who would be affected. Once those questions are asked, the idea of there being 
purely inter-state activities which form the natural realm of international law, 
quickly turns into a conceit.
But founded on the logic that international affairs are by definition merely inter- 
state affairs,17 no situation could possibly bring the individual into contact with 
international law, as indeed Triepel observed and further theorized in 1899.18 The 
universes of domestic law and international law were considered to be hermetically 
sealed off. Empirically, Triepel noted, domestic law deals with relations involving 
individuals, and international law is limited to regulating relations between states. 
On the rare occasions that a treaty would aim to do something for individuals, it 
would have to be transformed into domestic law. This idea came to be known as 
dualism, and is still maintained (albeit often in somewhat softened form) in many 
states. The gist is that domestic legal orders can only work on the basis of instru-
ments recognized as legally valid within those domestic orders, typically Acts of 
Parliament, Governmental Decrees, and the like. As a result, other instruments, 
regardless of their provenance (but typically referring to international legal instru-
ments) must be transformed into acts recognized as legally valid by and within the 
legal order concerned; a treaty must be transformed into an Act of Parliament or 
Governmental Decree in order to be recognized as valid within that legal order, and 
in order to create rights or obligations for individuals within that legal order.
This was never a fully accurate or convincing picture, but it worked until the 
1920s, and generated an understandable popularity. It entailed that domestic parlia-
ments, which had fought hard and long to acquire a say over domestic legislation, 
could not be outflanked or overruled by governments entering into international 
commitments. Over international commitments, after all, typically those same par-
liaments had no influence. If dualism thus respected concerns about local democ-
racy (at least nominally), a side-effect was the re-affirmation of the role of the state 
and a re-affirmation of the strict separation between international and domestic law.
Triepel himself pointed out that his theory was empirically-based; it was built on 
the finding that there actually were no contacts between the international and the 
domestic legal order. These things are always in the eye of the beholder (in that few 
matters in law really have an empirical correspondent independently from the par-
ticular theory in which empirical observations play a role, and tend to be much more 
dependent on hermeneutics19), but Triepel made a forceful case. He did note, how-
ever, that the minorities treaties concluded in connection with the re-drawing of 
Europe’s map at Versailles could come to affect individuals.20 But, he wrote in 1923, 
that moment had not yet arrived. International law still dealt only with states.
17 Note how, as so often in legal thought, the conclusion is already inherent in the premises.
18 Triepel (1899).
19 Klabbers (forthcoming).
20 Triepel (1923), pp. 73–121.
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Naturally, this strict separation between the domestic and international spheres 
also affected the creation of international organization, including the very early 
river commissions addressing issues of navigation, safety, and security. The idea 
behind the river commissions was to establish common rules for navigation, and 
this was done by ordering the states to legislate—thus keeping the separate spheres 
intact. The Final Act of the Congress of Vienna 1815, e.g., proves illustrative. Article 
108 provides that states set up common regimes for navigation, while Article 110 
made clear that “uniformity” was key. On the Rhine, the Neckar, and other rivers, 
the exact same rules should apply with respect to all states concerned, both relating 
to navigation and in terms of policing. Article 111 further underlined the need for 
harmonization: “Les droit sur la navigation seront fixé d’une maniére uniforme, 
invariable, et […] indépendente de la qualité différente des marchandises […]”.
Note the way Article 111 was written: what was needed here was for the river 
commissions to set standards, and then for the riparian states to turn these into 
law—no one had given any thought to allowing river commission to set those stan-
dards directly. Instead, the instruction of Article 111 was directed at states: states 
would have to set in uniform manner the navigation rights.
This pattern continued throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth century. 
The International Telegraphic Union (ITU), the Universal Postal Union (UPU), 
International Bureau of Weights and Measures, the Union of International Transport 
by Rail, the International Sugar Union, the International Institute for Agriculture: all 
late-nineteenth century and early twentieth century creations were thought of as 
creations of states, affecting those very states (the member states) in their very 
capacity as states. And in the case where they were not thought of in state-centric 
terms, as creatures of states, then they were not considered part of international law. 
The Red Cross (created in 1863 by Henri Dunant and Gustave Moynier21) is a prime 
example; another is the Institut de Droit International, set up in Ghent in 1873.22
Still, every now and then a minor crack became visible. The US, e.g., was reluc-
tant to join the ITU,23 mostly because the telegraph networks in the US were in 
private hands, while in other member states they were usually under public control. 
This seemed to signify, however dimly, a realization that the work of the ITU might 
affect network operators. It was also said of the Union of International Transport by 
Rail that its dispute settlement procedures made no distinction between governmen-
tal and nongovernmental railway administration, again suggesting a dim realization 
that the Union’s work may affect entities within the state, and not just those states 
themselves.24
Indeed, the strict separation between the international and domestic spheres was 
never very realistic. It seems fairly obvious that the setting of postal rates by UPU 
not only affects Denmark and Japan and Nigeria, but also affects individuals and 
21 Bennett (2005).
22 The latter is memorably depicted in Koskenniemi (2001).
23 It eventually joined in 1908.
24 Jessup (1956), p. 17.
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businesses as senders of letters and packages, and it seems fairly obvious that prices 
set by the sugar union affect the market price for sugar and therewith immediately 
affect consumers and producers.25 But while there was inevitably an indirect effect 
on individuals, it was always mediated by the state—and indeed, international law 
did not have any other mechanisms at its disposal. Edwin Borchard, writing in 1940, 
summarized the dualist position, noting that “dualists will admit that many of the 
rules of treaty and international law are devised for and accrue to the benefit of 
individuals, they nevertheless insist that only States may become spokesmen for 
these rules and advantages.”26
The thought that international law could have direct effect on individuals was, so 
to speak, not yet thought, and would only first be thought by the Permanent Court 
of International Justice (PCIJ) in the late 1920s.27 And even then, the PCIJ, when 
developing its position on direct effect, did so with considerable ambivalence: 
whether or not a provision of a treaty would be directly effective would depend on 
the intentions of the drafters of that provision, and those drafters were, invariably, 
states. This was, in other words, not quite the empirical position Triepel had in 
mind. Or rather, more accurately perhaps, the empirical evidence could be manipu-
lated by states: a provision where international and domestic law would be in con-
tact could still be said not to be directly effective if there would be an indication that 
parties wished to preclude direct effect.28
3  Establishing the ILO
But in 1919, when the ILO was created in Versailles, this was still something for 
the future.
Versailles saw the creation of the League of Nations, the clearly still highly state- 
centric creature to guarantee collective security.29 But Versailles also saw the cre-
ation of the ILO. But why the ILO, and why not an international organization for, 
say, global health? Or for maritime affairs or arms control? Why even create a sec-
ond organization, in addition to the League, and why not simply a convention to 
treat workers decently? In other words, what was the problem to which this interna-
tional organization, the ILO, was expected to be the solution?
The obvious answer—or the beginning of an answer—is that the ILO marks a 
response to the October revolution of 1917, and reading contemporary papers and 
25 See also the illuminating study by Fakhri (2014).
26 Borchard (1940), p. 139.
27 Permanent Court of International Justice, Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig, Advisory Opinion, 
3 March 1928. In Publications of the Permanent Court of International Justice, Series B, No. 15.
28 And this in turn has been put to effective use by some states in the form of so-called “non-self-
executing declarations”. See further Klabbers (2017c), pp. 325–326.
29 Note however that the League too could not avoid addressing the plight of individuals, in particu-
lar those living under the Mandate system. For a fine historical analysis, see Pedersen (2015).
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books, there is a clear sense of urgency on this point. Part of the idea behind the ILO 
was to set it up as an answer to the red threat, to communism. As David Morse, 
long-time Director-General of the ILO, much later put it in admirably bureaucratic 
and anodyne style, “there was general recognition that the ferment and instability 
which characterized the world of labor and industry in 1918 and 1919, particularly 
in Europe, called for immediate and constructive action.”30 The idea was to make the 
working man happy, or rather, to make sure he would not be so unhappy that he 
would turn to communism. In practice, this entailed decent working conditions: it is 
surely no coincidence that the first ILO conventions deal with working hours, unem-
ployment, maternity protection, and night work. The first recommendations 
addressed similar matters and tried to protect against dangerous materials, aiming to 
protect works working with anthrax, lead, white phosphorus.31
But still, a set of intellectual problems emerged. The drafters realized all too well 
that economic circumstances differ from country to country, from state to state. 
Thus, there is a quasi-natural competitive obstacle that needs to be overcome. What 
made things more difficult still was the realization that protecting labour comes at 
the expense of capital, and that the costs and benefits might not be evenly distrib-
uted. Some industries would be harder hit than others; for some industries, protect-
ing workers would come at bigger costs than for other industries, not because those 
others would have been doing so earlier, but because they would be less dependent 
on night work, or would be less involved with dangerous materials. A third problem 
that emerged revolved around colonialism: some of the bigger states benefitted from 
cheap labour being available in their colonies. In fact, as one of the founding fathers, 
Britain’s George Barnes, openly confessed in relation to the imperial issue: “To be 
quite candid, our motives were not altogether humanitarian.”32
Instead, while the communist threat was perceived as very real, it had to be met 
in such a way as not to distort global competition. The same George Barnes notes, 
in his work on the ILO written a few years after its creation, that the “need had 
arisen for levelling out industrial competition between the nations by raising the 
conditions of labour in the lower-paid countries”,33 and diagnosed the problem as 
being related to mass manufacturing by “cheap Eastern labour”.34
This proved quite a riddle. Capitalism requires competition, after all, and one of 
the more obvious arenas for industrial competition is in the sphere of labour, both 
by keeping wages low and not spending much on decent working conditions. Yet 
allowing for the race to the bottom to occur was thought to play in the hands of 
30 Morse (1969), p. 4. Contrast this with another view: “The spectre of Bolshevism was a powerful 
stimulus for being responsive to the requests of labor.” Jacobson (1984), p. 302.
31 Note that some of these (night work, phosphorus) had already been the subject of conventions 
concluded during the early 1900s under auspices of the International Association for Labour 
Legislation.
32 Barnes (1926), p. 45.
33 Ibid., p. 37.
34 Ibid., p. 45. By Eastern, he meant Asian.
J. Klabbers
131
communism, putting the capitalist world economy at risk. It seemed a veritable 
catch-22: either allow for unhampered competition and invite communism to take 
over, or limit competition as far as labour issues are concerned and in that way 
implicitly accommodate communism as well. Clearly, this left a delicate balancing 
act: infusing just enough worker protection into the system so as to save the system: 
too much would make the capitalist economy collapse, and too little would have 
pretty much the same result. The logic was well-put by a contemporary observer, 
Leonard Woolf: “If it is in the interest of every State to regulate the conditions of 
employment within its territory, but it is prevented from doing so unless all the other 
States do likewise”, so Woolf wrote, “then clearly the solution ought to be found in 
unification of the Labour laws of the different countries through international 
agreements.”35
One possible way—hypothetically at any rate—to solve the problem was to 
leave it entirely to the market, and open the borders for unmitigated migration. If the 
capitalist logic would work, after all, then people would move to the place where 
there would be work and a decent wage. This, however, was never realistic. As John 
Hobson observed at the time, Asia may be a “rich reservoir” of labour, but “the dif-
ficulty of procuring the general assent of civilized nations to “an open door” for 
Asiatic labour would, of course, be insuperable”36; Hobson’s casual use of the term 
“of course” spoke volumes.
One thing that became reasonably clear was that a single convention on worker’s 
rights was unlikely to do the trick. What was needed instead was a careful and con-
tinued balancing of the interests of workers, capital and states, and this, in turned, 
required permanent management, not a one-off arrangement in the form of a treaty; 
for a single treaty could never be comprehensive enough to cover all industries, 
cover all kinds of situations that might arise, and accommodate all conflicting inter-
ests.37 And the balancing act turned out to be quite successful. As historian Emily 
Rosenberg concludes, generally speaking “the organization supported a liberal cap-
italist system operating through cooperating national states […] and opposed an 
alternative transnational labor movement that was being promoted through the 
Soviet Union’s Third International.”38
The ILO’s success in performing the balancing act of navigating between unfet-
tered labour competition possibly leading to communism, and adopting commu-
nism tout court, it can be said with considerable hindsight, was due to the 
combination of organizational form and tripartite structure—even if the precise lim-
its of this organizational form remained subject to debate, and resulted in the 
35 Woolf (1916), p. 183.
36 Hobson (1915), p. 143.
37 Klabbers (2019a), pp. 629–646.
38 Rosenberg (2012), p. 35. Mazower agrees, noting that the ILO followed “a precarious corporatist 
course between hostile capitalists to its right and revolutionary socialists to its left”. Mazower 
(2012), p. 152.
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Permanent Court of International Justice being asked several questions.39 Paul 
Reinsch, arguably the most influential thinker about international organizations 
law,40 had already a decade earlier drawn attention to the difficulties involved in 
making labour legislation on an ad hoc basis, one treaty at the time.41 Hence, the 
organizational form was pivotal, for only a permanent organization facilitates per-
manent management. Only a permanent organization could manage and massage 
the constantly changing configurations of interests involving capital, labour and 
government.42
This dovetailed nicely with a second invention: tripartism. During World War I, 
the major industrialized states had all seen fit to mobilize labour and capital for the 
war effort, and in Britain in particular this was welcomed as an experiment well 
worth repeating. Britain made an effort to transplant the model to the nascent ILO, 
also because it realized that if it were alone among the major powers to continue to 
practice tripartism, it might suffer a competitive problem. Cox puts it well: “As the 
leading trading nation, Britain might have been disadvantaged in world markets if a 
peacetime prolongation of tripartism were to have the effect of raising labor costs. 
Hence the concern of British officials to internationalize the experiment.”43
One unexpected implication of the establishment of tripartism is that it cemented 
a place for non-state interests in the work of an international organization. It became 
clear that the interests of all stakeholders could not be reduced to those of the mem-
ber states. This had been the traditional idea: what is good for the state, is good for 
everyone within the state, and things can be kept on the inter-state level. But with 
the ILO now, it was clearly understood that whatever the ILO would decide, adopt 
and promulgate, would affect workers and capital—not just the state and its com-
petitive position. Thus, tripartism set in motion an accidental revolution, by incor-
porating other than direct state interests in the institutional structure of an 
39 Permanent Court of International Justice, Competence of the ILO in regard to International 
Regulation of the Conditions of Labour of Persons Employed in Agriculture, Advisory Opinion, 12 
August 1922. In Publications of the Permanent Court of International Justice, Series B, No. 2; 
Permanent Court of International Justice, Competence of the ILO to Examine Proposal for the 
Organization and Development of the Methods of Agricultural Development, Advisory Opinion, 
12 August 1922. In Publications of the Permanent Court of International Justice, Series B, No. 3. 
It also took a few years for the Court itself to come to terms with the institutional element: it only 
started to develop a theory of powers in Permanent Court of International Justice, Competence of 
the ILO to Regulate Incidentally the Personal Work of the Employer, Advisory Opinion, 23 July 
1926. In Publications of the Permanent Court of International Justice, Series B, No. 13.
40 On the relevance of Reinsch, see Klabbers (2014a).
41 Reinsch had noted that the International Association of Labor Legislation was “admirably fitted” 
for harmonizing and unifying labour legislation, probably precisely because of its permanence—
although he shied away from drawing the conclusion explicitly. Reinsch (1911), p. 47.
42 Maupain hints at much the same when discussing the difficulties inherent in making international 
labour legislation, resulting either in free riding (and thus disturbing competitive balances) or in 
the adoption of the lowest common denominator. As a result, what was needed was a constitutional 
structure that allowed for persuasion while leaving sovereign prerogatives intact. See Maupain 
(2013), p. 15.
43 Cox (1987), p. 75.
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international organization, and therewith acknowledging that the work of this orga-
nization did not just affect member states in their mutual relations, but could poten-
tially affect every worker in every member state, and every employer in every 
member state.
The revolution was accidental in that the inspiration behind tripartism had been 
to secure Britain’s competitive position, rather than any grand design about popular 
consultation or great philosophy of the quod omnes tangit variety.44 It owed little to 
good intentions or to visionary inspiration. And it was a revolution because it opened 
the door to changing conceptions of international law. The establishment of the ILO 
slowly created the possibility for thinking of international law as directly affecting 
the real lives, the real interests, the real blood and real guts, of real people. If until 
the creation of the ILO international law could still with some sense be said to apply 
to inter-state relations only (if only because everyone seemed to agree that this was 
the case), once the ILO was created this was no longer possible: the toothpaste had 
been squeezed out of the tube; and once the bell tolls, its sound can no longer be 
unheard.
4  The Changing Landscape
It is generally acknowledged that the ILO’s tripartite structure was, at the time, 
unique—and by and large it still is, at least in the sense in which the formal constitu-
tion of an international organization formally involves representatives of social 
actors other than government representatives, as the ILO does with insisting that 
states representations include representatives from government, labour and capital.45
But if the ILO’s structure is still unique, the past century has developed sev-
eral variations on the same theme. In some organizations, it is possible for states 
to be represented by specialists: meteorologists in the case of the World 
Meteorological Organization; police officers in the case of Interpol (which actu-
ally started as cooperation between police forces46), and in the WHO there is an 
understanding that states strive to be represented by people with a medical back-
ground. More generally, the Universal Postal Union was the brainchild of the 
US Postmaster General in the 1860s, Mr. Montgomery Blair,47 while most of the 
44 This is the sort of trope (quod omnes tangit ab omnibus approbatur; “what touches all should be 
approved by all”) that might come to play a role in different settings. One well-known manifestion 
is the slogan “no taxation without representation”.
45 This, in turn, may give rise to domestic struggles about who gets to represent labour and capital; 
those struggles sometimes reach international tribunals, and have done so right from the start: 
Permanent Court of International Justice, Designation of the Workers’ Delegate for the Netherlands 
at the Third Session of the International Labour Conference, Advisory Opinion, 23 July 1926. In 
Publications of the Permanent Court of International Justice, Series B, No. 1.
46 Martha (2010).
47 Sly (1927), pp. 395–436.
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directors-general of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) established 
in 1865, have been engineers or physicists.48 More generally, moreover, many orga-
nizations have specialized organs where the expectation is that members have a 
specialist background, as with the Radio Regulations Board in ITU or the various 
emergency committees advising the director-general of the WHO in accordance 
with the 2005 International Health Regulations.49
In other organizations, different mechanisms are opted for. Thus, the ITU allows 
for corporate membership of a kind, set up much like customer loyalty schemes 
with several tiers; an estimated 700 companies and academic institutions thus form 
part of the broader ITU circle; in addition to membership by states, in this way 
social interests (or, by and large more accurately, corporate interests) are directly 
represented. The European Forest Institute has two categories of membership: state 
membership, and membership of research institutions (it started out as an associa-
tion of research institutes), requiring an intricate institutional balance when it comes 
to decision-making. Some organizations participate in joint ventures with private 
sector actors: these are particularly prevalent in the global health domain, where an 
important role is played by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.50 More gener-
ally, organizations often participate in particular projects with a range of partners 
from both the public and the private sectors. One prominent example is that of the 
Contact Group on Piracy off the Somali Coast, a somewhat loose network compris-
ing a number of intergovernmental organizations but also comprising seafarers’ 
unions and, naturally perhaps, Lloyd’s of London, the leading maritime insurance 
company. Some organizations, moreoever, are quite dependent on financial contribu-
tions from agents other than their member states: UNHCR’s annual budget derives for 
some 10% from private donations, while an organization such as the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM) has to be largely self-sufficient, and can only do so 
by positioning itself as a private actor and collaborating with private actors.51
And then there are organizations where societal interests are represented in all 
sorts of advisory organs or through consultative status: think of the EU’s 
Committee of the Regions, or the hundreds of actors having consultative status 
with the UN General Assembly or the UN Economic and Social Council. Member 
states might be happy to include domestic actors in their national missions, 
whether senators or parliamentarians from the opposition or more straightfor-
ward interest representatives. And where consequential decisions are taken, lob-
bying is never far away. This applies not only to private interests, but also to civil 
society actors: it is a public secret that the Assembly of States Parties to the 
International Criminal Court52 is in thrall to the many NGOs dedicated to bringing 
48 Klabbers (unpublished paper, 2019, on file with the author).
49 On the latter, see Klabbers (2019b).
50 Andonova (2017).
51 Klabbers (2019c).
52 Note that for these purposes there is no problem in treating the ICC and its ASP as an interna-
tional organization. For other purposes doing so might be less easily justifiable: to the extent that 
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an end to impunity, and getting various crimes and classes of victims to be recog-
nized as relevant.
The ILO was pioneering in its tripartite structure, ensuring the representation of 
social interests in its standard-setting work. But it was also pioneering in a different 
sense: it was the first organization explicitly devoted to improving the plight of 
individuals, regardless of the then prevailing template according to which interna-
tional organizations would only affect member state interests. At any rate, that was 
always an impossible conceit: it may be the case that the telegraphic pipelines regu-
lated by the ITU were mostly publicly owned, but the senders and recipients of 
telegraph messages were, most often, private individuals and private companies.53 
At the end of the day, the impact of the ITU was not just on its member states 
(although it was that too), but also on the citizen, the industrialist, the reporter.54 
Likewise, the work of the UPU could not but affect those who send and receive 
postcards, letters and parcels from abroad—the state plays an intermediary role as a 
conduit for all those private interests, but it would be difficult to maintain the fiction 
that a missing postcard or a lost parcel would come to hurt the national interest. This 
was, admittedly, the prevailing mindset, but was always more ideological than real. 
Indeed, even the navigation rules of the early river commissions affected shipping 
far more than national states, and more often than not, that was the very motive 
behind their creation. Sayre unapologetically wrote, a century ago and at the eve of 
the creation of both the League of Nations and the ILO, that the various interna-
tional river commissions operating in China were set up to protect western com-
mercial interests—and these did not even bother to include China among their 
member states.55
In a sense then, by focusing on protection of workers, the ILO made explicit 
what was already implicit with other organizations: that the ultimate addressee and 
stakeholder would be the individual, whether as worker or as industrialist, with 
member states mostly involved as conduit. The member states make the rules 
together and have to implement them in one way or another, but it would be insuf-
ficient to say that the regime only affected those member states, and not any one 
residing within them. With the ILO this was, no doubt, the result of turning vice into 
virtue: the focus on the individual was occasioned by the distrust of other states. The 
risk of facilitating “free riding” was simply too big to organize worker protection in 
any other way than through the combination of continuous law-making while 
organizations exercised delegated powers and act under instructions from their member states, one 
might be reluctant to include judicial institutions.
53 In his pathbreaking study, Murphy demonstrates just how strongly the ITU has been the pivot 
around which the first global telecommunications revolution revolved in the late nineteenth cen-
tury, effectively establishing the global legal infrastructure for the entire business. See 
Murphy (1994).
54 It is hardly a coincidence that around the same time, international journalism came off the 
ground, and Reuter’s started to become a household name. See, e.g., Wilson (2016).
55 Sayre (1919).
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respecting sovereignty, and to do so through a permanent entity rather through a 
single convention or small group of related conventions.
It was only once the ILO had sensitized international law to the possibility of 
piercing through the mystifying veil of the state, that the international community 
could come to think of protecting human rights. And even then it took a while still, 
with direct protection of individual human rights hesitantly56 emerging in the late 
1940s and early 1950s and, importantly, after another World War had underlined 
that perhaps concerted action would be required to prevent further atrocities, and 
states could not be relied on to do so themselves.57 The Universal Declaration, the 
European Convention on Human Rights, the Genocide Convention and the Refugee 
Convention, they were all concluded within a period of 3 years or so (1948–1951), 
and all have protection of the individual as their common topic. Importantly though, 
they all envisage a conduit role for the state, and to the extent that international 
monitoring was put in place, it would be considerably later, and typically on a vol-
untary basis, through additional optional protocols. The point for present purposes 
though is that these instruments were only possible once the ILO had opened the 
windows and let in a fresh breeze, diluting the stale air of a strong inter-state con-
ception of international law.
This would be further developed by the EU, that wonderful and occasionally 
somewhat tragic experiment in governance and authority beyond the state.58 The 
original treaties, concluded in the 1950s, already manifested that public and private 
participation were envisaged, for instance in the form of the revolutionary creation 
of the European Parliament. But the EU went considerably further, as its Court of 
Justice (itself open to other than inter-state complaints) acknowledged in a string 
of classic cases, including Van Gend & Loos and Costa v ENEL, both decided early 
in the EU’s existence.59 The existence of a preliminary reference procedure, allow-
ing domestic courts to consult the CJEU, was pivotal, as was the positing of the 
direct effect of EU law in the domestic legal orders of the member states. The legal 
instruments envisaged would create Union-wide legislation (or at least harmonize 
the domestic laws of the member states), and the Commission would have enforce-
ment powers across national boundaries. The EU truly marked an astonishing 
experiment, but it is important to note that, as with most other experiments, it 
stands on the shoulders of predecessors: the EU would have looked different, and 
possibly less adventurous, without the earlier pioneering work that went into creat-
ing the ILO.
56 Some suggest it was not until the 1970s that human rights seriously became successful. See 
Moyn (2010).
57 The interbellum minorities treaties were always exceptional: the ambition was not so to protect 
individuals, but to counterbalance the viccisitudes of great power politics at Versailles.
58 Klabbers (2019d), pp. 25–41.
59 European Court of Justice, NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & 
Loos v. Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration (Case 26/62), Judgment, 5 February 1963; 
European Court of Justice, Flaminio Costa v E.N.E.L (Case 6-64), Judgment, 15 July 1964.
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This is so not only because its main auctor intellectualis, Jean Monnet, worked 
for a while close by the ILO as the Deputy Decretary-General of the League of 
Nations, and may have had a look at how the ILO was set up and how it worked in 
practice.60 It is also not only because the EU was created with considerable Christian- 
democrat input, and had an ideological affinity for social cooperation between 
stakeholders in accordance with Christian doctrine.61 This may have been given an 
extreme form earlier by Mussolini, turning corporatism into fascism, but the basic 
corporatist idea so central to Christian political philosophy characterizes both the 
ILO and the EU—albeit probably for different reasons.62
But the main reason why the EU would have looked differently without the ILO 
experience is the circumstance highlighted above: the ILO was the first to clear the 
state-centric cobwebs from international organization, and the first to open up inter-
national law to recognition and embrace of interests other than those presumed to be 
of states. One might argue, of course, that states have few interests of their own, 
other than the circular concept of the raison d’état. That is an insight that is slowly 
gaining acceptance, but credit where credit is due: possibly the first venue where 
this was made visible was the ILO, partly because it incorporated social interests 
through its tripartite structure, and partly because it may well have been the first 
venue (forced by circumstances, but nonetheless…) which recognized that individ-
uals could be addressed under international law. While there is some ground to sug-
gest that the bilateral treaties of the nineteenth century aided in bringing slavery to 
an end, these treaties were still the result of paternalist impulses. What made the 
ILO different was that to the extent that paternalist thought was involved, it was 
counterbalanced by the self-interests of employers. The ILO took the form, eventu-
ally, of states making law to protect individuals, but beneath this surface layer, the 
ILO’s output is the outcome of serious social struggle between labour and capital—
governance beyond the state, rather than governance between states.
5  To Conclude
It may well be the case that, as far as the concrete standard-setting and effectiveness 
thereof is concerned, the ILO may have become somewhat marginalized over the 
course of its first century.63 There are some topics related to labour where one wishes 
60 Monnet’s biographer does not discuss the ILO, but does cite Monnet’s confession that while at 
the League, he “did not understand the politics of Versailles, only the economics”. Duchêne 
(1994), p. 364.
61 While not stressing the Christian-democrat element, an excellent discussion of the ordo-liberal-
ism that went into the EU and later the WTO is Slobodian (2018).
62 See Cox (1987), p. 101. Above I explain that tripartism (the ILO’s version) owes much to British 
interests; that logic cannot apply to the EU, which saw the light without much British 
participation.
63 Klabbers (2014b), pp. 181–196.
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it would have been a little more active, a little more vocal—the link between labor 
and migration comes to mind, which can scarcely be left to individual governments 
alone or to the International Organization for Migration, with its mandate to ensure 
orderly migration but with less of a humanitarian impulse governing its activities. 
Likewise, the ILO may still be adapting to transformations of the global political 
economy, with global supply chains and the emergence of the platform economy 
changing the scene.64
But even so, the world would look differently, and most likely considerably 
worse, without the ILO. Its main contribution has not just been in concrete standard- 
setting, but perhaps even more so, as this paper has argued, in opening up the closed 
universe of inter-state international law, therewith paving the way for later 
developments,65 including refugee protection, human rights protection, and the 
emergence of the EU. And that is, by any standard, quite an achievement.
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The Covid-19 epidemic has exposed many of the deficiencies in national and global 
economic and social systems. For all its wealth, the seemingly richest and most 
powerful country, the United States, became the global leader in infection rates, 
deaths, and an increased unemployment rate. The riots that broke out across the 
country in May, 2020, signified a country greatly divided. Money can buy a lot of 
things, but evidently it alone can’t buy health or social harmony.
The reasons for the dismal failure of the US are manifold: Unfettered capitalism 
led to unbridled inequalities and unmatched instabilities, exemplified by the 2008 
financial crisis in which ordinary citizens who lost their homes and jobs bore the 
brunt of the costs; corporations and banks have been allowed to exploit their cus-
tomers, their workers, and the planet that we share;1 but among the most important 
reasons for the US failures is the inadequacy of its systems of social protection and 
the denigration of the rights of workers.
The connections are, unfortunately, all too clear.2 The US is the only advanced 
country that doesn’t recognize the right to health care as a basic human right. And 
while President Obama tried to extend access to health care for all, President Trump 
and his party have worked hard to reduce it, so that 3 years after taking office, some 
1 I expand on many of the themes raised in this post script in my recent book, Stiglitz (paperback 
edition, with new introduction, 2020).
2 For a further discussion of these issues, see Stiglitz (2020).
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two million more Americans are without health insurance. The minimum wage in 
the United States is lower than it was 60 years ago, adjusted for inflation, and that 
means working fulltime doesn’t generate a livable income. Large fractions of 
Americans live paycheck to paycheck. On top of that, America is one of the few 
advanced countries not to mandate paid sick leave. The combination—living pay-
check to paycheck and no paid sick leave—is lethal, because it means that employ-
ees infected with Covid-19 go to work when they possibly can. They have to, if they 
are going to feed their families and pay their bills.
Congress recognized the problem, and passed a law requiring paid sick leave, but 
just for workers sick with Covid-19. Then, under pressure from America’s biggest 
and richest companies, they exempted employers with more than 500 employees—
precisely the employers who could most easily pay for it. Thus, almost half of all 
workers were exempted. This story tells a lot about the short-sightedness and the 
selfishness of capitalism American-style—even the corporations lost. For instance, 
when meat packing companies, which failed to provide masks and protective gear 
for their workers, became hot spots of the disease, the plants had to shut down. This 
cost the companies far more than they would have saved by not providing paid sick 
leave. With such pervasive myopia, it explains why government must play a role.
The corporate decisions might have been different if workers had had a say on 
company boards. The workers might have been able to explain that not providing 
health insurance or paid sick leave was penny wise but pound foolish, because a 
healthy labor force is a more productive labor force. Governance matters. Who 
makes the decisions affects what decisions are made. And good economic gover-
nance has to pay attention to social consequences.
Indeed, the objective of our economic system should not be to just increase 
GDP—or corporate profits. A well-functioning economic engine should be designed 
to raise the living standards—broadly understood—of all citizens. GDP, it is now 
recognized, is a poor measure of societal well-being, or even economic performance 
more narrowly defined.3
It used to be that workers’ perspectives could be presented strongly by unions. 
Here in New York City, the butchers’ union made it clear during the pandemic that 
their workers weren’t going to work unless employers provided masks. But in the 
US and many other countries, unions have been weakened to the point where they 
are unable to adequately advocate on behalf of workers.
1  Globalization
Underlying the problems that Covid-19 has exposed so dramatically is the weaken-
ing of the power of workers—their bargaining power vis-a-vis corporations in the 
marketplace, and their political power, as corporate money has held increasing sway 
in America’s money-driven politics. (I should emphasize: I write about America 
3 See Stiglitz et al. (2010, 2018).
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both because it is the country I know best, but also because it has become the para-
digm for what happens with unbridled capitalism. Too many countries, especially 
before the 2008 crisis, looked to the US as a model, to their detriment. Those coun-
tries that have most closely emulated the American model have the highest levels of 
inequality and the worst performance across a wide range of social dimensions.4)
There are, in turn, multiple intertwined reasons for this weakening of workers’ 
political and economic power. The weakening of unions has had political conse-
quences; imbalances in wealth and economic power inevitably translate into imbal-
ances of political power, and the consequence is legislation that makes workers’ 
collective action more difficult—more difficult to unionize and to achieve gains at 
the bargaining table.
Poorly managed globalization is one of the important reasons for the change in 
the power of workers. As emerging markets and less developed countries became 
more integrated into the global economy, workers in advanced countries were pitted 
against workers from the developing world. Standard theory predicted that this 
would lower wages of workers in the advanced countries, especially if they were 
unskilled. Indeed, this process would continue until wages (adjusted for skills) were 
the same everywhere—that’s the ideal of a well-functioning market. Of course, the 
advocates of unfettered globalization never “advertised” that this would be the out-
come. Rather, they told another story, of globalization making countries richer, of 
benefits trickling down to everyone in society. There was never any theory or evi-
dence behind these arguments, they were just shiny lures—and now four decades 
have shown to be true what serious economists had predicted all along: stagnant 
incomes for large fractions of workers and a hollowing out of the middle class.5
Of course, globalization could have been managed in other ways, but it was man-
aged by and for corporate interests. These interests, for instance, succeeded in get-
ting stronger property rights protections outside the United States than corporations 
had within the US. The companies could then threaten to move abroad unless their 
workers gave concessions on wages and working conditions.
Again, the pandemic has illustrated the short-sightedness of this unbalanced glo-
balization, where the United States was incapable of quickly producing the masks, the 
protective gear, the ventilators, and the tests that the country required. A focus on 
short-term profits had made the economy far less resilient, far less able to respond.
2  Global Cooperation
Meanwhile, the pandemic has illustrated both the negative and positive sides of 
global cooperation. The pandemic and its economic consequences will not be con-
tained until it is contained everywhere, and unless there is a global economic 
4 Overall, countries with greater inequality also have poorer economic performance, more narrowly 
defined. See, e.g., Stiglitz (2012).
5 For a more extensive discussion of the points raised in this paragraph, see Stiglitz (2017).
Postscript
144
recovery. Pandemics and global environmental issues, like climate change, are are-
nas where global cooperation is absolutely essential. Fortunately, the world has, 
over the past hundred years, created international organizations to manage global 
cooperation. In this arena the lead organization is the World Health Organization, 
but the multilateral financial institutions have played an important role in providing 
finance for poor countries to strengthen their health care systems.
At the same time, scientists around the world are cooperating in the attempt to 
quickly discover a vaccine, develop better tests, and find therapies that are effective 
against the disease.
That’s the positive side. On the negative side, the American president pulled out 
of WHO, and has undertaken policies to ensure that the US has first access to any 
vaccine—rather than that the vaccine goes to where it is most critical, e.g. to health 
care workers. While other countries have committed themselves to a Covid-19 pat-
ent pool—to ensure that the knowledge will be available to all, with appropriate 
licensing fees—so that the scourge will be eliminated as quickly as possible, the US 
has focused on strengthening intellectual property claims.
Almost 20 years ago, I served on the World Commission on the Social Dimensions 
of Globalization established by the ILO. This 101-year-old organization is distinc-
tive in bringing together governments, workers, and businesses to address the com-
mon problems we face, and working to achieve solutions that are in the common 
interest. Earlier discussions of globalization had largely forgotten its social dimen-
sions. As I pointed out earlier, unfettered globalization—or more accurately, global-
ization managed for the benefits of large corporations—can result in a race to the 
bottom, with wages and working condition deteriorating for many in the advanced 
countries. The environment, too, will be a victim of this kind of globalization. We 
didn’t fully see that even the economy can be a victim, as became apparent during 
the global financial crisis a short five years after the issuance of our report.
One area in which we had a healthy discussion was intellectual property, where 
the particular concern was access to medicines, precisely the issue raised by the pat-
ent pool. It should be clear that most of the key advances in this area rest on founda-
tions of publicly funded research. Moreover, there are better ways to conduct testing, 
at lower costs, and with fewer conflicts of interest, than by allowing the very com-
panies that stand to profit from a drug to be responsible for its testing. The drug 
companies do perform a role in bringing the drugs to market, though the way they 
do this often results in exorbitant prices and actually impedes innovation.
Our Commission concluded that the intellectual property regime established as 
part of the Uruguay Round that had created the WTO, the so-called Trade Related 
Intellectual Property system (TRIPS), was badly flawed. We needed “TRIPS- 
minus,” that is, a system of intellectual property rights that also guaranteed the 
rights of access, especially for life-saving drugs. The drug companies, not surpris-
ingly, supported by the US and some other governments, have, to the contrary, suc-
ceeded in creating in the subsequent years a “TRIPS-plus” regime, one that further 




3  Concluding Comments
Crises provide moments for reflection. The 2020 pandemic is a major crisis—a 
health crisis precipitating a major economic and social crisis. It is a global phenom-
enon, requiring a global response. It is a crisis that highlights the inequalities in our 
society. The virus is not an equal opportunity infector—it goes after people in poor 
health; and in societies like the US, marked by high levels of health and income 
inequalities, there are many in poor health.
Had there been more global cooperation before the pandemic—cooperation in 
which all voices were heard, not just the corporations’—we might have built a 
world marked by less inequality. We might have constructed more resilient econo-
mies that were better able to cope with the pandemic and with its economic 
consequences.
Now, the imperative is to construct a post-pandemic world marked by more 
global cooperation, with better social governance, with the voices of all stakehold-
ers being heard. The ILO provides a model of what can be done.
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